LayTheLine

About a month ago, Detroit was being pounded by heavy rains. I put them on Broadcastify to listen in. They were running trees down, wires down and cars stuck in the flooding underpasses. I looked on the Internet for Detroit Fire to get an idea of what they run. What I found is astounding. Detroit is the arson capital of the world! It's almost like "The Bronx is Burning" back in the '70's & 80's. In a nutshell they have about 5,000 Working Fires or greater each year (that's about 13 a day). That's more than FDNY!! I couldn't believe it. Granted many of their fires are already burned buildings, but I've been listening the last month and they get their share of occupied structure fires & commercial fires. I am not exaggerating when I say that if turn on Broadcastify and listen in, there is either a Working Fire in progress, just ending, or one being dispatched. It's continuous. If this interests you, then read on.
 
The city has 28 Engines, 13 Ladders, 6 Squads, and 8 Battalion Chiefs. Within the city limits the cities of Hamtramck & Highland Park reside. These are two very small cities, both surrounded by Detroit and each is only about 2 square miles. Each city runs an engine and a ladder. They work in conjunction with Detroit and are even dispatched by Detroit. So adding in those two cities, Detroit is covered by 30 Engines, 15 Ladders, 6 Squads & 8 Battalions. I have NO idea how they have so many fires with such a relatively small department. In addition to the structure fires they have daily car fires, dumpster fires and also run first responder on medical calls. I am not sure what their mutual aid agreement is with surrounding cities. The firefighters in Detroit must go to work and expect to be working their whole shift on a daily basis. I'm just guessing but I assume they must rotate people from the quieter companies to the busier companies to keep them fresh. It sounds like everyday would be the equivalent of playing a football game. Again, only a guess, but the average Detroit firefighter probably lasts 20 years and then is completely broken-down and has to retire.
 
I like what they have for radio communications. They have fire dispatch on one frequency and then 8 fireground channels. They assign them by which chief is assigned first due to the box. If Battalion 4 is assigned, they assign Fireground 4. If there is another fire in Battalion 4's area, they just assign a fireground channel to whichever chief is coming in. "Companies responding to Main & Elm switch to Fireground 8 for Battalion 8."  In just a month I've heard numerous Working Fires going on at the same time.
 
There response, from what I can figure out is as follows:
Box Alarm 3 Engines, 1 Ladder, 1 Squad, 1 Battalion
Commercial Box Alarm: 4 Engines, 2 Ladders, 2 Squads, 2 Battalions
2nd Alarm: 3 Engines, 1 Ladder, 1 Squad, 1 Battalion (If it came is as a Box Alarm and they go to a 2nd it sounds like they round out the Commercial Box assignment along with the 2nd Alarm assignment.)
 
Their manning appears to be 4 on an Engine, Ladder, and Squad; however, all those units will drop to 3. So on any given shift Squad 1 may have 4 and Squad 2 may have 3. When they sign on location they'll declared their PAR. "Engine 9 on location, PAR 4." Here's what I don't understand, about 50 percent of the time a unit will sign off and say PAR 3 plus 1 or PAR 2 plus 1 or it may just be PAR 3 or PAR 4. So I don't think it's the number of firefighters plus the officer. All I can think of is that it must be Probies on the rig, which means about 20% of the department must be probies. The whole thing is just mind-boggling and I really can't wrap my brain around it. At busy times they must have 3 or 4 Workers at a time!
 
I'm sure many have heard about Devil's Night in Detroit (Oct. 30th). At one point they were averaging 80 structure fires on that night. I believe last year it was cut down to about 40. Well, Devil's Night is fast approaching and I will be sure to listen in. God Bless the Detroit firefighters and stay safe!

Date: 10/19/2016
 Time: 19:36
 Location: 1 Southfield Ave (Between Selleck St & Homestead Ave)
 District: SFD 2 Channel: Ground 1 Weather: 71, Clear
 Units: 1st Alarm:      E2, E5, E4, E6 (RIT), T2, R1, U4 (IC),          Working Fire: U6 (Safety), FM105, FM111,          2nd Alarm:     E3, T3          3rd Alarm:     E1, T1, C1 (Chief of Department), C2 (Assistant Chief), C11 (Assistant Chief of Volunteers), FM101 (Chief Fire Marshal)          Special Call:   E9          Callback:       E12, U5 (Deputy Chief)          Relocated:    E7 (Station 1), E8 (Station 3)          SEMS:           M5, M3, M901 (Supervisor)          SPD:             1B31, 1A42, 1E34, 2C292, 1C30, 2A24, 3B33, 8D77 (Shift Commander), 8S3 (Sergeant)          VFD's            E34 (Glenbrook), E41, T45 (Belltown), E52 (Springdale), E64, T67, R66, K68 (Turn of River) all staffed in quarters due to incident.
 Writer: AFS1970 *** At time of this call SFD Station 3 (2nd due) & Station 1 (3rd due) were at other incidents. ***
 Description: Multiple calls, conflicting between exterior brush fire and condominium fire. Possible exterior fire extending into building. E2 arriving in area reported visible fire in building. Once on scene E2 confirmed working fire and transmitted 2nd alarm due to exposures. U4 arrived and assumed command, transmitting the 3rd alarm shortly there after.   At 20:10 U4 gave the MARC update of fire on all three floors of a 20 x 40 foot condominium, fire darkening down, Probable will hold.   Fire under control at 20:26, U4 expects to free up 3rd alarm companies shortly.   E12 was sent to assist with picking up hose and equipment. M3 was sent late into the incident for an injured civilian. Edited 5 minutes ago by AFS1970

MTD7, let me try to answer the previous question even though I have no knowledge of Ossinning.  From looking at the 1 & 2 series boxes, you can figure out the area of town where the engines are located. Example: E97 & E100 are in the south end; E96 & E99 are in the north end. So if you had an MVA in the southern part of the village, you'd probably here Box 7-2 OR Box 7-5 transmitted for the closest engine & the rescue. The 8 boxes are also geographic based on the information provided. So if you needed 1 engine for a trash can fire in the park in the north end of the village you would probably hear Box 8-1 OR Box 8-4 for either E96 or E99 to respond. How's that for an educated guess?

MTD7, let me try to answer the previous question even though I have no knowledge of Ossinning.  From looking at the 1 & 2 series boxes, you can figure out the area of town where the engines are located. Example: E97 & E100 are in the south end; E96 & E99 are in the north end. So if you had an MVA in the southern part of the village, you'd probably here Box 7-2 OR Box 7-5 transmitted for the closest engine & the rescue. The 8 boxes are also geographic based on the information provided. So if you needed 1 engine for a trash can fire in the park in the north end of the village you would probably hear Box 8-1 OR Box 8-4 for either E96 or E99 to respond. How's that for an educated guess?

No rustled feathers here, but I think you're kind of on the wrong page.
 
Given the significantly different operating conditions, you can't directly apply all of the concepts to the fire service.  You are correct, there is an inherent level of risk to the job that just can't be completely eliminated without eliminating the ability to do the job we are expected to perform.  I don't think the "lessons" to be learned from the aviation industry are about elimination of risk, but rather following sound practices that can help reduce risk where we can reasonably do so.
 
As you pointed out, if something is mechanically wrong with the plane, the plane doesn't fly until it's fixed.  In the fire service, we routinely respond with apparatus that is known to not be 100% mechanically sound.
 
Aircraft have somewhat strict maintenance requirements and many parts are serviced or replaced after a specific number of flights or hours in order to prevent "critical failures".  In the fire service, many departments lack proper preventative maintenance programs and repairs are typically reactive rather than proactive.
 
Every person on the crew of the aircraft is fully trained in their duties before stepping foot on a plane to perform those duties with real passengers, each person has a specific role and sticks to that role (under normal conditions).  As such, you don't see flight attendants flying the planes and the pilots passing out pillows and beverages.  In the fire service, we have many departments that routinely allow personnel to respond to incidents before completing initial training and allow personnel to actively perform tasks that they are not trained to perform.
 
The aviation industry has checklists for performing routine tasks, like a pre-flight check and for situations that may arise.  The checklists serve to help guide personnel thru the situation and ensure that important tasks are not overlooked.  In the fire service, checklists can help to ensure nothing is overlooked during the apparatus check and can do the same thing for the IC during an incident to ensure that essential tasks and notifications are not missed and are performed in a timely manner.  They can particularly help when dealing with a low frequency incident like a true hazmat situation, technical rescues, etc.
 
 
I see these types of things as where we can apply lessons learned rather than on scene decision making about strategy & tactics.

I believe the fire service can learn a lot from the airline industry. With that being said, I don't really think we're comparing apples to apples here. The airline industry goes out of it's way to prevent accidents before they happen. If a wing flap is showing the slightest problem during pre-flight checks they won't take off. If the weather is not good, they won't take off. If the co-pilot feels ill and can't make the flight, they wait for another co-pilot and just don't allow the pilot to fly solo. The airline industry does have emergency procedures for when something goes wrong, be it engine failure, smoke in the aircraft, or deploying the emergency chutes after landing. But their response to emergencies is about 1% of what they do. The majority of flights go off without a hitch, as airline travel is the safest means of transport in the country.
 
Now compare the fire service. We have our fire prevention personnel and our public education programs, but when we get called it's because an emergency has already happened. Now I'm not saying we shouldn't use safe and effective procedures, nor am I implying we should go "all out" to get to the fire and the rest of the world be damned. What I am saying is that (just like in the military) there has to be a certain acceptable levels of casualties. If the military wanted to eliminate all casualties, they would never attack. But they plan for, practice for, and then implement a plan that will hopefully obtain a positive outcome with the least amount of casualties. The fire service should be looked at in the same light. Plan, practice, train, educate and then respond and implement a reasonable action that will hopefully mitigate the situation without casualties, but they are going to happen.
 
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY DOES EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO STAY OUT OF HARMS WAY, THE FIRE SERVICE IS EXPECTED TO GO INTO HARMS WAY.
 
The police are much in the same situation as the fire department. Prior to Columbine, police responded to the scene of a shooting and secured the scene and waited for SWAT. Now they are trained for and expected to confront the shooter/s. If two police officers arrive at a school shooting and shots are being fired, they are trained to enter the school and try to at least "pin down" the shooter so he/she can't continue to move and inflict harm. The officers are to hold their position until help arrives and the shooter/s can be neutralized. Not for me!
 
I believe that being safe is of utmost importance, but if you dot every "I" and cross every "T" before you begin operating, you will suffer "paralysis by analysis." At some point educated and calculated risks must be taken. Here is an example: I agree with doing a 360, but it's not always possible or practical. You're the Captain on a 3-man engine. Let's say you pull up on a 4 story multiple dwelling contained in a block long length of multiple dwellings. You see fire in a first floor room and it's just starting to extend to the public hallway. To complete a 360 you'd have go through exposure B, perhaps by breaking in the public door, go out the back door and into the rear yard. You then encounter a chain-link fence blocking you from the rear of the fire building's yard. You decide to pull a garbage can over and jump the fence. You look at the back of the fire building and can see the glow of fire in the public hallway. You then come across a wooden stockade fence blocking you to the backyard of exposure D. You take your tool and break through. Now you have to break into the rear of exposure D and go through and out the front. By this time, the driver has hooked up to the hydrant and your firefighter is finishing up stretching a 1 3/4" line to the front door. You look up and see that the fire has grown in size and now has control of the public stairway and is almost to the 2nd floor landing. By now you're thinking you better go back to the engine for the 2 1/2".
 
Now, would it be better if you pulled up and saw the situation at hand. You see there are attached exposures on Side B & D. You can't even see wants behind the fire building (Side C). You evaluate that 1 room is burning and the occupant left the door open and it's starting to spread into the public hallway. You make an educated decision based on the factors at hand. You and the firefighter stretch a 1 3/4" right away while the driver is hooking up to the hydrant. You immediately stretch the line to the front door and call for water. You flow water and extinguish the fire in the public hallway. You crawl down the hall and give a burst into the apartment to darken down the fire but not totally extinguish it. You use your tool and pull the apartment door shut. You instruct the firefighter to stay at the door with the line and keep the door closed but be ready with the hoseline to drive the fire back. You race up the stairs to do a quick primary of the public hallway. You stop at the door of the second floor apartment over the fire and bang on the door. The door opens and two people are standing there. There is no smoke or fire apparent in the apartment. You direct them to follow you and shut the door. You direct them into the neighbor's apartment across the hall and shut the door. You continue up the stairs. There is a moderate smoke condition going up to the fourth floor. You meet a couple people entering the hallway and advise them to go back into their apartments and close the door. You make it to the top floor and there are no people anywhere in the public hallway. You hear other sirens coming and you race back down the stairs. You meet up with your firefighter, still protecting the door, and advise him to back out onto the stoop. You meet up with the chief. Two more engines and a ladder arrive and go to work finishing off the fire, evacuating the building and doing a complete search.
 
To sum it up, you broke the 2 in / 2 out rule. You left your partner and two members worked by themselves in a building. You went above a fire without a hoseline. You made a conscious decision to do a quick knock down of the fire, then confine it by closing the door, doing a quick primary search of the public hallway, and decided to employ the tactic of "defending the occupants in place." You were aware that help was on the way and would arrive in 5 minutes. But instead of following the book and doing a complete 360 of the building, you put your judgment, training and experience to use by taking a reasonable risk by confining the fire and hence, saving the people in the building. This is much like Sully did when he decided to land his plane on the Hudson River. His experience, training and education told him he couldn't make it to any airport and the smoothest place to try to land the plane was in the river. He calculated and won.
 
 

I believe the fire service can learn a lot from the airline industry. With that being said, I don't really think we're comparing apples to apples here. The airline industry goes out of it's way to prevent accidents before they happen. If a wing flap is showing the slightest problem during pre-flight checks they won't take off. If the weather is not good, they won't take off. If the co-pilot feels ill and can't make the flight, they wait for another co-pilot and just don't allow the pilot to fly solo. The airline industry does have emergency procedures for when something goes wrong, be it engine failure, smoke in the aircraft, or deploying the emergency chutes after landing. But their response to emergencies is about 1% of what they do. The majority of flights go off without a hitch, as airline travel is the safest means of transport in the country.
 
Now compare the fire service. We have our fire prevention personnel and our public education programs, but when we get called it's because an emergency has already happened. Now I'm not saying we shouldn't use safe and effective procedures, nor am I implying we should go "all out" to get to the fire and the rest of the world be damned. What I am saying is that (just like in the military) there has to be a certain acceptable levels of casualties. If the military wanted to eliminate all casualties, they would never attack. But they plan for, practice for, and then implement a plan that will hopefully obtain a positive outcome with the least amount of casualties. The fire service should be looked at in the same light. Plan, practice, train, educate and then respond and implement a reasonable action that will hopefully mitigate the situation without casualties, but they are going to happen.
 
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY DOES EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO STAY OUT OF HARMS WAY, THE FIRE SERVICE IS EXPECTED TO GO INTO HARMS WAY.
 
The police are much in the same situation as the fire department. Prior to Columbine, police responded to the scene of a shooting and secured the scene and waited for SWAT. Now they are trained for and expected to confront the shooter/s. If two police officers arrive at a school shooting and shots are being fired, they are trained to enter the school and try to at least "pin down" the shooter so he/she can't continue to move and inflict harm. The officers are to hold their position until help arrives and the shooter/s can be neutralized. Not for me!
 
I believe that being safe is of utmost importance, but if you dot every "I" and cross every "T" before you begin operating, you will suffer "paralysis by analysis." At some point educated and calculated risks must be taken. Here is an example: I agree with doing a 360, but it's not always possible or practical. You're the Captain on a 3-man engine. Let's say you pull up on a 4 story multiple dwelling contained in a block long length of multiple dwellings. You see fire in a first floor room and it's just starting to extend to the public hallway. To complete a 360 you'd have go through exposure B, perhaps by breaking in the public door, go out the back door and into the rear yard. You then encounter a chain-link fence blocking you from the rear of the fire building's yard. You decide to pull a garbage can over and jump the fence. You look at the back of the fire building and can see the glow of fire in the public hallway. You then come across a wooden stockade fence blocking you to the backyard of exposure D. You take your tool and break through. Now you have to break into the rear of exposure D and go through and out the front. By this time, the driver has hooked up to the hydrant and your firefighter is finishing up stretching a 1 3/4" line to the front door. You look up and see that the fire has grown in size and now has control of the public stairway and is almost to the 2nd floor landing. By now you're thinking you better go back to the engine for the 2 1/2".
 
Now, would it be better if you pulled up and saw the situation at hand. You see there are attached exposures on Side B & D. You can't even see wants behind the fire building (Side C). You evaluate that 1 room is burning and the occupant left the door open and it's starting to spread into the public hallway. You make an educated decision based on the factors at hand. You and the firefighter stretch a 1 3/4" right away while the driver is hooking up to the hydrant. You immediately stretch the line to the front door and call for water. You flow water and extinguish the fire in the public hallway. You crawl down the hall and give a burst into the apartment to darken down the fire but not totally extinguish it. You use your tool and pull the apartment door shut. You instruct the firefighter to stay at the door with the line and keep the door closed but be ready with the hoseline to drive the fire back. You race up the stairs to do a quick primary of the public hallway. You stop at the door of the second floor apartment over the fire and bang on the door. The door opens and two people are standing there. There is no smoke or fire apparent in the apartment. You direct them to follow you and shut the door. You direct them into the neighbor's apartment across the hall and shut the door. You continue up the stairs. There is a moderate smoke condition going up to the fourth floor. You meet a couple people entering the hallway and advise them to go back into their apartments and close the door. You make it to the top floor and there are no people anywhere in the public hallway. You hear other sirens coming and you race back down the stairs. You meet up with your firefighter, still protecting the door, and advise him to back out onto the stoop. You meet up with the chief. Two more engines and a ladder arrive and go to work finishing off the fire, evacuating the building and doing a complete search.
 
To sum it up, you broke the 2 in / 2 out rule. You left your partner and two members worked by themselves in a building. You went above a fire without a hoseline. You made a conscious decision to do a quick knock down of the fire, then confine it by closing the door, doing a quick primary search of the public hallway, and decided to employ the tactic of "defending the occupants in place." You were aware that help was on the way and would arrive in 5 minutes. But instead of following the book and doing a complete 360 of the building, you put your judgment, training and experience to use by taking a reasonable risk by confining the fire and hence, saving the people in the building. This is much like Sully did when he decided to land his plane on the Hudson River. His experience, training and education told him he couldn't make it to any airport and the smoothest place to try to land the plane was in the river. He calculated and won.