INIT915

I love it! Yet again, members with only a passing knowledge of the events, and in this case based completely on misinformation, hijack the thread, and, as we now see, cannot even gather the basic confirmation before posting. Thanks fireguy43 for the correct version of events. I dare to say, I recently recall a roughly 24-hour period on this site where I literally only saw a handful of new topics or comments, and I and others, believe its antics like this. Feel free to post anything you want. Want a topic on manpower, start one! But to hijack threads, and in retrospect, using unreliable data, is really getting old.

While not commenting on the specifics of this particular NYS legislation, as I'm indifferent to it, everyone should be aware, New York Courts recognize an exception to "at-will" known as the "Implied Contract Exception". Two other common exceptions, known colloquially as "Public Policy Exception" and "Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing" are not recognized under current NYS Labor Law, nor through existing case law here.
Again, this is not a reflection on the current topic, just a clarification on your skewed interpretation of current New York civil practice.
And a further clarification, every state is an "at-will" state, so New York isn't actually "one of several", it's more like "one of every". The only quasi-exception is in Montana where they have a complicated law called the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA). I'm not going to go into explaining it here, but if your truly interested in why Montana is different, check out an article written by Don Robinson in the 1996 edition of the Montana Law Review.
One last additional point, "at will" does not supersede federal statutes such as ADA, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, or any other statute governing workplace discrimination.

Wow, alleging money laundering and grand larceny? Pretty serious charges. Any offer of proof???

"as told to me" and "Last I heard" is very strong proof that your facts are all correct. So did they do 2,000 calls but 80% or 8,000 calls were given away? I don't think so or did the recieve 2,000 calls (which sounds about right for the population) and they gave away 80% or 1,600 calls.
Lets assume the 1st. they did 2,000 calls and they billed $400 per call (average) the collection rate ranges from 50% - 75% so your $800,000 is closer to $400,000 - $600,000.
If we assume the 2nd, then they did 400 calls and collected $200 - $300 per call or a total of $80,000 - $120,000.
So whats the correct amount:
a. $800,000
b. $600,000
c. $400,000
d. $120,000
e. $ 80,000
f. None of the above. The information is such a wild a** guess that there is no way to calculate it.
New ambulance cost more than $100,000. And you left out insurance (liability, vehicle & workers comp) which are substantial.
Because it is illegal.
Because it is illegal. And if they had not broken away and started hiring EMS staff (which was clearly needed) then they would be increasing the tax levy on you.

Wow, alleging money laundering and grand larceny? Pretty serious charges. Any offer of proof???

Kudos to Mohegan VAC!

I give Mohegan VAC tremendous credit. To go from 100% volunteer to having a paid crew is a huge step that most departments won't take even though they need to.
Regarding the employees vs contractors, consider this. Someone from Mohegan VAC just pays a bill (if there is one) once a month to Empress and then the Chief/Captain handles any issues that may come up. If you direct hire employees, you have a fixed number of employees, whereas Empress can pull any of their employees to fill in shifts at Mohegan VAC and you are also not dealing with the whole human resources aspect of the paid crews (vacation and sick coverage, benefits, training, certifications, terminations, hirings, physicals, immunizations, etc.)
Beekman pays a bill once a month and TransCare handles everything else. I don't need any more headaches and I'm sure Mohegan VAC doesn't either.

Let's take them one at a time. (I italicized the key points, as many of the orders are lengthy.) And I'll reiterate, read the recent decision out of the N.D.N.Y. by Judge Kahn. I've provided the sections of interest in the recent post.
And I've listed the four cases in order of preeminence as they could address the instant case. By default, you could assume the recent NDNY case would replace US Trust v NJ, in prominence.
1. U.S. Trust V. N.J.
New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies.The Court ruled the repeal violated the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued that the states could have implemented a less drastic solution to encourage people to use commuter train services in lieu of driving their cars. (State leaders thought the increase in bridge fares that would occur with the agreement's repeal would cause this to occur.) Furthermore, since the need to facilitate mass transportation in the New York metropolitan area had been a concern long before 1962, the states could not justify their action as a response to unforeseen circumstances.
2. MASCIO v PUBL EMPLOYEES RET - 1998 FED App. 0328P (6th Cir.)
In its balancing of the four factors in the case at bar, the district court placed great weight on the circumstance that, as the court saw it, Judge Mascio had shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of both his Bill of Attainder and Contract Clause claims. We find it unnecessary to address the Bill of Attainder Clause question, because it seems to us that the district court was clearly correct in its assessment of the likelihood that Judge Mascio would prevail on the Contract Clause issue.
The Contract Clause provides that "[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.1. To prove a violation of this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a "change in state law has `operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.'" General Motors Corp. v. Romein , 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus , 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)). In deciding whether such a demonstration has been made, the court must ask whether "(1) a contract exists, (2) a change in law impairs that contract, and (3) the impairment is substantial." Linton v. Comm'r of Health & Environment , 65 F.3d 508, 518 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1155 (1996). If a contractual obligation is substantially impaired by the change in law, the court must further inquire whether the adjustment of the rights of the parties to the contractual relationship was reasonable and appropriate in the service of a legitimate and important public purpose. See Allied Structural Steel , 438 U.S. at 242 -44.
The retirement benefits of Ohio public employees vest, by statute, at the time when the retirement allowance or pension is granted by the public employees retirement board. Ohio Rev. Code § 145.561. The effect of this vested rights statute is "to make the engagement of public authorities to pay a pension, upon conditions fulfilled, a contractual obligation founded upon a valid consideration, giving to the pensioner a vested right in his pension which cannot afterwards be impaired or revoked." State ex rel. Cunat v. Trustees of Cleveland Police Relief & Pension Fund , 149 Ohio St. 477, 482, supplemented , 150 Ohio St. 377 (1948).
Judge Mascio's pension was fully vested as of October 1, 1996, the date on which he began receiving benefits. As of that date, in other words, Mascio had a contractual right to continued receipt of the benefits. Forfeiture of the benefits would obviously constitute a substantial impairment of this vested contract right. 1
The defendants argue that no impairment could occur unless, as of December 6, 1996, Mascio had a present right to receive both his pension and his judge's salary. We disagree. The newly enacted statute effected a forfeiture of pension benefits, not a forfeiture of salary. Although it is conceivable that under the new law Mascio could have continued to receive his pension benefits by resigning from the office to which he had been re-elected, his contractual right to the pension benefits was not conditioned on his giving up his judicial salary.
3. ALLIED STRUCTURAL STEEL CO. v. SPANNAUS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MINNESOTA
If the Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at all, however, it must be understood to impose some limits upon the power of a State to abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of its otherwise legitimate police power. The existence and nature of those limits were clearly indicated in a series of cases in this Court arising from the efforts of the States to deal with the unprecedented emergencies brought on by the severe economic depression of the early 1930's.
4. ASSOCIATION OF SURROGATES v. STATE OF NEW YORK, 79 N.Y.2d 39, 588 N.E.2d 51, 580 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1992).
And in denying the certified question on appeal from the S.D.N.Y.:
The State Comptroller implemented the legislative direction by a "lag payroll": commencing November 7, 1990, affected employees were paid nine rather than 10 days' salary in each two-week pay period, for 10 periods. As a result, during the 1990-1991 fiscal year ending March 31, 1991, employees were paid for 50 rather than 52 weeks of work. Withheld amounts were to be repaid upon termination of employment at the employees' then rate of salary.
Plaintiffs are 11 labor organizations representing nonjudicial employees and 11 individual employees of the court system. Each of the labor organizations was a party to a collective bargaining agreement with the Unified Court System for the three-year period from April 1, 1988 to March 31, 1991. Each agreement provided that "Bi-weekly salaries will be computed on the basis of 10 working days."
Plaintiffs contend that the lag payroll violates the provision of their contracts that salaries will be computed on the basis of ten working days; that the legislation authorizing the lag payroll is an unconstitutional impairment of their contracts (US Const, art I, § 10); and that the law transgresses their Equal Protection and Due Process rights (US Const, XIV amdmt).

Let's take them one at a time. (I italicized the key points, as many of the orders are lengthy.) And I'll reiterate, read the recent decision out of the N.D.N.Y. by Judge Kahn. I've provided the sections of interest in the recent post.
And I've listed the four cases in order of preeminence as they could address the instant case. By default, you could assume the recent NDNY case would replace US Trust v NJ, in prominence.
1. U.S. Trust V. N.J.
New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies.The Court ruled the repeal violated the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued that the states could have implemented a less drastic solution to encourage people to use commuter train services in lieu of driving their cars. (State leaders thought the increase in bridge fares that would occur with the agreement's repeal would cause this to occur.) Furthermore, since the need to facilitate mass transportation in the New York metropolitan area had been a concern long before 1962, the states could not justify their action as a response to unforeseen circumstances.
2. MASCIO v PUBL EMPLOYEES RET - 1998 FED App. 0328P (6th Cir.)
In its balancing of the four factors in the case at bar, the district court placed great weight on the circumstance that, as the court saw it, Judge Mascio had shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of both his Bill of Attainder and Contract Clause claims. We find it unnecessary to address the Bill of Attainder Clause question, because it seems to us that the district court was clearly correct in its assessment of the likelihood that Judge Mascio would prevail on the Contract Clause issue.
The Contract Clause provides that "[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.1. To prove a violation of this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a "change in state law has `operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.'" General Motors Corp. v. Romein , 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus , 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)). In deciding whether such a demonstration has been made, the court must ask whether "(1) a contract exists, (2) a change in law impairs that contract, and (3) the impairment is substantial." Linton v. Comm'r of Health & Environment , 65 F.3d 508, 518 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1155 (1996). If a contractual obligation is substantially impaired by the change in law, the court must further inquire whether the adjustment of the rights of the parties to the contractual relationship was reasonable and appropriate in the service of a legitimate and important public purpose. See Allied Structural Steel , 438 U.S. at 242 -44.
The retirement benefits of Ohio public employees vest, by statute, at the time when the retirement allowance or pension is granted by the public employees retirement board. Ohio Rev. Code § 145.561. The effect of this vested rights statute is "to make the engagement of public authorities to pay a pension, upon conditions fulfilled, a contractual obligation founded upon a valid consideration, giving to the pensioner a vested right in his pension which cannot afterwards be impaired or revoked." State ex rel. Cunat v. Trustees of Cleveland Police Relief & Pension Fund , 149 Ohio St. 477, 482, supplemented , 150 Ohio St. 377 (1948).
Judge Mascio's pension was fully vested as of October 1, 1996, the date on which he began receiving benefits. As of that date, in other words, Mascio had a contractual right to continued receipt of the benefits. Forfeiture of the benefits would obviously constitute a substantial impairment of this vested contract right. 1
The defendants argue that no impairment could occur unless, as of December 6, 1996, Mascio had a present right to receive both his pension and his judge's salary. We disagree. The newly enacted statute effected a forfeiture of pension benefits, not a forfeiture of salary. Although it is conceivable that under the new law Mascio could have continued to receive his pension benefits by resigning from the office to which he had been re-elected, his contractual right to the pension benefits was not conditioned on his giving up his judicial salary.
3. ALLIED STRUCTURAL STEEL CO. v. SPANNAUS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MINNESOTA
If the Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at all, however, it must be understood to impose some limits upon the power of a State to abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of its otherwise legitimate police power. The existence and nature of those limits were clearly indicated in a series of cases in this Court arising from the efforts of the States to deal with the unprecedented emergencies brought on by the severe economic depression of the early 1930's.
4. ASSOCIATION OF SURROGATES v. STATE OF NEW YORK, 79 N.Y.2d 39, 588 N.E.2d 51, 580 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1992).
And in denying the certified question on appeal from the S.D.N.Y.:
The State Comptroller implemented the legislative direction by a "lag payroll": commencing November 7, 1990, affected employees were paid nine rather than 10 days' salary in each two-week pay period, for 10 periods. As a result, during the 1990-1991 fiscal year ending March 31, 1991, employees were paid for 50 rather than 52 weeks of work. Withheld amounts were to be repaid upon termination of employment at the employees' then rate of salary.
Plaintiffs are 11 labor organizations representing nonjudicial employees and 11 individual employees of the court system. Each of the labor organizations was a party to a collective bargaining agreement with the Unified Court System for the three-year period from April 1, 1988 to March 31, 1991. Each agreement provided that "Bi-weekly salaries will be computed on the basis of 10 working days."
Plaintiffs contend that the lag payroll violates the provision of their contracts that salaries will be computed on the basis of ten working days; that the legislation authorizing the lag payroll is an unconstitutional impairment of their contracts (US Const, art I, § 10); and that the law transgresses their Equal Protection and Due Process rights (US Const, XIV amdmt).

Let's take them one at a time. (I italicized the key points, as many of the orders are lengthy.) And I'll reiterate, read the recent decision out of the N.D.N.Y. by Judge Kahn. I've provided the sections of interest in the recent post.
And I've listed the four cases in order of preeminence as they could address the instant case. By default, you could assume the recent NDNY case would replace US Trust v NJ, in prominence.
1. U.S. Trust V. N.J.
New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies.The Court ruled the repeal violated the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued that the states could have implemented a less drastic solution to encourage people to use commuter train services in lieu of driving their cars. (State leaders thought the increase in bridge fares that would occur with the agreement's repeal would cause this to occur.) Furthermore, since the need to facilitate mass transportation in the New York metropolitan area had been a concern long before 1962, the states could not justify their action as a response to unforeseen circumstances.
2. MASCIO v PUBL EMPLOYEES RET - 1998 FED App. 0328P (6th Cir.)
In its balancing of the four factors in the case at bar, the district court placed great weight on the circumstance that, as the court saw it, Judge Mascio had shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of both his Bill of Attainder and Contract Clause claims. We find it unnecessary to address the Bill of Attainder Clause question, because it seems to us that the district court was clearly correct in its assessment of the likelihood that Judge Mascio would prevail on the Contract Clause issue.
The Contract Clause provides that "[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.1. To prove a violation of this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a "change in state law has `operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.'" General Motors Corp. v. Romein , 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus , 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)). In deciding whether such a demonstration has been made, the court must ask whether "(1) a contract exists, (2) a change in law impairs that contract, and (3) the impairment is substantial." Linton v. Comm'r of Health & Environment , 65 F.3d 508, 518 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1155 (1996). If a contractual obligation is substantially impaired by the change in law, the court must further inquire whether the adjustment of the rights of the parties to the contractual relationship was reasonable and appropriate in the service of a legitimate and important public purpose. See Allied Structural Steel , 438 U.S. at 242 -44.
The retirement benefits of Ohio public employees vest, by statute, at the time when the retirement allowance or pension is granted by the public employees retirement board. Ohio Rev. Code § 145.561. The effect of this vested rights statute is "to make the engagement of public authorities to pay a pension, upon conditions fulfilled, a contractual obligation founded upon a valid consideration, giving to the pensioner a vested right in his pension which cannot afterwards be impaired or revoked." State ex rel. Cunat v. Trustees of Cleveland Police Relief & Pension Fund , 149 Ohio St. 477, 482, supplemented , 150 Ohio St. 377 (1948).
Judge Mascio's pension was fully vested as of October 1, 1996, the date on which he began receiving benefits. As of that date, in other words, Mascio had a contractual right to continued receipt of the benefits. Forfeiture of the benefits would obviously constitute a substantial impairment of this vested contract right. 1
The defendants argue that no impairment could occur unless, as of December 6, 1996, Mascio had a present right to receive both his pension and his judge's salary. We disagree. The newly enacted statute effected a forfeiture of pension benefits, not a forfeiture of salary. Although it is conceivable that under the new law Mascio could have continued to receive his pension benefits by resigning from the office to which he had been re-elected, his contractual right to the pension benefits was not conditioned on his giving up his judicial salary.
3. ALLIED STRUCTURAL STEEL CO. v. SPANNAUS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MINNESOTA
If the Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at all, however, it must be understood to impose some limits upon the power of a State to abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of its otherwise legitimate police power. The existence and nature of those limits were clearly indicated in a series of cases in this Court arising from the efforts of the States to deal with the unprecedented emergencies brought on by the severe economic depression of the early 1930's.
4. ASSOCIATION OF SURROGATES v. STATE OF NEW YORK, 79 N.Y.2d 39, 588 N.E.2d 51, 580 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1992).
And in denying the certified question on appeal from the S.D.N.Y.:
The State Comptroller implemented the legislative direction by a "lag payroll": commencing November 7, 1990, affected employees were paid nine rather than 10 days' salary in each two-week pay period, for 10 periods. As a result, during the 1990-1991 fiscal year ending March 31, 1991, employees were paid for 50 rather than 52 weeks of work. Withheld amounts were to be repaid upon termination of employment at the employees' then rate of salary.
Plaintiffs are 11 labor organizations representing nonjudicial employees and 11 individual employees of the court system. Each of the labor organizations was a party to a collective bargaining agreement with the Unified Court System for the three-year period from April 1, 1988 to March 31, 1991. Each agreement provided that "Bi-weekly salaries will be computed on the basis of 10 working days."
Plaintiffs contend that the lag payroll violates the provision of their contracts that salaries will be computed on the basis of ten working days; that the legislation authorizing the lag payroll is an unconstitutional impairment of their contracts (US Const, art I, § 10); and that the law transgresses their Equal Protection and Due Process rights (US Const, XIV amdmt).

Too bad those of us in unions, (PD, PD, Teachers) don't work hard enough in your eyes. Thanks for your insightful comments and pointing out how lazy we are.

Date: 4/11/10
Time: 22:15 hours
Location: Grand St x Eldridge St
Frequency: FDNY Manhattan
Weather Conditions: humid, light drizzle
Description Of Incident: fire extended from the basement through the roof of a 6 story MD and into exposures 2, 2A, and 4. Companies initially unable to locate source of fire.
Reporters/Writer: ryang
Additional Info:
Chinatown, Manhattan, NY, 4/11/10
Address: 283 - 285 Grand St between Forsyth and Eldridge Sts
22:14 hours
Phone Box 259 - Report of smoke in the area
Engs. 9, 55, 15
T6, TL18
Battalion 4
10-75-259 - 22:16 hours
E28
T20 (FAST Truck)
Battalion 2
Squad 18
Rescue 1
Division 1
22:21 hours
Battalion 4: We're opening up at this time, we're trying to locate the source of the smoke. We're not sure if this is even the right building at this time. We have 1 line stretched, ready to go into operation.
22:25 hours
Division 1: We're going to change the address to 285 Grand St, we have a heavy smoke condition throughout the building, still trying to locate the source. 1 line stretched at this time, start out an extra engine and extra truck.
E7, L11 S/C
7-5-259 - 22:29 hours
DC1: We have a 20x80 mixed-occupancy type 6 story. We're still searching for the fire at this time. All-Hands at this time.
RAC1
Exposures are:
1 - street
2 - similar attached
3 - unknown
4 - similar
CIDs for 283 - 285 Grand St:
6 story 60x75 MD class 3. Rear fire escape. Solar panels on roof.
2-2-259 - 22:34 hours - Duration 20 minutes
Car 6 (AC James Esposito, Manhattan Borough Commander): Box 259, transmit a full 2nd alarm on this box, k. Box 259, right now we're using a 2nd alarm, heavy smoke in the cellar and 1st floor. Undetermined source of fire at this time, Trucks are still opening and searching for fire. This report by AC James Esposito, citywide tour commander.
Engs. 33, 5, 6, 10
E24 acting 9 w/ Satellite 1
TL9, L3 acting 6
Battalion 1 (Safety Officer)
Battalion 6 (Resource Unit Leader)
Safety, Rescue Battalions
Tactical Support 1
FieldCom, Command Tactical Unit
22:36 hours
Car 6: 2nd Alarm Box 259, 10-45 no code.
22:38 hours
Car 6: The satellite, let's get them on Grand St in front of the park on Eldridge, get the manifold set up right in front of the fire building. I want the two trucks into the command post ASAP, with their tools, k, they're going to work. Special call 1 additional truck on the 2nd
TL1 S/C
22:40 hours
The staging area is Grand St and Chrystie St
22:41 hours
Receiving apartment 4H at 45 Allen St reporting smoke.
22:42 hours
Car 6: Special call an additional truck above TL1.
L8 S/C
22:43 hours - Duration 29 minutes
Car 6: 2nd Alarm Box 259, another, 2nd, 10-45 no code
3-3-259 - 22:47 hours
Car 6: 259 box, transmit a full 3rd alarm. I want the entire third alarm to stage at the staging area
Engs. 4, 3, 16, 23 acting 55
L10, T5
Battalion 7
Battalion 35 (Staging Manager)
Battalion 43 (Air-Recon Chief)
Mask Service Unit

22:54 hours
Car 6: Have the 1st due trucks on the 3rd alarm respond in to the Command Post.
22:55 hours
Car 6: Call 2 trucks and have them go to staging.
TL21 acting 1, TL15 S/C
22:59 hours
Car 6: Give me 2 engines and 2 trucks off of staging, have them report in to the Command Post.
Engs. 4, 3, L10, T5 re-directed
23:00 hours
Car 6: Special call two Battalion Chiefs on this assignment, I want them at the command post.
Battalions 8, 57 S/C
23:00 hours
Battalion 31 replacing Battalion 57
4-4-259 - 23:01 hours
Car 6: Transmit a 4th Alarm! Have the 4th alarm report to staging, I have Battalion 35 at staging.
Engs. 8, 1, 54, 14
E262 w/ IMT Unit
TL7, TL12
Battalion 57 (Planning Sections Chief)
Car 4 (Chief of Operations Robert Sweeney)
Car 36B (Department Chaplain)
23:02 hours
Car 12A (Executive Assistant, Safety and Inspectional Services) is responding
Car 17 is 10-84
23:05 hours
FieldCom: 4th alarm Box 259, AC Esposito, Car 6, would like to request ConEd Gas and ConEd Electric to the scene, k.
23:08 hours
Fallback Step III has been implemented in the borough of Manhattan.
23:10 hours
Receiving report of person trapped in apartment 4C on the 6th floor
23:10 hours - Duration 57 minutes
FC: Progress report #6 on the 4th alarm Box 259, the correct address is 283 Grand St. Car 6, AC Esposito reports we have fire in the basement and 1st floor of the fire building, which is 283 Grand St, with possible extension into the 2nd floor. We have extension into exposure 2, which is 285 Grand St, into the 1st floor. They have 5 hands lines stretched and in operation, they are evacuating civilians from the upper floors, and they are getting water on the fire, primary searches are in progress, and the fire remains Doubtful Will Hold.
23:12 hours
Receiving apartment 14 at 285 Grand St reporting a person choking from smoke.
23:13 hours
FC: By orders of Car 6, AC Esposito, special call 2 Battalion Chiefs above the 4th Alarm.
Battalions 9, 32 acting 1 S/C
23:13 hours
Car 12 (DAC Stephen Raynis, Chief of Safety and Inspectional Services) is responding
23:16 hours
FC: Can you put in another call to ConEd, we need a supervisor forthwith and get an ETA
5-5-259 - 23:17 hours
FC: Per Car 6, AC Esposito, transmit a 5th Alarm!
Engs. 26, 226, 34 acting 24, 230 acting 10
6-6-259 - 23:23 hours
Engs. 205, 224, 210, 211
L154 acting 1, L24
23:26 hours - Duration 1 hour 12 minutes
FC: Progress report #7 for the 6th Alarm Box 259, at this time AC Esposito reports, 8 handlines stretched and in operation, fire on the 1st and 2nd floors of exposure 2, fire extended to the 3rd floor of the original fire building. Transmit 2 additional 10-45s, for a total of 4, still evacuating numerous civilians from the upper floors, and the fire remains Doubtful.
23:32 hours
Car 36A (Department Chaplain) is responding
23:34 hours
FC: Special call a 95 foot Tower Ladder, we need them to respond to Eldridge St adjacent to exposure 2.
TL14 acting 21 S/C
23:42 hours
FC: At this time the Chief of Operations, Chief Sweeney, is on scene. We have evacuated all members from the fire building and from exposure 2, and we are in the process of conducting a rollcall.
23:44 hours
Battalion 43 - Air Recon: Can you advise the FieldCom, from our vantage point we have heavy fire through the roof.
FC: Have the Air Recon Battalion switch to channel 5 while they conduct rollcall.
23:45 hours
Car 3 (Chief of Department Edward Kilduff) is 10-84
Car 1 (Fire Commissioner Salvatore Cassano) is responding
23:54 hours
Car 1E (Commissioner's Liaison) is responding
Car 14 (Chief Fire Marshal) is responding
7-7-259 - 23:55 hours
FC: At this time can you special call an additional FAST Truck, have them report to Battalion 9 on exposure 3. By orders of the Chief of Department, Chief Kilduff, transmit a 7th Alarm.
T118 (FAST Truck) S/C
23:56 hours
FC: By orders of Car 3, Chief Kilduff, we will only special call 2 engines.
Engs. 21 acting 15, 219 S/C*
((7th Alarm rescinded)
00:00 hours - 1 hour 46 minutes
FC: Progress report for the 6th Alarm Box 259, at this time Car 3, Chief of Department Kilduff reports they have heavy fire on all floors of the original fire building, and they have fire on all floors of exposure 2. They have 2 tower ladders set up and in operation: 1 on the fire building, and 1 on exposure 2. They have extension into exposure 2A, and have 3 handlines stretched into exposure 2A, and the fire remains Doubtful.
7-7-259 - 00:05 hours
FC: By orders of the Chief of Department, Chief Kilduff, transmit an additional alarm for the 7th alarm.
Engs 216, 258 acting 33, 271 acting 6, 202
L30 acting 3, TL146 acting 18
00:07 hours
FC: Can you special call an additional Deputy Chief.
Division 11 S/C
00:11 hours
RAC1: You're going to have to dispatch another RAC to the 7th Alarm here.
RAC2 S/C
00:27 hours
FC requests a mixer-off message.
00:33 hours
FC: Can you special call 1 additional battalion chief, have them report to the Command Post.
Battalion 44 S/C
00:46 hours
Receiving report of embers falling on Hester St between Eldridge and Forsyth Sts
00:46 hours - Duration 2 hours 32 minutes
FC: At this time Chief of Department Kilduff reports they have fire in exposure 2A on the 4th, 5th, 6th floors and in the cockloft, they have a tower ladder operation on the fire building, another tower ladder operating on exposures 2 and 2A. They had some extension into exposure 4 but that has been knocked down, and the fire remains Doubtful, k.
00:54 hours
FC: On the original 4 10-45 no codes, 2 of them are going to be code 2s (Red Tag, Immediate) and 2 will be code 4s (Green Tag, Minor).
01:14 hours
FC requests a mixer-off message.
01:25 hours
BC43 (Air Recon): Advise FieldCom we have re-fueled and are ready to take off again, ascertain if they have any special instructions and what handy-talky channel they want us to come in on.
01:26 hours
FC: You can notify the Air Recon as per the Chief they can go back in service.
01:35 hours - Duration 3 hours 22 minutes
FC: Progress report #10 for the 7th Alarm Box 259, the Chief of Department, Chief Kilduff, reports: at this time they have shut down all tower ladders, they have no visible fire in the original fire building, exposure 2, or exposure 2A. They are evaluating the structural stability of the original fire building and exposure 2, they will be going back to a handline operation in exposure 2A, and places the fire Probably Will Hold, k.
01:49 hours
FC: We have a correction on the 10-45s: originally we had a total of 4 1045s, it is now only 3. 2 will be code 2s, and 1 has been upgraded to a code 3 (Yellow Tag, Delayed).
01:51 hours
Rescue Battalion is 10-8 back to Citywide.
01:54 hours
Tactical Support 1 is 10-8 back to Citywide.
02:00 hours
Car 1 is 10-8.
02:12 hours - Duration 3 hours 58 minutes
FC: Progress report #11 on the 7th Alarm Box 259, the Chief of Department, Chief Kilduff, reports: at this time they have 1 tower ladder operating into exposure 2, they have 2 handlines stretched and in operation in exposure 2A knocking down pockets of fire in the shaft and cockloft, he's placing the fire Under Control, k.
Relocations:
Engines: 316/1, 292/3, 280/4, 271/6, 221/7, 24/9, 22/9, 306/22, 230/10, 35/10, 291/14, 21/15, 255/15, 319/21, 34/24, 325/24, 73/26, 237/28, 258/33, 259/33, 23/55, 74/55
Ladders: 21/1, 154/1, 115/1, 3/6, 30/3, 128/6, 163/7, 110/8, 16/11, 22/12, 111/15, 146/18, 119/18, 101/20, 14/21, 23/21, 54/14
Battalions: 32/1, 11/2, 10/4, 45/6, 52/8

While no CIC's receive bonuses or payment of the sort, programs that get reputations as "too hard" or "too demanding" or get a history of dropping under-performing students mear fear a drop in enrollment, as students could potentially seek out training that is "easier" or "less challenging". So, this is in effect a potential reason programs may push through students that we all would like to have seen be dropped long ago.
And, in a county like Westchester, where without a doubt most of us either are or know all the CIC's, you have a pretty good idea from their reputation which ones push through unqualified candidates and which ones have the ethics to drop those students in the interest of remediation.

Read up on your case law. He probably will not win an appeal. Public sector employees do not have the same First Amendment rights of the general public.

Well, very presumptuous (or clairvoyant) of you to assume what other Members are thinking. It seems like the Union doesn't need help discrediting themselves here. Just like in volleyball, sometimes when someone sets you, you spike it. And coming from a Union that has had 14 line of duty deaths in 10 years, with all associated expenses paid by the Union, I have no qualms about saying so.
As for the secondary debate that has evolved, in full disclosure, I think use of taxpayer funds to stock bars at volunteer stations is equally unethical and an abuse.

Well, very presumptuous (or clairvoyant) of you to assume what other Members are thinking. It seems like the Union doesn't need help discrediting themselves here. Just like in volleyball, sometimes when someone sets you, you spike it. And coming from a Union that has had 14 line of duty deaths in 10 years, with all associated expenses paid by the Union, I have no qualms about saying so.
As for the secondary debate that has evolved, in full disclosure, I think use of taxpayer funds to stock bars at volunteer stations is equally unethical and an abuse.

Well, very presumptuous (or clairvoyant) of you to assume what other Members are thinking. It seems like the Union doesn't need help discrediting themselves here. Just like in volleyball, sometimes when someone sets you, you spike it. And coming from a Union that has had 14 line of duty deaths in 10 years, with all associated expenses paid by the Union, I have no qualms about saying so.
As for the secondary debate that has evolved, in full disclosure, I think use of taxpayer funds to stock bars at volunteer stations is equally unethical and an abuse.

Well, very presumptuous (or clairvoyant) of you to assume what other Members are thinking. It seems like the Union doesn't need help discrediting themselves here. Just like in volleyball, sometimes when someone sets you, you spike it. And coming from a Union that has had 14 line of duty deaths in 10 years, with all associated expenses paid by the Union, I have no qualms about saying so.
As for the secondary debate that has evolved, in full disclosure, I think use of taxpayer funds to stock bars at volunteer stations is equally unethical and an abuse.

Well, very presumptuous (or clairvoyant) of you to assume what other Members are thinking. It seems like the Union doesn't need help discrediting themselves here. Just like in volleyball, sometimes when someone sets you, you spike it. And coming from a Union that has had 14 line of duty deaths in 10 years, with all associated expenses paid by the Union, I have no qualms about saying so.
As for the secondary debate that has evolved, in full disclosure, I think use of taxpayer funds to stock bars at volunteer stations is equally unethical and an abuse.

If they are trying to get the city to pick up the bar tab; I have to admit that I would agree with the city on this one.
Story

Our paychecks are funded through taxation. So, therefore, are you saying that we should not be able to spend any of our salaries on alcohol?
This is monies which the BFD union feels were owed to them contractually to be spent as they see fit for funeral expenses. Alcohol being served at a funeral reception is a normal, legitimate expense.
There were many thousands of mourners in Buffalo for two funerals and consuming alcohol off duty at a funeral is a perfectly legal, acceptable thing to do. Considering the numbers of attendees I don't think either $7,600, as the union claims, or $11,000, as the City claims, is a lot of money to spend on booze. It was not a frat party, however, this whole matter is obviously a thinly veiled attempt for the Buffalo City Administration to make it look like just that in order to discredit the union.
Some on this site are attempting to take that ball and run with it for their own reasons...

I agree 100% here.... was that for a gathering of mourners or a frat party... lets keep it to the matter at hand... I agree about any money being collected through taxes being used for alcohol, regardless if its career or volunteer... Bottom line its wrong... and this time it was from a career department.
The union was wrong...

I'm kind of surprised anyone is defending the choice to use more than $11,000 of taxpayers money for alcohol. If the BFD Union wanted to raise the funds for it, that would be a different story.

I think the fence will be an immense help. Not so much for jumpers, as already mentioned, they will still find a way. Rather, when the bridge finally hits it's breaking point and crumbles/collapses, it will give motorists something to cling to while awaiting rescue.

I don't think anyone is second guessing the officers involved in this incident or their professionalism, nor should anyone because without being there we don't know what transpired. But unforunately this incident, as well as the New Rochelle incident does send the wrong message to the general public.
When police involved shooting incidents occur, I frequently see questions being asked by people along the lines of, "Why couldnt they shoot the gun out of his hand?", "Why didn't they just shoot him in the leg?", and now, "Why didn't they just Taser him?". Unfortunately, when it comes to force-on-force encounters, the general public only knows what they see in Hollywood and the occasional reality TV show such as Cops. Obviously, if true police officers possessed the skills of Steven Seagal, Sylvester Stallone, or any one of the many "action hero" police officers in Hollywood, all we'd have to do is look at criminals and they would surrender. And reality shows such as Cops rarely show force-on-force encounters which result in the use of deadly physical force. In fact, I can only recall one episode where a police officer in Massachusetts shot a perp who charged him with a knife in the middle of the roadway.
The problem with applying a less lethal option against an armed adversary who has threatened deadly physical force is that it looks all great in the paper and in the eyes of the public, but what about the next Police Officer who appropriately applies deadly physical force to an armed adversary? Members of the general public, especially critics of Law Enforcement, as well as the media, will drag that Police Officer through the mud, questioning why he/she couldn't just disarm the perpetrator. Law Enforcement today has become more concerned with looking good in the eyes of the public and critics of Law Enforcement tactics, which in turn is jeopardizing the lives of Police Officers, as well as the reputation of certain Police Officers who use appropriate tactics and follow the use-of-force continuum.
With that being said, the Officers involved in this incident should be applauded because they did do a great job. They were able to disarm and apprehend an armed subject without injury to themselves or any members of the public.
Remember, it was our fantastic current Governor who, prior to being Governor, introduced a bill that would have forced Police Officers to "shoot to wound".