JBJ1202

Date: 12/9/10
Time: 05:35
Location: 3901 Gomer Court (Off of E Main St) Town of Yorktown "Jefferson Valley Collision"
Frequencies: 46.26 / 453.275 / Fire 17 / FG 1 / MVAC
LMFD Units Operating: 2261, 2262, E253, E258, L10, 69B1
YHFD Units Operating: 2533, E270 FAST
MFFD Units Operating: 19-6-1
MFD Units Operating: 18-2-1, 18-7-1
CVFD Units Operating: 2132, E231
PVFD Units Operating:
YVAC Units Operating: 86B1?, 34 Medics
SFD EMS Units Operating: 80B2, U88 (RAC)
WCDES Units Operating: Bat 16, C&O Zone 4 w/ 1404
Weather Conditions: Cold, 21 Degrees
Description Of Incident: Working fire in 30' x 50' 2 1/2 story dwelling attached to 100' x 100' auto body shop
Reporters: Remember585
Writer: Remember585
LoHud Article
Relocated to Mohegan HQ: 2341, 2342, TL45 (Peekskill FD) & 88B1 (Cortlandt VAC)
05:35 - L10, E253, E258 dispatched to reported structure fire. 60 Control advising multiple calls on it.
05:39 - 60 Control advising responding units one person possibly trapped per YPD.
05:40 - E253 reports fully involved house fire, still not on scene.
05:41 - 10-75 transmitted. E253 has a propane tank that already "let go."
05:41 - 60 Control dispatching Yorktown FAST, Mahopac Falls Cascade, Mohegan VAC & Bat 17 to the scene.
05:42 - E253 to 2262, fully involved and reports from units on scene all occupants are out.
05:43 - 2261 requesting a Ladder to HQ and send one Tanker from "somewhere."
05:45 - Peekskill TL45 dispatched to cover Mohegan HQ.
05:46 - 60 Control dispatching Battalion 10. 2261 cancelling the Tanker.
05:48 - E270 responding. 2262 requesting Con Ed Electric to the scene. Battalion 16 dispatched.
05:49 - 2262 reports an auto body shop on first floor with a residence above, 30' x 50'.
05:50 - 2262 requesting Con Ed to "step it up."
05:52 - 19-6-1 responding.
05:54 - "L10, as soon as the PD car moves, I want you to set up in the rear," per 2262.
05:55 - "E258 to the hydrant, send me water!"
05:56 - "2262 to the hydrant on E Main St, shut it down, I have a situation." 19-6-1 on location.
05:57 - "2261 to 60 Control dispatch an Engine from Mahopac, we need manpower here."
05:59 - E270 on location.
06:02 - Units reporting partial collapse, E258 has no water, 2262 reports "we're working on it."
06:03 - "2261 to all units, switch to Fire Ground 1."
06:05 - 18-2-1 responding. 69B1 transporting 1 to WMC.
06:06 - 2261 requesting Yorktown Highway Department for salt, "we're falling all over the place."
06:12 - 18-2-1 on location.
06:18 - Bat 16 on location, 2261 requesting the C&O Team to the scene. DC41 reports "Ladder operation is underway."
06:19 - C&O Zone 4 dispatched. Mohegan VAC, 39M2, U18 dispatched to an EMS call.
06:23 - Bat 16 requesting an update on the electric company, please put a 2nd call in, we have a hazardous condition.
06:25 - 60 Control advising Con Ed crew assigned, should be there in 15-20 minutes.
06:28 - 60 Control advising Bat 16 that Con Ed reports they have a rep on scene.
06:29 - Bat 16 requesting run down of EMS units on scene, 60 Control reports a YVAC rig and Yorktown Medic.
06:31 - Unknown unit reporting, "not enough pressure on this line over here."
06:32 - Bat 16 requesting 1 Ambulance to cover Mohegan and 1 Ambulance to the scene.
06:34 - Cortlandt VAC dispatched to Mohegan HQ for coverage.
06:38 - New Channel 4 Chopper showing live video, fire appears to be darkening down.
06:41 - Bat 16 reports units making progress, exposure issue is a 100 x 100 body shop, 4 L/S/O and 1 Ladder Pipe.
06:44 - 2261 requesting two ambulances total on scene at all times. YVAC is transporting unknown #.
06:47 - News Channel 4 Chopper reports business is "Jefferson Valley Collision."
06:48 - Bat 16 requesting Somers Rehab to the scene. Carmel VAC & Somers EMS have been requested to the scene.
06:49 - 1404 responding.
06:53 - 60 Control reports that YVAC is going to be transporting 3 with smoke inhalation shortly.
06:54 - Bat 16 requesting Con Ed Gas to the scene.
07:06 - 1404 on location.
07:07 - 60 Control advising Bat 16 that 80B2, 18-7-1 on scene. Bat 16 reports exterior operation, fire darkening down, making progress.
07:22 - U88 (RAC) responding.
07:31 - U88 on location.
07:36 - 2261 declaring the fire under control.
07:39 - Bat 16 requesting Code Enforcement to the scene.
08:01 - 2261 reports they have an excavator coming, the building has to be torn down for total extinguishment.
08:02 - 2261 requesting manpower from Continental Village & Putnam Valley to the scene.
08:15 - 2132 on location.
08:16 - E232 responding. (Originally called in as E231, later corrected they were in E232).
08:27 - 24-2-1 responding.
09:13 - Yorktown FD units released.
10:00 - C&O units returning.
10:09 - Bat 16 reports Red Cross is on location.
10:15 - Bat 16 going in service.
10:28 - Continental Village units in service.
10:45 - 2261 requesting Yorktown Water Department to the scene.
11:00 - Mahopac & Mahopac Falls FD units in service.
11:08 - E254 & TL45 responding on a CO investigation.
12:05 - All units clear from the scene. TL45 released from standby.

Most here realize I'm posting from Florida. I have no ties, no connections, nothing, to the Somers Fire District. What I do have is experience in a system that had it's own dispatching room for many decades, including the first 6-8 years of my career. We followed New Rochelle in the move to 60-Control dispatching after a consultant report was done on our district. The recommendation to move to 60-Control was done because the district was looking for ways to maximize our career staff out in the field, without adding positions.
Our union was against the idea initially, because our own dispatch position had a value to our membership; if one of us became injured or sick and was unable to perform on the fireground, being able to slide them into the dispatch position could potentially keep them employed. Losing that was THE major drawback to going to 60-Control dispatch.
Aside from that, the initial problems with start-up of 60-Control dispatching our department, were the common ones to be expected. They included a lack of knowledge of the district, that only our experienced firefighters with years working in the district could possibly have.
As the months turned into years, the initial problems with moving to 60-Control dispatch were addressed as they arose, and corrected. The system began to function rather smoothly. I do not recall any of the issues with the move to 60-Control involving any sort of life hazard, or serious dysfunction of the system that caused a serious problem to become worse.
One thing I can attest to is that 60-Control NEVER "LOST" a call for help within our district. We had some storms where we ran 30+ alarms in a day tour (before we went to 24 hour shifts) and probably 50-60 alarms in a 24 hour period. They would get backed up as our company availability would go to zero with all units tied up at alarms.
When I found myself in the position of doing tour command during one of these multiple call days, I simply kept track of the units and a rundown of alarms. As units became available I had them all go 10-8 to headquarters, and as 60-Control delivered more alarms, the 10-8 units would pick them up as available.
This would lead to L-17 responding way deep into L-16 first due, and all the engine companies would be responding into others' first due; from headquarters.
It worked out great.
And 60-control NEVER lost an alarm, or any call for our service anywhere.
That's my experience with the change-over from self-dispatch to 60-Control dispatch. It can be done.

This requires a rather lengthy complicated answer, but I'll try to sum it up.
Sergeant: Just your traditional Sergeant as you know them commonly. Now the NYSP doesn't have "Patrol Sergeants" or "Desk Sergeants." They are really administrative positions only, and if you seem them in the field, it is most likely because they are responding to a large scale incident, or overseeing a detail. They do not patrol. Sergeants have permanent rank based on a competitive test.
Technical Sergeants: These are appointments to positions which require some unique skill or expertise. Technical Sergeants either have the permanent rank of Sergeant, or in many cases have the Permanent rank of Trooper. However, a Trooper who is appointed a Technical Sergeant receives all the benefits of a permanent rank of Sergeant.
Sergeant/Station Commander: Highest ranking Sergeant in each Barracks. Not always the most senior Sergeant.
Zone Sergeant: Sergeants who oversee a Zone. The state is divided into Troops, then subdivided into Zones. Usually 3-4 Zone Sergeants per Zone.
First Sergeant: Highest ranking Sergeant in a Troop. Only one per Troop.
Chief Technical Sergeant: Usually assigned to a technical position. For instance, the highest ranking NCO of the TTMC is a Chief Technical Sergeant.
Staff Sergeant: High ranking administrative Sergeant. Could be assigned to any office at Division HQ in Albany.
Lieutenant: Member who has passed the competitive testing process and has the permanent rank of Lieutenant.
Technical Lieutenant: This is someone who may either have the permanent rank of Lieutenant or the permanent rank of Sergeant, and has been appointed to a technical/expertise position where they had unique skills.
Also, in the NYSP, once you receive the permanent rank of Sergeant, if you are an Investigator in the BCI, you can opt to remain in the BCI with the title “Investigator”, while having the permanent rank of Sergeant. This differs from most agencies where when a Detective is promoted to Sergeant, they go back into uniform.
Again, as I mentioned, this is a very, very brief explanation. It’s a little more in depth, but you get the point.

The Croton-on-Hudson Volunteer Fire Department recently took delivery of a new Chief's response / command vehicle, a 2010 Ford Expedition, replacing a 2000 Ford Explorer, assigned to Car 2082. The new unit was put into service on Wednesday, November 10, 2010.
All warning lights and siren were installed at the dealer, Warnock Fleet, as well as the Havis-Shield equipment console in the front of the vehicle and the Truckvault storage unit in the rear. All lettering and graphics were done by McCaffrey Signs in Peekskill, the radios and portable radio chargers installed at Metrocom in Bedford Hills, and additional work and installations done at the Croton DPW shops.
Some of the vehicle features include:
- Whelen LED Liberty Lightbar
- Six-Head Whelen Dominator on Go-Rhino Push Bumper
- Two Whelen 500 Series Linear LEDs on side of Go-Rhino Push Bumper
- Two Whelen LIN3 LEDs mounted on both side running boards
- Whelen Dominator Traffic Advisor mounted on roof above rear hatch
- Two Whelen LIN3 LEDs mounted on rear license plate bracket
- Six Whelen Vertex Hide-A-Way LED lights
- Whelen Cencom Gold siren and control unit
- Motorola XTS2500 Trunking radio
- Kenwood TK-690 Low Band VHF Radio
- Kenwood TK-790/890 Dual-Band UHF/VHF Radio
- Unity LED Spotlight
On behalf of the Croton-on-Hudson Volunteer Fire Department, we thank all of those involved in helping us build a safe, reliable and functional response / command vehicle.

The Yorktown Fire District's southern lines are drawn in a manor that do not protect the citizens within its boundaries. I don't know many who will argue that Yorktown is a bad fire department. On the contrary, every time I've worked with them I've thought that they are professional, extremely well trained, and well staffed. At the same time, no one can argue that the membership base for the YFD is located north of the reservoir. There are areas of the district that are less than a mile from either of the Millwood stations where Millwood's membership is strong and able to respond within a timely manor. There are several areas that come to mind like the area of Shinglehouse Road in front of IBM where the YFD district begins, it's a mile from Millwood Station 1 and saturated with Millwood firefighters. On the other hand you can place a YFD substation on Rt134 a similar distance away that is in an area void of YFD firefighters. So maybe they'll get one or two members that live close, but by 2 in 2 out standards that apparatus will be useless until the remainder of their members arrive from north of the reservoir.
The answer here is to share a little more and spend a little less.
Yes as the lines are drawn, it is Yorktown's responsibility to provide protection to the ares south of the reservoir. Apparatus located in the vicinity without an abundance to staff that apparatus in a timely manor does not satisfy that responsibility. I would argue that responding from YFD HQ with a full crew that will be completely dressed and packed up when they arrive is more efficient than members driving their POV the same distance to arrive at a station and still have to don their PPV and respond in apparatus to the scene.
For many years MFC has indicated that they would respond to incidents on a dual response basis south of the reservoirs in conjunction with YFD. This same method works very well for Briarcliff and Millwood on the TSP south of Rt 100 where both are dispatched and those who are in need of aid receive it in a timely manor. I'm sure a similar arrangement can be worked out between MFC and YFD and even include a "mutual aid member" status for any YFD members who are in the area when a call comes in to respond on/with Millwood apparatus.

If you don't have a truck having one on the box is a good idea. It seems an increasing number of chimney fire become structure fires these days. Probably because chimneys get older and the mortar and other materials deteriorate over time. So sending a full first alarm assignment is warranted.
I would cover these bases.
Inside Team: Gain entry, put down a tarp in front of the fireplace, remove the contents of the fire box, report condition to command, use the TIC to check the run of the chimney for indications of extension.
Roof Team: Get up to the roof have a roof ladder or two if your not operating off an aerial or tower. Remove the cap. Drop ziplock bags with full of ABC powder into the chimney to extinguish the fire. Thin non freezer bags are thin and melt quickly to extinguish the fire. Many places have chains to clear blockages. I would use them if necessary to get the fire out but be careful the last thing you want to do is cause damage that will allow the fire to extend. Also remember it's not your job to clean the chimney for the resident just put the fire out.
Additional Staff: Standby to stretch a hoseline, search the upper floors with the TIC for extension, RIT.
I will say that I have seen it done multiple ways and the way I described it above is what I personally found to be the most effective, professional, and safe. There are multiple methods and most work but the above way is least likely to damage the chimney and possibly cause extension.
Some other methods.
Misting nozzle: Idea is to steam out the fire with a small amount of water and not crack the flue. While this works I don't see the benifit over the ziplock bags. Add this to the manuvering you have to do on the roof to get it down the chimney its more difficult and increases the chance of falling off the roof. Also unless your connections are perfect water will leak onto the roof and potentially freeze causing additional hazards.
Application of a can or dry chem up the chimney: Can may crack the chimney. ABC undoubtedly will push back a little and make a mess. Both usually work because the natural flow of air carries the agent up the chimney.
Chimney Flares: Only have seen this method used once and it was not that effective. Others may have better experience.
Hope that answers your questions. If you have more ask. I'll get on after the Jet Game.

From a legal standpoint, the issue being addressed by the District Court Judge is one of "disparate impact." He (or the plaintiffs) don't have to show how or why the pass rates for minorities/non-minorities are so different (hell, they don't even have to understand why there is a disparity), rather, the plaintiff only has to show there is a statistical anomaly, and in the end the protected class can meet the minimum practical responsibilities of the job. The concept was developed (or more appropriately honed) in Griggs v. Duke Power, in the 1970's.
As unfair as it seems (and I am one who does believe it is unfair), this Judge is unfortunately just following precedent. What needs to done is a ruling from a Court of Record (COR) essentially modifying existing precedent. Some of the SCOTUS argument in Ricci v. NH did that, so in this case NYC will have a leg to stand on that it didn't only a few years ago. The ironic thing is if he ruled for NYC, we would be calling him an "activist judge."
While I disagree with this ruling, I don't envy the rock and the hard place this Judge is in, ruling between precedent and what is, in my personal opinion, the right thing to do. NYC's best avenue of regress here is an appellant argument, relying heavily on the Ricci decision.

As the IC, I rarely need any equipment other then the radios, a notebook and/or dry erase board. But Chiefs aren't always the IC, and sometimes we're the first ones on the scene and we need to do things ASAP. Some examples include MVAs where the trauma bag is needed, or small nuisance fires where the can is sufficent. Other equipment in our cars includes a set of irons, bolt cutters and binoculars - all of which get used.
To generalize that equipment isn't needed in a command vehicle is wrong. How department #1 works may be different than department #2.

With all of this being said, do you think it would be better for a department to have an older member with more experience fighting actual fires and less training OR a newer member with less actual experience, but much more training, as an officer?
I feel that some departments could have a bunch of 25-year members that are complacent and come from the era of "charging into burning buildings without SBCA" and then many 7-10 year members that are progressive and would like to use the knowledge they received from classes they've taken. In this situation, maybe younger members, or members with less time in the department, would serve as better officers.

I'm reading this before the Sun comes up, so bare with me.
WCPD (or DPS) is an awesome agency that has always struck me as proactive and aggressive when it comes to planning and coordination in Westchester County. I've participated in training exercises and worked at many incidents with the DPS and in plain english, they've got their s#it together. As a fire chief, I know I will catch crap for saying this, but I don't think any other organization around the county has a better grasp of the incident management system. During major incidents, they show up, size things up and establish not only a command presence, but implement an action plan in a timely manner. I think their expertise on hazard and disaster recognition and planning mixed with the response knowledge and capabilities of DES could result in an amazing organization poised to respond to major emergencies in Westchester County.
But, by eliminating some positions, doesn't this threaten the span of control in some areas? And what happens after some positions are eliminated, and they come to realize that perhaps they were beneficial? Will they bring them back, or out of pride will they keep them vacant and make some perform dual roles?
I have seen counties that have all services under one umbrella that work. I have also seen them fail or come up short. What concerns me is the vibe I get in this proposal - it feels more like a takeover then it does a merger. All references in the proposal seem one-sided from DPS on how they can absorb DES and make it run smoother and more efficiently. In many ways, I think that this has great potential, but something also tells me that we may see it deplete / ruin certain things that many people worked hard to accomplish.
As for consolidating communications, this isn't a bad concept. The bigger issue would be to have one central communications center that handles everything in every community, with the exception of the larger cities (if so desired). People don't realize how inefficient it is now to have 911 calls go to one place, then get transferred to another - which sometimes goes to the wrong place or doesn't happen. I personally feel that if we can consolidate DPS and 60 Control communications centers, that we should eventually assume the responsibility of answering cellular 911 as well. The TMC already transfers many police requests to WCPD, and fire/EMS requests come to 60 Control (majority of the time). When a call is in an unknown area or outside of Westchester, many times they transfer it to us to "figure out" and send to the proper agency (IE: FDNY, Rockland, Putnam, Nassau, Suffolk, etc.). With the CAD system we have, we can handle this almost seemlessly. If you add the knowledge of the DPS communications personnel, Westchester County could have one of the best communications centers in the country. (IMHO)
Time will tell, I just hope that every aspect is looked at beyond it's cost efficiency shock value.
(Now I will go hide because I am sure someone will jump down my throat for speaking my mind...)

After taking the time to read the document it does appear to be one sided with a "Crystal Palace" empirical look at how things would work in a "perfect world". But we all know it is far from a perfect world. Through out the document it consistantly states that DES is providing a duplication of DPS services. It never states that DPS is duplicating DES services. One section relating to HazMat that seemed to be through rose colored glasses was the text


"Under a consolidated DPS, the HMRT will be an arm of the DPS Hazardous Devices Unit (formerly known as the Bomb Squad). The Hazardous Devices Unit will respond to all potential CBRNE incidents and utilize available volunteers of the HMRT to support its operations. This should significantly reduce response times to CBRNE in Westchester County and ensure that resources are used efficiently and effectively."
If we thought the paid/volunteer issue was always raising its ugly head here combine that with Paid PD/Volunteer FD and what how it plays out.

Get outside... enjoy some fresh air. At 14-17 years old, you shouldn't be fretting about such things from a TV show...

CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES: AL
* Physical data
1. Atomic weight: 26.98
2. Boiling point (at 760 mm Hg): 2327 degrees C (4221 degrees F)
3. Specific gravity: 2.70 at 4 degrees C (39 degrees F)
4. Vapor density: Data not available.
5. Melting point: 660 degrees C (1220 degrees F)
6. Vapor pressure at 1284 degrees C (2343 degrees F): 1 mm Hg
7. Solubility: Insoluble in hot or cold water, concentrated nitric acid, and hot acetic acid; soluble in hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid and alkalies.
8. Evaporation rate: Data not available.
* Reactivity
1. Conditions contributing to instability: Contact between aluminum powder and ignition sources may create a severe explosion hazard. Because it is strongly electropositive, aluminum corrodes rapidly in contact with other metals.
2. Incompatibilities: Aluminum is an extremely reactive metal. Contact between aluminum and acids, caustics, combustible materials, chlorinated hydrocarbons, and strong oxidizers should be avoided.
3. Hazardous decomposition products: None reported.
4. Special precautions: Aluminum may corrode in contact with other metals.
* Flammability The National Fire Protection Association has assigned a flammability rating of 1 (slight fire hazard) to aluminum (dust or powder).
1. Flash point: Data not available.
2. Autoignition temperature: Data not available.
3. Flammable limits in air: Data not available.
4. Extinguishant: Do not use water, carbon tetrachloride, or halon to fight fires involving aluminum. Control small fires with sand, talc, or sodium chloride. Dry chemical or carbon dioxide extinguishers are also acceptable. Fires involving aluminum should be fought upwind from the maximum distance possible. Keep unnecessary people away; isolate the hazard area and deny entry. Containers of aluminum may explode in the heat of the fire and should be moved from the fire area if it is possible to do so safely. If this is not possible, cool fire exposed containers from the sides with water until well after the fire is out, but be careful not to get water inside containers. Stay away from the ends of containers. Firefighters should wear a full set of protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus when fighting fires involving aluminum.
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/healthguidelines/aluminum/recognition.html

Maybe they are Dave Matthews Fans!!

You must live in either the five boroughs of New York City or in Westchester, Putnam, Rockland, Orange, Nassau, or Suffolk County.
Do you have to be a New York City resident to be a NYC firefighter?

Interactions between field units and 60 Control operators are generally limited to radio transmissions during an incident. Take a quick look at their role as call takers, all of whom are certified emergency medical dispatchers. Great interviews with 651 and 662, and of course, well-delivered pre-arrival instructions by 637.

I was at work so didn't respond to this job but since the door has been opened I'll step through. Some bullet point comments on Seth's post.
First and foremost, everyone went home some minor injuries, smoke inhalation aside. The two brothers in Bridgeport were not so lucky yesterday.
Above, pre-plans and response policies were questioned and referred to as "antiquated" in Westchester. I do not know how Briarcliff operates, but I can tell you that many volunteer and career departments alike in Westchester have detailed greater alarm response policies in the CAD at 60 control and are often executed automatically without any radio transmissions necessary. In addition to that, the county "battalion cars" act as the resource officer at jobs, taking pressure off of the IC. I do not know all of the battalions personally but I will tell you two I do know bring to the table plenty of experience to know when to "suggest" to IC's when to request additional resources.
I am quite sure this fire could have been run differently, as every single fire is different and different IC's will not run the same
fire the same way. It is quite possible that had this job had occurred in another district it would have sounded more "professional" on the air. Maybe some unknown department that sounds great on the air loses the entire structure, maybe not? How u sound on the air means dick when u have someone trapped above the fire and everyone is looking at you to make a decision.
Most volunteer rescue companies in Westchester were born from fire police. Just because a particular company carries certain tools does
not mean that their membership is as specialized as their toolbox.
FAST in the weather conditions yesterday needed to be properly relieved. A good proactive FAST is doing more than anyone realizes, just being bunkered up and ready to roll on a day like yesterday is taxing on the body. If after rehab the IC chooses to use the relieved FAST for overhaul or salvage rather than request additional resources, I don't see an issue. I see it done often.
Radio discipline is a issue everywhere. And I do mean everywhere, ever hear tapes of ground ops channels from highly regarded paid
departments where maydays are stepped all over due to poor radio discipline?
The fire service is reactive by nature, if if Black Friday had never occurred PSS systems would not be an NFPA standard today. Each member from the to the IC down to the probie has to take a personal inventory after each job and ask him/herself how they can be better and safer next time.
I think in a forum such as this positivity is key. Every member can learn something from every run...
Stay Safe and Hydrate...

A friend found this in his house. It lists Box locations in Scarsdale. The card states, "Effective May 15, 1927."

Well this is a topic that can't be adequetely covered in a couple hundred words on here. Here are some things that come off the top of my head.
1. Risk Management-The whole thing will depend on if the place is opened or closed. If it's open some sort of interior attack will probably be necessary to attempt a primary search. After the joint has closed the only life hazard becomes us and any advanced fire the risk may very well outweight the benifit of interior attack.
2. Water supply- Lay in (don't count on somebody else to do it for you). 2 1/2 with a smooth bore is an excellent choice in commercial for a number of reasons. Great reach, absorbs lots of btu's, and is powerful so that is blows those ceiling tiles apart and penetrates to the fire.
3. Thermal Imaging Camera- The TIC is always important but at a commercial building where you have high ceilings it may be your first warning of heat build up above your head. A good tactic is to lift up a ceiling tile on entry and check the plenum for fire before you venture in too far below it. The TIC will help you stay orientated, find victims, keep track of your crew, and locating the fire).
4. In many cases we will be dealing with truss roofs so roof ops is out.
5. Consider using the search rope if you are entering without a handline.
6. A middle of the night fire in one of these buildings is a good canidate for a backdraft.
Most of the fires you will encounter in these buildings are duct fires which have different tactics. Lastly here is the link to a LODD report about a fire in a McDonald's in Houston Texas that occured in 2000. This tragic fire took the lives of two firefighters.
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200013.html

My background is in truck and Rescue work mostly so I'm not an Engine expert but I will now show you all how I am an equal opportunity critic...YFD does not normally team up multiple engine companies to stretch the first line (or any lines). Typically every engine on the first alarm gets their own hydrant and forward stretches in, leaving the officer and nozzleman to stretch the handline which is normally 1 3/4". The hydrant man hooks up, charges the hydrant and follows the line in. If the hydrant is close enough, the driver may get the hydrant himself, allowing an additional man on the stretch. My personal opinion is that for any stretch longer than 3 lengths it would ususlly be better for two engine companies to team up, utilizing one hydrant and using the remaining members to stretch and operate a single hoseline. We rarely do this. Of course, for departments around here, other than FDNY, it is difficult to make hard and fast SOG's regarding such evolutions because manpower is limited and sometimes it is better to inadequately stretch and operate three hoselines than to adequately stretch and operate one hoseline in the initial stages of the fire. In another words, sometimes a little water in three places( fire floor, floor above, exposure line as an example) with a little delay is better than a lot of water in one place with no delay, if that makes any sense. Unfortunately there is a stigma on our department attached to not having a hydrant or not stretching your own line which IMO shouldn't be. I would like to see more first due Engine companies getting on the radio and telling the second due to supply them and using the "hydrant man" on the stretch of the initial hoseline. Then, after supplying first due engine (or as this is being done) second due engine can make the decision whether or not to stretch their own line or help the first due, dependent on the conditions found. I have spoken to many FDNY members over the years who think we are crazy to not team up engine companies and they have a valid point but it is not quite as simple as it may seem to an FDNY member due to our lack of manpower.
As a Chief, if I have members searching the fire floor and the floor above, and fire in or about to be in the exposure building(s), I may decide to have all 4 engines on the first alarm stretch their own line in order to cover these areas, even though I realize these lines are woefully undermanned and we are stretching 1 3/4 when 2 1/2 would be preferable...on the other hand, if there is fire confined to an apartment on an upper floor on arrival, the right move may be to team up two engines or possibly even three to get that first line in and oftentimes we don't even consider that option because each engine getting their own hydrant and stretching their own line is so ingrained. Old habits die hard....
I wrote this fast so apologize if it is rambling...this has been one of my many pet peeves about my own department for many years and it is not a black and white issue so YFD guys, please remember.....qtip

Date: 3/9/10
Time: 1626hrs
Box: 8480
Area: Great Kills Park
Location: Hylan Boulevard X Buffalo St and Model Airplane Road
Frequency: 154.190
Weather Conditions: Clear, dry, windy
Description Of Incident: Large area brush, approx. (4) acres.
Writer: PEMO3, Truck4
http://www.silive.com/southshore/index.ssf/2010/03/fdny_douses_years_first_brush.html
1626hrs- B-23 and Brush Fire assignment responding to the model airplane field off Hylan Boulevard for brush fire.
E-167, 164/BFU-1, 161/BFU-5; L-82, 85; B-23
1630hrs- 10-75 for large area brush.
E-162; L-87FAST; R-5, Sq-252; B-21
1631hrs- B-23 transmitting 2nd Alarm.
2nd Alarm: E-160, 163, 159/S-5, 168; L-84, 76; B-22 Safety, 40 RUL; Rescue B/C, Safety B/C; FieldCom., TAC #1, MERV
1634hrs- B-23 transmitting 3rd Alarm. Staging will be Hylan X Buffalo
3rd Alarm: E-156/BFU-3, 153, 157, 155; L-79, 80; B-33, 48 Staging, 39 Air Recon; MSU #1
1642hrs- B-23 rpts large area of bruch burning on both sides of Wetlands Road toward Buffalo St. (2) L/S/O, (2) Tower Ladders going into operation.
1646hrs- Staten Island advsing Fall Back Step 3.
1650hrs- Div. 8 S/C extra Satellite.
S/C: E-284/S-3
1718hrs- Div. 8 rpts fire in (3) sections, (2) Satellites, (2) BFU's, (2) Tower Ladders and (2) L/S/O. S/C extra truck for FAST.
S/C: L-86
1725hrs- Car 8 transmitting 4th Alarm. S/C (2) extra Trucks above the 4th.
4th Alarm: E-165, 220, 151, 158; L-77, 149
S/C: L-110, 147
1748hrs- Car 8 rpts northern sector of the fire is K/D. Co's continue to operater on the southern end.
1753hrs- Car 8 rpts NYPD Aviation operating with the Bambi bucket. Fire darkening down.
1840hrs- Fire is K/D, operating with (2) Tower Ladders, (2) BFU's, (2) Satellites and (5) L/S/O. P/W/H.

And at home they are protected by big fire stations with lots of apparatus and more highly trained manpower......oh never mind....dont want to spoil the atmosphere.
Most commuters think they have the same coverage at home that they see in NYC

Fire #1
87 Brook Street "Nappy Auto Collision & Repair"
Croton FD Units: 2082, 2083, E118, E119, E120, TL44, R18
Montrose FD Units: 2271, TL8
Ossining FD Units: 2332, 2334, E98, U51 (FAST)
Buchanan FD Units: 2553, U12 (Cascade)
Croton EMS: 5511, 55B2
Cortlandt EMS: 88B2
Ossining EMS: 36M1, 7405
WCDES: Battalion 10, C&O Zone 4
RELOCATED TO CROTON: Montrose E123, Yorktown L51
Info: CFD full assignment dispatched at 16:09 for heavy smoke coming from the building. CPD (who could see it from their HQ) updated as working fire right after dispatch. Fire in rear of 100 x 150 two story autobody shop with apartment above. Cars 2082 & 2083, E118 on location within 3 minutes, E119 & TL44 one minute after, E120 & R18 two minutes after that. Crews made entry and put two 2 1/2" lines to work, while simultaneously opened up the roof on the single story shop garage, conducted searches and laddered the building with portable ladders. (Truck had no access due to downed wires and trees). A 2nd Truck was requested (Montrose TL8) to position in the rear on Terrace Place and to assist opening up. Main body of fire knocked down 20 minutes after arrival, under control 40 minutes after arrival. Mutual Aid companies picked up at 17:25, all units off the scene at 18:52. One occupant to the hospital with smoke inhalation.
Fire #2
702 Half Moon Bay Drive
Croton FD Units: 2084, E120
Montrose FD Units: 2271, 2274, E123 (Cancelled en route & sent back to CFD for coverage)
Yorktown FD Units: 2534, L51
Ossining FD Units: 2332, 2334, E97, E98, U51 (FAST) (Cancelled en route)
Croton EMS: 55B2
Cortlandt EMS: Cancelled en route
WCDES: Battalion 10 (AKA 2084) & C&O Zone 4
Info: CFD, E123 and L51 dispatched for a basement fire at 18:11. E120 & L51 on location at 18:16 with smoke showing and sprinkler activated. Initial crews found fire in basement level being contained by sprinkler, 10-75 requested. 2084 had the command, L51 had the aerial to the roof as a precaution. The 10-75 assignment was cancelled enroute as the fire was knocked down quick. 1 L/S/O - fire contained to basement level storage room. All units up at 19:45.
On behalf of the Croton FD, THANK YOU to Ossining FD, Montrose FD, Yorktown FD, Buchanan FD, Croton EMS, Croton PD, Croton DPW, Cortlandt VAC, Ossining EMS and of course - 60 Control - for an awesome job! Thanks for the continued support.

The Deaprtments that use the Trunked System "full time" are (if I remember correctly):
Ardsley - Fire 14
Armonk - Fire 16
Banksville - Fire 16
Bedford Hills - Fire 16
Bedford - Fire 16
Chappaqua - Fire 16
Croton Falls - Fire 13
Fairview - Fire 14
Goldens Bridge - Fire 13
Hawthorne - Fire 11 (EMS 11 for EMS)
Irvington - Fire 14
Katonah - Fire 16
Mamaroneck Town - Fire 15
Mount Kisco - Fire 16
Sleepy Hollow - Fire 12
North White Plains - Fire 19
Pleasantville - Fire 11
Purchase - Fire 19
South Salem - Fire 13
Thornwood - Fire 11
Valhalla - Fire 11
Vista - Fire 13
Yorktown - Fire 17
Westchester EMS (45 Medics) use EMS 13 or EMS 16 depending on where the call is)
Katonah-Bedford Hills VAC - EMS 16
Mount Kisco VAC - EMS 16
Pound Ridge VAC - EMS 13

Good morning Mike,
I'd call for Spanky if it was Metro North. Power shut-down, all tracks. Total rail traffic stoppage. Call for everybody, activate WSOTF, have Control notify every agency that they have a phone number for.
Mass EMS mobilization, and hospitals, trauma-center notification. Control is going to be very busy. Call for some air-med transport and establish a triage and landing zone in an open area somewhere nearby; plan for an EMS ferry system for multi-victims to the triage site, get that Command Board set up and get all the agency heads together there.
You're going to need rail-mounted cranes for stabilization, haevy duty air-bag system for some temp-stabilization, all portable stabilization systems available to the scene, maybe some tractor-trailer sized wreckers to spin out some cable and get a grip on something, even calling a few light duty Holmes wreckers might help.
Very important to establish NIMS ICS, especially get a staging officer out there to organize all the help coming in, I'd assign a firefighter or LT immediately, no sense in blocking up the area we might need road access to the site. How about a drop off point as close to the scene as possible, where rigs can roll up and stage equipment, then roll out to a parking area?
Depending on the time, you might need some heavy lighting systems, plus the generator-lights that we carried, portable 1000 watt lights.
Get the hydraulic rescue tools (you're going to need at least 4-6 systems maybe more?) out to the site. Ground ladders, Back-boards, stretchers, EMS equipment, lines stretched. Tread VERY carefully. Make entry into the cars in a stable area, and work your way forward, after evacuation of the able bodied. Then get ready for some serious PTSD scenes, some very dangerous and strenuous work lay ahead.
Then my superior officer would show up and change everything