"Baltimore Recruit Not Ready for Live-Burn Training"

[PVFD233 68]

Annie Linskey,

The Baltimore Sun

A Baltimore fire recruit who was killed in a February training exercise was not ready to be sent into a burning dwelling, had failed agility tests and had been given old protective gear that frayed and failed to protect her from the intense heat, according to a report prepared for the mayor.

The 121-page report by an independent investigator, obtained yesterday by The Sun, adds new details to the death of Racheal M. Wilson and places much of the blame on her instructor, who investigators say abandoned her in the burning rowhouse, and on other mid-level fire commanders, three of whom have already been fired.

It describes a chaotic scene conducted by instructors who acted with little oversight and concludes that 50 national safety standards were violated during the exercise, more than the 36 previously acknowledged by the city and the department.

Fire Chief William J. Goodwin Jr., who has been criticized for allowing lax standards at the training academy he once headed, is mentioned once in the detailed report, in a paragraph in which investigators note that he was unaware that the live-fire exercises would take place.

Mayor Sheila Dixon, who commissioned the investigation, is expected to release the report publicly Thursday after Wilson's family has had a chance to read it. She refused to discuss the contents yesterday.

The lead investigator, Howard County Deputy Fire Chief Chris Shimer, concluded his report by expressing hope that other departments would learn from the mistakes made by Baltimore firefighters.

"The ultimate sacrifice by Racheal Wilson should serve as a reminder to fire officials everywhere that rules and standards are developed for a reason," Shimer wrote. "The primary reason is to ensure that we keep our personnel safe so they may return home each and every day to their loved ones."

Two previous investigations into the Feb. 9 fire on South Calverton Road have revealed dozens of violations of national safety standards, including the setting of seven or eight fires instead of the one that is permitted, the lack of radios for some instructors, the failure to clear debris from the vacant dwelling and the failure to brief students before the exercise.

The report was based on a six-month investigation into what occurred during the fatal fire, but it also scrutinized other practices, finding "systematic problems" at the training academy.

It includes graphics, photographs and 19 appendices. Toward the end of the report, Shimer concludes that the fire academy is governed by an "unacceptable" view that "recruits must be exposed to heavy fire conditions in order to be adequately prepared for the field.

"These practices are unacceptable and may lead to serious injury and in this case death," the report says.

After the fire, three commanders lost their jobs. Division Chief Kenneth Hyde, who was head of the academy when Wilson died, was fired by Dixon in February. Lt. Joseph Crest, the instructor in charge of the fire, and Lt. Barry Broyles, who was supposed to be in charge of an unprepared rescue team, were fired on the recommendation of a panel of their peers.

Goodwin has said that the Fire Department needs to focus more on safety and has taken steps to improve it. He replaced most of the staff at the training academy, obtained grants for radios, increased the department's safety office operation and started to rotate all midlevel battalion chiefs, in part because of a belief that they had grown too close to their men and were not reporting safety violations.

Investigators noted that Goodwin was interviewed and that the Fire Department was mostly cooperative, with the exception of three key people.

Lt. Eugene Jones, who was supposed to light fires at the fatal burn, would not allow officials from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives to interview him. Tarnisha Lee, a firefighter paramedic who lit some of the fires in the rowhouse, would submit to only a brief interview with investigators.

Hyde, who was in charge of the training academy, initially cooperated with investigators but stopped participating on the advice of his lawyer, according to the report.

The report examined for the first time a similar training exercise that was conducted Feb. 8 on Sinclair Lane, the day before the fatal burn. Investigators found that national safety standards were violated there, too, something that Fire Department spokesmen have denied.

From watching a video of that fire, investigators determined that instructors lit more than one fire, recruits entered and exited the burning building without being accompanied by instructors and a recruit left the building with what appeared to be burning debris on his or her back and neck.

Instructors were not wearing their face pieces properly, the report says. One recruit, Daniel Nott, was injured after removing his mask and suffering burns to his face. Lt. Sam Darby, an instructor, suffered a burn on his hand at that fire.

"It is obvious to an observer of this video that the fire is beyond the capabilities of a recruit class, especially one with minimal training," the report says.

Problems with class

Even before the back-to-back training fires on Sinclair Lane and South Calverton Road, the recruit class had problems, it says.

As officials were selecting members for Class 19 in November 2006, they overlooked Wilson's having failed one section of a seven-part agility test given to recruits before they can enter the class. Disregarding physical fitness is a common practice, the report says.

In early 2006, Wilson, who was a civilian working in the Fire Marshal's office, applied to the academy. She took an agility test but was rejected.

She took the agility test again in November 2006 and failed. The report says she was 10 seconds too slow on the "tower walk," a timed drill during which recruits wearing weighted vests must climb and descend the steps at the fire academy's six-story fire tower.

Wilson was accepted into the November 2006 class, however, even though the report says she had scored better the first time she took the agility test and did a better job on four of the five stations. That indicates that her physical conditioning had deteriorated from the time she initially applied to the fire academy and was rejected.

Wilson's autopsy found that she was 5 feet, 4 inches tall and weighed 192 pounds.

"Racheal's physical stature may have presented some challenge to her becoming a firefighter," the report says.

Other problems were noticed. Wilson's instructors told investigators that during training she "had a propensity for removing her face piece" and said that she had trouble holding the nozzle of a hose under pressure. Instructors never documented their concerns and allowed her to progress through the academy without mastering those skills, the report says.

Wilson was holding a nozzle the day of the fatal fire, though she had never done so successfully in a live fire. As had occurred during previous training exercises, she was knocked backward when she opened it to spray water on a second-floor fire.

The day of the training fire on Calverton Road, the department issued her a pair of pants that had "significant problems," including worn knee patches and a hole in the fly, the report says.

Wilson's autopsy found that her thigh and leg were seriously burned, and investigators concluded that her turnout gear "was not adequate for interior fire fighting."

The report says that the "crotch had no integrity, and thermal protection in the crotch had diminished. It may have accounted for serious burns in her lower extremities."

The report gives a detailed account of what occurred within the rowhouse.

The recruits had never been given a thorough walk through the building or a clear plan for attacking the fire, and the report says the little information they were given turned out to be wrong. They were told that there would be no fire on the first floor, but when they walked in the back door of the building they were met with fire.

Two recruits said they had questions about what they were supposed to do before entering the building. Their instructor, Capt. Louis Lago, said he did not have time to answer them, "presumably due to the fact that the fires had already been ignited," the report says.

Wilson's crew, led by Ryan Wenger, an emergency vehicle driver, was ordered to take a crew of recruits to the third floor, bypassing a fire on the second level, a practice typically used only if firefighters are rescuing someone.

Wenger told investigators that he had concerns about carrying out that order but suppressed his worries in the belief that if he objected, somebody else more cooperative would be put in his place, the report says.

Wenger was told that the crew behind him would put out the fire on the second floor. That group was delayed as it tried to put out the unexpected fire that had been set in first-floor room filled with debris that included tires, mattresses, branches and a television set, the report says.

"To extinguish the fire, the crew had to place the nozzle under the debris, which materially delayed their response to the second floor," the report says.

When Wenger got his crew to the third floor, he fell to his knees because of the heat.

"The heat was unbearable even while on his knees, but he apparently did not think about retreating and getting his crew out of the building," the report says.

Another recruit, Stephanie Cisneros, approached Wenger and said she thought she should get out of the building. It was then that Wenger began evacuating his team. He did not have a radio and could not call for help.

After Wenger helped Cisneros get out, Wilson said she wanted to leave. Rather than helping her out first, Wenger pulled himself out of the burning building and then tried to pull her out. He lifted her torso, hand and arms but could not get her out.

"He asked her if she could help him, and she replied that she could not help, as she was burning up and could not take the heat," the report says.

Wenger lost his grip, and Wilson fell back into the building. He grabbed her a second time. She remained conscious and talked to Wenger, saying that she was "burning up," according to the report. The skin on her face was blistering from the heat.

Her mask started coming off during the rescue attempts, but investigators say they could not conclude whether she took it off or if it slipped off.

Two other recruits tried to help her out of the building, and Michael Hiebler, an emergency vehicle driver, lifted her legs out.

The initial Fire Department report suggested that Wilson's boot might have become caught in the room's faulty floor, hampering her escape. The report concludes that Wilson's left boot became lost but most likely did not become "entangled" in the debris.

`Flashover' suspected

Other recruits and firefighters in the building described conditions that investigators said could have been a "flashover," a dangerous situation in which the heat inside a building becomes so intense that all surfaces ignite.

While a rescue of Wilson was being attempted, an unknown number of firefighters entered the building. At some point, all of the other recruits got out, but nobody sounded an evacuation horn and nobody kept track of who was inside the building and who was outside, so a proper head count was impossible.

After the fire, two top staff members at the academy said that they had expressed reservations about the class.

Crest told investigators that he was "uncomfortable with the majority of the class," the report says.

Capt. Terry Horrocks told investigators that he had asked Hyde not to take the class to the burn.

Neither formally documented their objections, and investigators found no way of verifying that those conversations took place.

annie.linskey@baltsun.com

[Guest feraldan]

At 5'4" and almost 200 lbs, with an agility test failed, I am puzzled as to why she was allowed to even continue training. Very sad and totally unnecessary.

edited for correctness

Edited August 22, 2007 by feraldan

[Guest]

From the August 22, 2007 Baltimore Sun (emphasis added):

"baltimoresun.com

Sun Follow-Up

Chief backs fire dept.

Goodwin responds to report on death; Dixon says she has 'strong questions'

By Annie Linskey

Sun reporter

August 22, 2007

Baltimore's fire chief defended his beleaguered department yesterday after an independent investigation concluded that a recruit who was killed in a training exercise had been poorly trained and outfitted. But Mayor Sheila Dixon said her "confidence level" in the chief's leadership "is very questionable."

Dixon said she also had concerns about the judgments made by firefighters who were at the Feb. 9 fire in a vacant rowhouse on South Calverton Road that killed cadet Racheal M. Wilson and indicated more discipline could be meted out in the coming days. A top commander and two supervisors have already been fired.

When asked about the future of Fire Chief William J. Goodwin Jr., Dixon said: "I have real strong questions at every level. I'll need to digest the report."

Goodwin, who escaped criticism in the independent report to be released tomorrow, which was obtained by The Sun, said he felt it was "thorough" but he disagreed with the finding that Wilson wasn't properly prepared to fight a live fire.

The chief distanced himself from decisions made by firefighters during back-to-back training exercises Feb. 8 and 9 - which the report criticized for violating national safety standards - saying they do not represent the department he has run for the past five years.

"It was not the department I was raised in, it is not the department I know," Goodwin said in an interview. He said an exercise should be a perfectly planned event - and one which can be canceled at any moment if a problem occurs. "Anything could have happened to that vacant house," he said. "It could have burned to the ground. There was no reason to go forward if everything isn't perfect."

Frustrated members of Wilson's family in Baltimore reacted with anger when they heard the details of the report from news accounts. "At this point now I'm so angry, that it is best not to say anything for now," said Priscilla Neal, the mother of Wilson's boyfriend. "Why would they send her in a burning building?"

Another branch of the family, in Denver, received the report from the mayor's office via e-mail early yesterday. They declined to comment.

The 121-page report, commissioned by Dixon and written by a Howard County deputy fire chief, criticizes virtually every aspect of the exercise and concludes that 50 safety standards were violated, including setting multiple fires when only one is allowed, failing to have adequate backup and failing to equip some of the recruits and instructors with radios.

City officials had said the exercise was fraught with problems, but the report due out tomorrow lists many new concerns.

It concludes that Wilson had failed agility tests and was not prepared to fight a live fire, and died when she became trapped on the third floor during a chaotic escape as the fire raged out of control. The report said her decade-old pants had holes and frayed in the intense heat and criticized instructors who it said abandoned her inside the dwelling.

The heads of the Fire Department's two unions, who did not have copies of the report yesterday, agreed that the department had failed Wilson but complained that undue blame was being placed on low-level firefighters who didn't have any way of knowing about training safety standards.

"The ultimate responsibility should lie with Goodwin," said Richard G. Schluderberg, the president of the Baltimore Fire Fighters Union. "I believe we are lucky that this didn't happen before if this is the type of training that was going on all along."

Capt. Stephan G. Fugate, president of the fire officers' union, said accountability should not end with those who ran the exercise. "I'm disappointed but not surprised about the apparent exoneration of Goodwin," he said. "This thing could be written on Scott towels because he's washing his hands with it."

The report noted for the first time that fire commanders violated safety standards at a similar live burn Feb. 8 where recruits "burned the whole roof off" a vacant dwelling, according to an account from an interview with the then head of the training academy, Division Chief Kenneth Hyde, who was fired after the exercise.

It says that instructors at the fire academy allowed Wilson to progress despite reports that she had removed her air mask in exercises, had trouble controlling the nozzle of a hose and had experienced difficulty putting up ladders. "It is clear that she wasn't prepared," Dixon said at a news conference at City Hall yesterday. "It is very clear there was a breakdown in oversight."

Dixon focused on the actions of instructors and mid-level fire commanders who conducted the exercises. "What stood out [in the report] is you have experienced firefighters who made decisions and who were unprepared," the mayor said. "They should have led by example."

Dixon said that she expects the department to implement recommendations in the report, which include requiring new recruits to pass an agility test before being hired, stabilizing leadership at the academy, which has had six chiefs in five years, and ensuring that subordinates feel comfortable questioning orders.

"The overall culture and attitude within the Baltimore City Fire Department's Training Academy and possibly the department in general maybe be in need of adjustment," according to the report.

Dixon and Goodwin left open the possibility that more firefighters could be fired. Goodwin noted that the two firefighters who refused to cooperate with the investigation, Lt. Eugene Jones and Tarnisha Lee, an apprentice, may face disciplinary action.

About others who may face punishment for their role, he said: "I don't know which direction it will take. Do we want to do more discipline or do we want to promote a sense of healing? Do we want to continue to dig?"

The three fire commanders who have already lost their jobs in the wake of the exercise are Hyde and two instructors, Lts. Joseph Crest and Barry Broyles.

Goodwin disputed the report's conclusion that Wilson was unprepared, saying she "absolutely" should have been accepted to the academy despite falling 10 seconds short on a test that required her to run up and down a six-story tower in four minutes and 30 seconds. "We didn't accept the people who took 14 minutes," Goodwin said.

He also said that he was unaware of the systematic problems at the academy that the report revealed, noting that during Hyde's brief tenure he heard only glowing reports. "People were sending him high accolades. They were saying that [the] academy never looked better," he said.

About the recommendation that recruits must pass a physical fitness test to gain a space in the academy classes, Goodwin said: "I rose to chief and I never took one."

He does not object to requiring recruits to pass a fitness test as long as all firefighters have to pass similar exams. Both Goodwin and the union chiefs insisted that they've been trying for years to implement fitness standards - but each party said the other had blocked that process.

Goodwin has sought to change the culture at the academy and the department. The mid-level battalion chiefs are now rotated through firehouses, out of a concern that some have grown too close to their men and won't properly discipline them. Roughly 700 pieces of equipment have been replaced on orders from officers at the newly empowered safety office, according to Rick Binetti, a department spokesman.

Despite Goodwin's efforts to improve the fire academy, the report noted that at least one person was still able to graduate without completing all of the requirements. "There may be others in the same situation, but this was the only one brought to the attention of the investigative team," according to the report.

The investigators criticized Emergency Vehicle Driver Ryan Wenger, Wilson's instructor, for leaving the burning building before she could get out. The report states that had he stayed in the building he would have been better positioned to lift her out.

Schluderberg, the president of Baltimore Fire Fighters union, said that labeling Wenger's actions abandonment was "libelous," noting that the instructor suffered severe burns to his wrists while trying to extract Wilson. "It had to be like a blast furnace in there," Schluderberg said. "He was trying to get her out. Abandonment means running away."

annie.linskey@baltsun.com"

[Guest alsfirefighter]

Read up Westchester County Fire Chiefs and training officers.....READ THE (a profane word would have been used here to express a tone of seriousness and sarcasm but it is now banned) UP! And learn from this.

Sadly to say this is a situation that is often met and dealt with as a fire instructor and fairly often met with resistance from the department hosting the student as to why they need better equipment to continue in a course. Not to mention that not all fire service members take agilities nor get physicals but are "interior."

[kfire94 3]

well said alsfirefighter! so true

[16fire5 693]

"It says that instructors at the fire academy allowed Wilson to progress despite reports that she had removed her air mask in exercises, had trouble controlling the nozzle of a hose and had experienced difficulty putting up ladders. "

The Baltimore Live fire exercise was fraught with errors but this too is a contributing factor.

Not everyone has what it takes to be a firefighter. Some people should wash out of the academy. Efforts to increase diversity or increase the number of qualified volunteers should never cause unqualified people to be pushed through the academy.

Its interesting when you hear the number of firefighters most NY Volunteer departments claim to have around here. In most cases only half of these people are interior qualified and even some of them either have no buisness going in or are unqualified.

Allowing only qualified capable and trained firefighters to respond and operate is the only way to go. You are doing yourself and them a favor.

[Guest feraldan]

Well said 16fire5.

Here's another article about the supervisor leading the team that got trapped. It sounds like he did what he could. The guy does have 2nd degree burns covering his hands and arms to prove he tried to help the woman.

Annie Linskey,

The Baltimore Sun

The supervisor of the Baltimore fire recruit killed in a training exercise rejected yesterday the findings of an independent report that concluded he had abandoned the cadet inside a burning rowhouse, saying his wrists are scarred from his efforts to pull her out of a window.

"I gave everything I could to save her that day," said Emergency Vehicle Driver Ryan Wenger, in his first public account of how Racheal M. Wilson died Feb. 9 inside a vacant rowhouse on South Calverton Road.

"I think about it nonstop," he said, recalling efforts to pull Wilson through a third-floor window. "All I have to do is look at myself to remember. ... I had to listen to her screams."

Wenger, whose father is a battalion chief in the city department, had been assigned to watch over Wilson and others on her crew as they battled multiple fires set by instructors for the exercise.

The report, commissioned by the city's mayor and due to be released publicly today, said Wenger was not qualified to instruct others, went into the burning house without safety equipment and a radio, followed a dangerous order to take the recruits above a fire and left ahead of his recruits.

Wenger, 32, who was accompanied by two fire union leaders, said the report unfairly damaged his reputation and blemished his 10-year career. But he conceded that he was assigned jobs that he does not typically perform. Of his role as an instructor, he said he was "helping out for the day."

Union officials criticized the report for blaming rank-and-file firefighters while saying it exonerated Chief William J. Goodwin Jr.

City Councilman Kenneth N. Harris Sr., who is running for the council presidency, called for Goodwin to resign. "At some point he has to be held accountable," Harris said.

Mayor Sheila Dixon has said that her level of confidence in the chief is "very questionable" but she has also expressed disappointment that firefighters at the deadly burn did not speak out when they saw safety violations.

The report found 50 violations of the national safety standard governing how live-burns should be conducted, criticized the department's culture as too rigid and said firefighters should be empowered to question orders when safety is an issue.

Among the findings, the report faulted instructors for setting more than the one fire permitted in such circumstances, for not issuing radios to all the recruits and for not having an adequate backup water supply.

In the interview, Wenger defended his decisions, saying he has been trained to put trust in his co-workers and his superior officers, and he did not want to question those in command.

"In the Fire Department they charge you with insubordination, which is a suspending offense," said Wenger. But he did not dispute concerns raised about his instructing credentials. He had never taught anyone at the academy, and he was asked at the last minute to fill in for an instructor who was burned in another exercise the day before.

"I don't have any certification; I was never asked if I did," Wenger said.

He said that in the exercise in which Wilson died, he was assigned tasks he does not do when he is on the job, such as work with hoses and water supplies.

Wenger is assigned to a truck company, whose members knock in doors and cut holes for ventilation. Firefighters assigned to engine companies are in charge of water supplies, and that was his role during the Feb. 9 exercise.

Four recruits were assigned to him shortly before the drill. "I had no history with the people who I was assigned to," he said.

Lt. Joseph Crest, the instructor in charge of the exercise, told Wenger to expect fires on the second and third floors of the building. But there also was a fire at the rear on the first floor. Crest is one of three commanders who were fired after Wilson's death.

That day Crest told Wenger to take the crew past the second-floor fire and extinguish the one on the top floor, according to the report. A crew behind was to put out the fire on the second floor.

About that order, Wenger said: "It struck me as odd at first. The rule is that you do not go above a fire. Heat rises."

Wenger said he dismissed his concerns in part because he knew and trusted the firefighter who was going to be coming up directly behind him. Also, Wenger said, "I trusted the fire academy, I'm just here helping out for one day."

Wenger was not given a radio, nor did he ask for one. "Look at what the Fire Department is," he said. "The Fire Department has a command structure, I've never had a problem with insubordination in the past, and this wasn't going to be the first."

The team entered the building, and Wenger said he did not notice the first-floor fire.

When he got to the second floor he was confronted with more fire than he expected: "The fire was starting to come after us, it was starting to come down the hallway. The fire kept getting closer and closer to us."

Wenger said he disobeyed an order from Crest to bypass the fire on the second floor and proceed directly to the level above. He said he told Wilson to spray water on that fire.

But she had trouble with the hose, and after several attempts Wenger took it from her and sprayed down the fire himself. "I started to worry about her capabilities," he said.

The two other recruits in the crew were tasked with freeing the hose line on the lower levels and were not with Wenger when he got to the third floor. There he began to feel hot. "I got to my knees," he said in the interview. "I felt like there was heat coming from everywhere."

He had never been on the third floor of the building and had no idea where the windows or escape routes would be. He noticed light streaming though the smoke and put his head out a window to see whether he could determine where all the heat was coming from.

Then another recruit on his team, Stephanie Cisneros, hollered to him. In her interview with investigators, she said that she saw flames coming off her gear.

Wenger said he was relieved that he wasn't "the only one" feeling heat. He agreed they should leave and instantly decided the window was the best way out.

"They teach you to be in control of a rescue situation," Wenger said. "I had no means of calling for help. It was me with the recruits, knowing that in my head I had to get out so I could help them safely."

He pulled through and then grabbed Cisneros. Once she was through, Wilson appeared in the window, yelling. Wenger reached in to get her but he could not pull her to safety.

"I gave 110 percent to help her.," he said. "I looked up the definition of `abandonment.' It is not me."

Eventually his friend, Emergency Vehicle Driver Michael Hiebler, came up to the third floor and helped from the inside to push Wilson out. But it was too late.

Wenger was taken to the Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center's burn unit. He had second-degree burns on his wrists, arms, fingers and the back of his neck. It was there that he learned Wilson had died.

"I never went in this thinking anything bad would happen," Wenger said. "I put my confidence and my faith in them that everything would be OK."

[Monty 35]

The report is available at here. I haven't had a chance to read through all of it (it is 100+ pages) - but it does seem very thorough. As is often the case, it is a chain of events - if something different had happened at any one place it could have been a very different outcome. But that didn't happen and it showcased a lot of problems.

The interesting thing is to see how the Chief reacts to this, and then in turn the Mayor. Certainly seems like a lot needs to change.

[exmrvfc 0]

It's hard to imagine that a 1700 member career department never learned some of the mistakes that were made in the Lairdsville incident.

After reading through this it's crazy that BCFD criticzed the FireHouse Expo instructors for having one of thier training fires get away from them in 2006. At least they had qualified instructors and followed NFPA Live burn regulations.

[antiquefirelt 994]

While it sounds like FF Wilson never should have been there in the first place, it is hard to beleive any dept. with any instructor capability would allow so many things to go wrong throughout their academy. While I agree that acquired structures are necessary to develop firefighters skills, NFPA 1403 must be followed very closely. This fire wasn't even in the same book! The Chief standing behind some of his instructors and their practices is proof that he should also be held responsible.

FF Wilson died as the result of a failed system. The system failed to protect her by allowing her to participate when she wasn't fit to pass the test, failed to provide her with adequate PPE, failed to wash her out or ensure she could operate a nozzle before being put on the knob in a fire situation and failed to protect her from dangerous practices employed to train FFer's in live fire attack.

[Monty 35]

While it sounds like FF Wilson never should have been there in the first place, it is hard to beleive any dept. with any instructor capability would allow so many things to go wrong throughout their academy. While I agree that acquired structures are necessary to develop firefighters skills, NFPA 1403 must be followed very closely. This fire wasn't even in the same book! The Chief standing behind some of his instructors and their practices is proof that he should also be held responsible.

FF Wilson died as the result of a failed system. The system failed to protect her by allowing her to participate when she wasn't fit to pass the test, failed to provide her with adequate PPE, failed to wash her out or ensure she could operate a nozzle before being put on the knob in a fire situation and failed to protect her from dangerous practices employed to train FFer's in live fire attack.

I think you hit the naiul on the head - this summarizes it up very well in my opinion.

[Guest alsfirefighter]

As is often the case, it is a chain of events - if something different had happened at any one place it could have been a very different outcome. But that didn't happen and it showcased a lot of problems.

I couldn't agree more and that one place was the failure to comply with 1 document...NFPA 1403. That was the one and only chain of event that caused a lot of problems. Anything else that day was by dumb luck and sooner or later we all know that it runs out.

While I agree that acquired structures are necessary to develop firefighters skills,

Why? What is it about an acquired structure other then it isn't made of concrete that is so special? Does pallets burn under plaster or wallboard any different? Why is it then that there are thousands of firefighters whom never received any initial training in an acquired structure and seem to do just fine? I never had a live burn in an acquired structure for any formal training course I was in (in Virginia, it is not allowed in NY) and the first time I ever entered into a burning building I didn't have a wow moment. Nor did anyone else that I've ever partnered up with say to me...wow this isn't what I totally expected. Good training is good training. To be honest I've been at many drills with departments where its all about the heat and not about the tactics. "Whew...man this is a good drill bro...its hotter then hell in there..." Meanwhile...took too long to stretch the intial attack line, it was stretched to the wrong place, had kinks all over and the primary search I believe is still going on as I type this. Oh..not to mention that it took 4 person to make the hydrant...but good drill. Catch my drift?

How many firefighters have been lost in a burn building? 1 at the Pennsylvania Fire Academy.

And no one knows exactly what happened in that case other then again...NFPA 1403 was not followed.

LEARN FROM LAIRDSVILLE?!? LAIRDSVILLE!?!

I totally respect you for even knowing about it...but they shouldn't have learned from Lairdsville...the lessons were there long before Mr. Baird and the death of Bradley Golden. How about why NFPA 1403 was developed: Mesa, AZ and Milford, Michigan after that and Parsippany, NJ or the injury in Delaware to a Fire Chief.