FireMedic049

My impression in answering G was that we were talking about a St. Louis type system where basically every (or most actually) rig in town is multi-use thereby "doubling" their efficiency while reducing the overall operating, maintainance and personnel costs. This is why the concept was developed and how the St. Louis or the TQ concept is meant to work (and part of the reason I despise the concept).

I can understand not liking the TQC based on the perception that using it reduces overall manpower and in-service companies. I can also understand not liking it because of the compromise that can occur with the apparatus vs regular engine/truck deployment.

However, there's some things to think about when looking at the use or suggested use of TQC. What's the alternative option? I'm not sure what happened in St. Louis, but I know when Richmond went TQC there was a reduction of companies and overall size of the department. There was a lot of grumbling over the change and all, particularly the view that using quints made what was lost "expendable". This could certainly be true, but what would've happened if they didn't make the change? If the goal was to reduce costs, then it's likely that a force reduction could have happened anyway. So, if you eliminate some personnel, then you either reduce company size or eliminate companies.

Let's say you have 20 engines and 5 trucks operating from 20 stations and have to eliminate 5 companies. Do you close a truck or two? Do you eliminate 5 engines and close 3 stations while also reducing 2 of the engine/truck houses to just the truck and leave the those 2 districts without a suppression capable apparatus? Do you close 5 companies, convert the rest to quints and keep all the stations open while retaining suppression capabilities in all stations and adding 15 aerial devices to your arsenal?

What's the best option if you are losing the positions anyway?

It seems to me that what you're suggesting is not really much different than what I'm suggesting by cross staffing. Putting Quints in every VFD house and then dispatching them based on the type of call is the same as cross staffing the existing rigs based on the type of call, except we have to buy a few more quints. The crews will still be gone with their rig as either an Engine or Truck thus leaving that area devoid of that piece in the matrix and the volunteers would still have to respond with what's left to the scene or staff the remaining rigs to answer addtional calls.

Cross staffing isn't quite the same as using a Quint. It is in the sense you refer to, but one of the main areas in which it can certainly cause a problem is when that manpower will not be responding from the station. If the crew on-duty is returning from a call, out doing an inspection, training or whatever, the quint allows them to immediately respond and act in either role. However, if they took the engine and the next call is for the truck what do you do? It's generally not very practical to return to the station to switch apparatus.

Your idea is certainly valid, but has some distinct drawbacks compared to the duty crews using quints.

In order for the QUINT system to work, they must be properly staffed with 5-6 FF per rig, so that multiple tasks can be completed by a crew. I don't see that happening in Stamford.

Not really. You seem to be making the common mistake when discussing the "QUINT system" (AKA "Total Quint Concept", TQC).

In a TQC type of deployment, the Quint is typically deployed as either an "engine" or as a "truck", not both. When doing such, manpower wise, a 4 FF quint is no different than a 4 FF engine or 4 FF truck. Obviously, additional staffing would increase a single unit's ability to do multiple tasks regardless of what type of unit it is.

The bigger issue for the system to work well is having firefighters who are trained in both disciplines, good SOPs and operations that clearly define what each unit's role will be on a call and good officers who will ensure that their unit will perform whatever role assigned.

That could work in some situations, but a lot of what the VFD's need are drivers. If there is a VFD crew with driver, they could take the truck. If just a crew, they could staff the engine with 5-6, or split the career staff and run 2 rigs with 3 each. If there isn't enough to supplemental volunteer manpower, then only the engine rolls from TOR and use Belltown's truck. Flexibility IS useful.

When TOR has their daytime driver, there is the manpower there to properly staff the apparatus and they get out the door. Daytime divers are hard to get, and when one goes on vacation, that's a problem. For instance, there are FFs at TOR now, with no driver, same with yesterday. Text gages go out for "full crew need driver" all the time. When they had a regular overnight driver and day driver, they made 85% of calls. Again, the volunteers firefighters ARE THERE. They just need drivers and additional firefighters for a truly strong response.

So, you state the problem is you have a crew, but no driver among the volunteers, correct?

Uhhhhm, maybe you should train some of those crew members to be drivers?

Here is what it is 4 man engine is 4ff and 1 officer, 5 man engine is 5ff and 1 officer.

Thanks.

5th man=5th FF

Thanks, but that didn't quite clear things up.

Were you trying to say that an Engine Company with a "5th FF" is a 5-person company?

You are correct. If one of the 60 Eng. Co's designated to have a 5th Fr. is short they will take any extra guy from any company that is over for the tour. That includes taking the 5th guy from a 4 man company.

Just for clarification because I've read conflicting and sometimes confusing things regarding this, is the "5th FF" actually the 5th person in a 5-person company or are they the 5th firefighter in a 6-person company (5 FFs & 1 Officer)?

Sorry, but this argument is flawed.

Going to college doesnt equate to being better.

A tart is a tart, know matter how many years they went to a place of higher learning.

Sorry, but your counter argument is flawed too.

A college education in many occupations does equate to being "better". Doctor, Lawyer, Accountant & Engineer are a few that come to mind right away.

You are right that a college education may not make someone a "better" firefighter or company officer no matter how long they spend in school. However, the converse can also be true. Some people, no matter how great a firefighter/company officer or how long as one will automatically make them a "better" Fire Chief. They may be prepared to lead a scene or be able to make other operational type decisions, but 20+ years on the front lines may not prepare them for the rest of the job, like preparing budgets, directly dealing with city officials, writing grant proposals, preparing and delivering presentations to acquire additional or protect current department resources,etc.

I think there's a legitimate argument for a Fire Chief to have some degree of college level education.

The "inside joke" is one city fire chief.

It's more than just "one".

There are many graduates of that course out there.

The Long Ridge Paid Drivers Association is currently seeking money for past wages in excess of over a million dollars. The Paid Driver's Association is suing the Volunteer Fire Company for the money owed.

The interesting part is that several of the 9 members of the Paid Driver's Association all serve and run the same volunteer Department in volunteer capacities, including positions such as Chief, Assistant Chief, and Treasurer...

This should be great testimony for the Chief, Assistant Chief and Treasurer who are all suing themselves.

How would that work under cross examination? Would the Chief have to quickly change costumes and jump back and forth between roles?

Sound ridiculous? You bet it is....what is even more ridiculous is the concept of using this same highly dysfunctional system as the platform to build a new Fire Department on.

What could go wrong?

Who exactly is the "employer" for the "Long Ridge Paid Drivers Association"? It would seem that it would be the fire company itself since they are being sued for the wages. So how are they getting around federal labor laws prohibiting volunteering for your employer if they are serving as volunteer officers in that same department?

Dont fall for the Morning Pride BS.

Out of curiosity, what would that BS be?

When it comes to buying new turnout gear for a small rural dept in the Hudson Valley, what do you suggest?

Call volume is 200- 250 calls per year. The usual occasional structure fire, car fires, brush fires, MVA's and the like are the norm. (Yes, I know you shouldnt wear bunker pants to a brush fire, but most small departments dont have enough brush fires to justify the big expense of wildland gear for a small handful of calls.)

Any particular features that work great as advertised or dont work at all, or "it sounded like a good idea, but no one ever uses that XYZ for it's intended purpose"?

I have already seen how sewing names either directly on to a coat or a panel on the coat doesnt work great when the member leaves the service and the coat gets passed on to a new guy, or more frequently, outgrows their gear.. A snapped on name panel is the way to go for that.

Any suggestions?

Considering that you likely have very few structural fires each year, you likely don't have a true need for the "high end" fabrics which tend to be a little pricey, but certainly worth the money for departments with high fire duty. I would suggest using the outer shell fabric known as "Advance". It's a blend of Nomex and Kevlar. Overall, it performs better than the regular Nomex III fabric, but isn't significantly more expensive like PBI or Millenia.

If you are looking at Globe/Cairns gear, I'd suggest their new Silicone based padded knee option.

You can also get the name panels attached with velcro.

But how many more resources could get to that fire at night within the NFPA 8 minutes for full assignment with nighttime traffic as opposed to daytime traffic.

Have you ever been to NYC? There's a reason it's been referred to as "The City that never sleeps".

I haven't once said that there need to be cuts but it amazes me how quickly people shoot down the idea of trying to do things better versus doing things traditionally when it comes to the fire department. All I know is that every time cuts are suggested, the Union says lives are at risk and the City says the cuts are necessary and won't impact operations. Neither, however, gives out facts to support their claims.

The Union typically says that "lives are at risk" because they are. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that if you remove resources from the system, then you will always get a reduced response in some fashion whether that be less units, personnel, increased response time or a combination of these. If you shut down one of the companies at night, then the people in that company's 1st due area clearly have a higher "risk" level since the closest engine company WILL NOT be responding and they will be waiting for one from further away to arrive. When they arrive the fire WILL be bigger than it would have been for the closed company. Bigger fire = more danger to civilians (and FFs for that matter).

The City says that the cuts "won't impact operations" because that's what their "handbook" says they are supposed to say to "calm" the masses in these situations.

I wasn't equating "like a business" to "profitable". What I meant by more like a business is that they need to constantly analyze needs and to correlate expenditures to those needs. It makes no sense to keep a firehouse open at night because its needed during the day. It does make sense to keep that firehouse open at night if there is a proven need for it. I find it extremely hard to believe that FDNY needs the same amount of resources at 0300 than it does at 1500.

In the abstract, it's probably true that overall the FDNY uses less resources at 0300 than it does at 1500. However, the fire that occurs at 0300 will likely require the same amount of resources as the one that occurs at 1500. There may be a population shift between night and day, but the number of buildings remains static.

As I said earlier, we never know where or when that next fire will break out. That's why the firehouse would still be needed at night even if it's "needed" more during the daytime because of higher call volume during those hours.

While this may be true, how many fatal fires could the FD have saved the deceased with a minute or 2 quicker response? I think the City needs to look at an "acceptable" response time for an FD engine, for a second alarm, for an all-hands fire, etc. If this can be accomplished with less companies at night, then so be it. They may actually realize they need even more staffing during the daytime to accomplish their goals. The FD needs to be run more like a business. Just because they've always done it this way doesn't mean it's the right way. Conversely, a good analysis might show that the way they are doing it IS the right way. The one thing that I'm sure of is that looking at call volumes and reports that tell only half the story isn't the right way to make a decision.

And what "business model" do you suggest?

I certainly don't disagree that analyzing your operation to see if changes are warranted is appropriate. However, an inherent problem with the "run it like a business" line of thinking is that FD deployment and working conditions are not like most business operations.

Probably one of the closest comparables is the food service industry. Typically, a restaurant will have a dynamic plan regarding their operation. Their staffing will typically peak around the "normal" meal times and then shrink back between meal times. This makes sense since you know when your highest demand periods will be each day and you can adjust for it. Now, there will be times when you get an off-peak rush, but you can generally handle it and the main consequence is generally a dining experience that isn't as efficient with the smaller staff. Additionally, if a meal period isn't as busy as predicted, some staff may be sent home early.

This type of planning doesn't lend itself well to the fire service. The main problem is the inherent unpredictability of the work and the varying levels of personnel needed to perform that work. You can look at call volume and see that "more" calls occur during the daytime than at night, but you'd be foolish to base staffing on just that. Most calls aren't going to be very labor intensive and require large sums of personnel, however some will and you will need those people in order to effectively and efficiently mitigate that problem. Another problem is that we also don't know where to problem will occur. The restaurant will always know that they will be feeding people in that one location. The fire service doesn't. Like call volume, we can identify areas that have historically had higher requests for service than others, but that doesn't provide enough information for deployment.

A large factor in FD deployment is response time. NFPA 1710's standard for the response of the first company is 4 minutes travel time and the full alarm in 8 minutes. If we knew where/when our calls were going to occur and what they would be in advance, then the fire service could reasonably tailor a dynamic deployment plan to match. Unfortunately, that's not possible, so the goal is to be able to provide a somewhat uniform response.

So, the inherent problem with closing fire companies at night, rolling brownouts, etc. is not so much with handling call volumes or handling "minor" calls, but rather for "serious" calls like building fires where the "extra" delay because those companies are closed becomes a big factor in terms of fire spread, civilian safety, etc.

I cannot nor will I even attempt to explain the rationale of another person and it is also not within my authority to question the decisions of the Chief of another department.

You aren't being asked to either of these things. You were asked if the decision was consistent with "normal" practices locally and if the same decision would have been made if it were a volunteer chief.

SFRD may well be obligated to follow their own SOGs ect but they must do so under the direction of the designated IC of the scene when out of district.

That's not being debated here. The issue I'm discussing is the cancellation of the SFRD supervisor while his units were operating at a scene, NOT any sort of undermining of the IC by SFRD units operating outside of the ICS.

Negative. It is SFRD that is obligated to adhere to those of the "host" department.

I think you missed my point.

Conjecture, and even if this presumption were to be true the legal authority still lies squarely with the VFDs. Rule are rules are they not? I will ask again what is the legal justification to suborn the authority of a volunteer Chief in their own recognized and specified district? Or are you advocating that there should be more than one command on a scene?

I think you are confusing the issues. IMO, there's three separate "issues" with the incident in question. 1) A department supervisor's response was cancelled while his units operated at a scene. 2) The Safety Officer "battle". 3) The alleged assault.

I'm not advocating that there be more than one "command" on a scene. From the information I've seen so far, none of the three "issues" actually created a situation of "more than one command" at this incident. I see the first as a "safety" issue and therefore not exactly a "legal" order. I see the second as more of a subversion of the ICS than a situation of having two "commands". The third has nothing to do with the ICS.

Again the willingness to work together cannot be dependent upon everyone agreeing with that objective because not everyone does or will. The process is undermined when there is no freedom to explore alternatives for those that seek to find them. And let's be honest here, it is not only the volunteer side that has an anti cooperation faction, and it seems by your statement above that even you agree with that assessment.

To achieve a mutually beneficial outcome we must work to achieve that goal because of those factions not in spite of them.

This is true, but there's a difference between not being in agreement with an objective and taking action to disrupt the process. In order to achieve that mutually beneficial outcome, the actions of those whose goal is to undermine have to be acknowledged as inappropriate on that "same side" otherwise it will negatively affect the trust between both sides in the process.

Be serious, you're asking me to explain the rationale of a Chief officer from another department. I can no more do that than I could explain yours in any given situation. As I said before I have answered this in terms of my opinions as to what happened. You will get nothing more or less

I am being serious. I'm asking you to explain his rationale for doing what he did. I'm asking you to acknowledge that what he did was not common practice and wouldn't have been done if it was a volunteer chief responding.

I can't always explain the rationale for the decisions my Deputy Chief (shift boss) makes, but I can tell you that he wouldn't cancel the chief of a mutual aid department while accepting help from their apparatus at a scene.

It's not a question of whether or not I believe he has the authority..he does. The 5 voluneer FDs in Stamford are under absolutely no obligation whatsoever to adhere to any standards, SOGs, rules, regulations (other than CT OSHA), certifications (other than FF I ), policies, procedures or anything else from SFRD and it is the State of CT that says so, along with our City Charter.

I would venture to say that you are partially correct in that the volunteer FDs have no obligation to adhere to SFRD rules & regs themselves. However, SFRD personnel ARE obligated to follow their own rules & regs. So the SFRD chief officer WOULD be obligated to adhere to HIS department's rules if the expectation is for there to be a SFRD chief officer on the scene of an out of district response.

If you accept the suppression units, then you accept the supervisor that goes with it. It's kind of a package deal. In this respect, the volunteer FDs would be obligated to indirectly adhere to SFRD's rules & regs.

This is what baffles me above all else. How is it that SFRD members think they can dictate anything to an independent VFD? By what means are they so entitled? By virtue of what statute are they entitled to disregard duly authorized ordinances of the City and State at a whim?

I don't know, but I'd suppose a lot of it probably has to do with what sounds like an often underperforming volunteer system.

You are not really implying that it is the volunteers alone that are against the goal of "working together" are you? I can say with all confidence that the utter silence and complete lack of interest from all the SFRD members here that have refused to accept the offer to sit down and try to work on a solution together speaks volumes more than my defending the system that, right or wrong, is legally in place and has been since before most of us were born.

No, I'm not implying that the volunteers are the only ones against "working together". I'm saying that you kind of need to get your own house in order if you want to work on "unity" with another. It's disingenuous to "call out" the other side on not stepping up to the plate to "work together" when you have a "loose cannon" on your side and can't even acknowledge that his actions are contrary to what the objectives are. It only serves to undermine the process.

Back to moving forward. While this has been a nice diversion it really isn't helping. What happened happened. It's done, so now what? Shall we wallow in it or is anyone ready to move forward together?

You're right, this isn't really helping that you appear to be refusing to answer some pretty simple, but possibly uncomfortable questions.

I think it's pretty obvious that the instigation of this particular incident was the result of prejudicial action that you believe the person had the authority to make. Others certainly disagree with that position. Now this doesn't excuse "the incident" that reportedly took place, but how can you guys "move forward together" if you can't even acknowledge that you have a Chief working against that goal?

To the best of my knowledge there hasn't been a situation where a Chief officer had to be cancelled directly.

But this time they had to be cancelled?

Once recall has been sounded they return to service. That isn't what happened here and in regards to that see my diatribe above relating to AHJs.

So who exactly was recalled in this instance? Did it include ALL SFRD units?

How is it that you expect me to speak for someone else? I have given you a clear description on what I saw and heard and what my opinion is of those events. To get the answers you seek you will need to speak to that Chief . As I said I'm not defending anyone personally, just pointing out that not everyone has the same view of the events in question.

Cogs

I'm not expecting you to speak for someone else.

I would think you'd be able to state whether or not the cancelling of a Chief Officer of a "mutual aid" department operating at a scene is a normal course of action on your incidents.

If it is, I don't agree with it, but so be it. If it is not, then it speaks volumes about why it happened in this situation.

I cannot say for certain that he would have, but I can tell you with a very high degree of certainty that if he or any IC had cancelled my Department's Chief, our Chief would follow that direction.

The fact that you can't answer that question one way or the other with certainty, IMO just further demonstrates that this was a selective decision.

Yes as I understand it he does, as does the Chief of any fire district in which they are the authorized Command.

Personally, I find that troubling and contrary to my experiences with those situations.

In fact it was always a general rule that unless a second or greater alarm was sounded it is our Company Officers that act as the command authority for MY department"s personnel on an out of district scene under the direction of the "host" department's Chief. Our Chief's primary responsibility is our district.

Shouldn't your Chief's primary responsibility be his personnel working an incident?

Yes if the incident were clearing. Can't the junior officers handle their own crews to clear a scene? Isn't it the job and responsibility of a company officer to manage their crew under the direction of an IC?

You appear to be evading the actual question(s). The question(s) were not about the ability of individual companies to return to quarters when the IC cancels or releases them. The question was, and still is, about cancelling ONLY the commanding officer of the department whose units the IC is utilizing on the scene.

I find nothing wrong with a Chief responding or staying on an active scene to monitor their personnel when that's the case, but in this case recall had been sounded and the scene was clearing. I do have a problem with a Chief or any officer from any department unilaterally disregarding the directions of an IC.

So when the "recall had been sounded", who was actually "recalled"? From the description of what happened, it appears that there were SFRD units still operating on the scene, so why would the IC specifically cancel their commanding officer?

All of this could have been avoided by simply returning to service when recall was sounded.

And it all could probably have been avoided if the IC had chosen not to cancel the SFRD Chief. Would he have done the same to YOUR chief?

I tried like hell to leave this one alone as I am one that truly believes it's in everyones best interest to work together, but I was on scene at this particular call and the actions of the DC were not professional on this occasion. The bottom line here is that there is ONE IC on a scene and in this case it was the Springdale Chief. And yes he does have the authority to release units, hold them or whatever else he decides as the IC in his authorized district, which this was.

I absolutely agree that there can only be one IC on a scene, but maybe you can better answer my questions.

Leaving out the "incident" that occurred on this specific call.....

Would he have cancelled/dismissed YOUR department's fire chief under the same circumstances?

Does he have the authority to cancel/dismiss YOUR department's fire chief at a scene in which YOUR department's units are operating?

That's just it Fire Medic. The SFRD chiefs are all professional. They would not have cancelled Springdale chief if his department were coming into Stamford. What's more is that this same nut in Springdale responds to almost every other district's (except SFRD of course)alarms fires etc. and is always assuming command until one of the other district volunteers show up.

As an outsider, I can clearly see that was due to a personal animosity.

One more question, does he actually have the authority to cancel and/or dismiss from the scene, the supervisor of another departments employees operating at the scene? It's one thing to cancel or release an engine or truck company, but how can he have the authority to accept the help of individual companies from a department, but reject their "boss"?

Here's a wrinkle -

Police investigate fire chiefs' scuffle

John Nickerson

Stamford Advocate

December 30, 2010

http://www.stamfordadvocate.com/policereports/article/Police-investigate-fire-chiefs-scuffle-929338.php

I just have one comment and one question regarding the cancellation of the SFRD Chief.

I think it's completely reasonable for a Chief Officer to respond to an "out of district" call in which his units are operating at. If I read the article right, 21 SFRD personnel were operating at this incident, so it would seem reasonable to have a Chief officer of their own there.

Would the IC have made the same decision if it was a Chief Officer of one of the volunteer departments on the call?

How much is too much? 100, 300, 500 backlog?

At what point does the City of New York reach out and say WE NEED HELP?

Does FDNY EMS have a Mutual Aid plan of any type with

Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Rockland, or parts of New Jersey?

I know a Task Force of NJ EMS was requested but at what point?

How far into the backlog? I heard 1,500

What can we learn from this?

Well, to me an obvious thing to learn from this is that you can't use an "everyday" approach to a "once in a decade" event that you have advanced notice of.

As for at what point does NYC reach out for help...........

Call it a Devil's Advocate thing if you will, but considering the scope of a storm like this, simply calling in Mutual Aid may not be much of an actual solution for a variety of reasons. It's quite possible that the communities being called for assistance may be experiencing an increased call load also and you may be creating a situation where you're "robbing Peter to pay Paul". Additionally, considering the volume of NYC ambulances getting stuck and having problems getting around on the snow covered roads and around the abandoned vehicles, would adding more units from out of town help the situation or compound the problem since it's likely that some of them will have the same problems?