M' Ave

Date: 3/10/15
Time: Approx 2355
Location: Manhattan Box 1335 - Address of 1295 5th Ave (off E 110th St)
Description:
Manhattan Box 1335 - 1295 5th Ave (off E 110th St) - 10-77 transmitted for fire out the windows of the 17th floor of a 34-story apartment building, extending to the 18th floor.
2nd Alarm Transmitted - Division 3 has Command
Car 6 (Manhattan Borough Commander) responding, reports he sees heavy fire still blowing out several windows while en route.
Apartments 31C and 31F reporting they are trapped.
1219 - Car 1-David responding on the 2nd alarm.
1221 - ***3rd Alarm Transmitted*** Heavy Fire on the 17th Floor, numerous people trapped. No water on the fire.
3rd Alarm:
E37, E44, E69, E60, E83
L23, L49 (Act. L26)
BN53, BN17 (Staging), Safety BN

Yeah, I'm not sure what all the distress is about. They called a lot of resources at a time when that seemed like the right choice and it worked out. Tough weather, tough geography and a tough time of day. I'm not sure why we latched on to the, "how many tankers" thing....
....call'em, you can always send'em back.
I will make one comment....I saw a couple of photos of guys walking around on a peaked roof, covered in a foot of snow....and I'm moved to ask: Why? Was there an urgent need for verticle ventilation?

This discussion, and this website, will often include conversations about operations and tactics. If we can't critique (constructively) operations of our own, or other departments, we'll learn nothing.
Emergency operations from New York City to Peoria deserve analysis and critique. No event is without mistake or action that could be evaluated after the fact. What are we supposed to say? The fire went out, great job guys?
For my own part of this discussion; I was not there, I did not take part. That limits my ability to comment, but photos and resources called raised some points for discussion. I for one will ALMOST never question the request for additional resources. Call more than ya need and send'em home if you find your self in better position to manage the incident with units on scene. At this particular fire, it looks as though the first due department was faced with several adverse conditions and they summoned more resources to overcome them. Fine. I did question the need for members to be operating on a peaked roof, covered in snow, to facilitate vertical ventilation. Vert. Venting is not always particularly beneficial in a PD and the risk of putting members on the roof seems unnecessary. In my dept., peaked roof ventilation is accomplished from the bucket of a tower ladder while the member is belted in. Clearly there is decades of operational experience that calls for such caution. Chainsaws, additionally, are THE. MOST. DANGEROUS. TOOL. we use.
I hope this discussion continues with focus on an, over-all, job well done. However,we can all improve and this is how.
**Discussions on staffing, consolidation and general resources is one that needs a great deal more attention than it's getting, but lets focus here on a single operation, it's merit's and detraction's, and not something fundamental that effects the whole fire service.

It seems like everyone is ignoring the side-by-side example of a consolidated volunteer department that sits right next door to the town in which this fire occurred. The town of Somers and the Town of Lewisboro have very similar constructs but have gone in opposite directions in terms of a consolidated department vs individual departments. Somers is about the same size as the Town of Lewisboro. They have 4 fire houses spread across town but operate as one department, with one chain of command, one set of SOPs, one fire district and consolidated resources. Conversely, in the Town of Lewisboro, they have the Golden's Bridge Fire Department, the South Salem Fire Department, and the Vista Fire Department (and the Lewisboro Ambulance Corps). Each of these departments are completely independent of one another and have their own chain of command, separate Fire District, separate equipment and their own set of SOGs.
In my opinion the consolidated volunteer department makes more sense for the following reasons:
The town of Lewisboro has 3 Mid-Heavy Rescue Units (Counting Rescue 24 may it rest in peace)...All of NYC has 5! The town of Lewisboro has 7+ Chief Vehicles. Each department in Lewisboro has at least 2 "Class A" engines so that they can stay in service when one goes out for maintenance. 90% of the time each engine rolls without a full crew anyway (thats if they can even get two engines out the door) Shortage of Officers. When I joined the fire service 10 years ago Vista Fire Department had 3 chiefs and a multiple captains, Lieutenants and Foremen, etc...now they are down to 3 officers (a chief, a captain, and a lieutenant). I believe that GBFD currently operates with two of their Lt. positions vacant. Moreover, many departments' by-laws are constantly being set aside to allow people who don't meet the professional qualifications to hold office. In many instances, members are being promoted to officer positions after being a member for only a year and having never been first-due to a car fire let alone a structure fire. What it all comes down to here is that you are ultimately going to get the same resources to a fire in both towns. In Somers you will probably get 20-30 members town-wide who will all respond to a daytime incident. In Lewisboro, you will get 10 members from the "host" department and 5-6 from each of the other 2 departments in town via mutual aid.
The differences however are major!
There will be a delay in resources because you have to wait for the host department to get on scene to dispatch mutual aid...they will have to operate with 4-6 people for at least the first 10-15 minutes until mutual aid can respond to their firehouses and then to the scene. There will be way too many Chiefs on scene because there will be 3 from each of the other departments in town...and not enough indians because anyone who is even remotely good will be a chief already (side note...I think Croton Falls had command on this last Goldens Bridge fire and at their firehouse fire last year). The manpower from the three independent departments will be less familiar with the equipment and personnel from the other departments than that of the one consolidated department. 3 sets of SOGs vs one consolidated set. I thought the side-by-side comparison may help clear up the confusion that a consolidated department would have to be paid. The Town of Somers could probably have ended up as the Granite Springs, Amawalk, Lincoldale, and Town of Somers fire departments had they wanted to go that route...for all I know they may have been at some point way back when.

A single department would have 1 set of SOPs. The initial alarm would get a standard alarm assignment. Maybe for this area 3 engines 1 truck and 3 tankers on the reported fire. When all the responding chiefs are members of the same department they would get assigned necessary roles as they reported in (basement division, division 1, safety, water supply).
A key to success is getting enough help there when it can make a difference. Too often the volunteer fire service in this area waits for a confirmed fire to call for adequate resources or runs out of resources on the scene and then puts the FAST to work and then calls for more help. In my opinion if you have a real working fire you should have at least one company standing behind you ready for assignment in addition to the fast. My opinion is that ability to forecast the incident needs and call for additional alarms early on comes with experience that is lacking for most volunteer ICs since they get kicked out every 2 years so everyone can have a turn as chief. As a young company officer I often though wow do we really need the second alarm that the chief just gave? We did. One of my first days as a Captain a well respected deputy chief visited me to give a little advice when i worked as an acting battalion chief. His advice was if the though of giving a second alarm even entered my mind he wanted me to give it.
As for this incident the factors involved seemed like a loser from the get go (basement fire and Colliers conditions) pulling the plug was the right move here and probably prevented injuries or worse.

That's the problem, you assume there would be a reduction in tankers. Frankly there would probably be an increase in tankers and a reduction in engines since the county already has more of them than all of NYC.
Properly analyzed and using real information not emotion or reliance on tradition, a regional, consolidated department would probably be far better equipped than we are today.

This discussion, and this website, will often include conversations about operations and tactics. If we can't critique (constructively) operations of our own, or other departments, we'll learn nothing.
Emergency operations from New York City to Peoria deserve analysis and critique. No event is without mistake or action that could be evaluated after the fact. What are we supposed to say? The fire went out, great job guys?
For my own part of this discussion; I was not there, I did not take part. That limits my ability to comment, but photos and resources called raised some points for discussion. I for one will ALMOST never question the request for additional resources. Call more than ya need and send'em home if you find your self in better position to manage the incident with units on scene. At this particular fire, it looks as though the first due department was faced with several adverse conditions and they summoned more resources to overcome them. Fine. I did question the need for members to be operating on a peaked roof, covered in snow, to facilitate vertical ventilation. Vert. Venting is not always particularly beneficial in a PD and the risk of putting members on the roof seems unnecessary. In my dept., peaked roof ventilation is accomplished from the bucket of a tower ladder while the member is belted in. Clearly there is decades of operational experience that calls for such caution. Chainsaws, additionally, are THE. MOST. DANGEROUS. TOOL. we use.
I hope this discussion continues with focus on an, over-all, job well done. However,we can all improve and this is how.
**Discussions on staffing, consolidation and general resources is one that needs a great deal more attention than it's getting, but lets focus here on a single operation, it's merit's and detraction's, and not something fundamental that effects the whole fire service.

This discussion, and this website, will often include conversations about operations and tactics. If we can't critique (constructively) operations of our own, or other departments, we'll learn nothing.
Emergency operations from New York City to Peoria deserve analysis and critique. No event is without mistake or action that could be evaluated after the fact. What are we supposed to say? The fire went out, great job guys?
For my own part of this discussion; I was not there, I did not take part. That limits my ability to comment, but photos and resources called raised some points for discussion. I for one will ALMOST never question the request for additional resources. Call more than ya need and send'em home if you find your self in better position to manage the incident with units on scene. At this particular fire, it looks as though the first due department was faced with several adverse conditions and they summoned more resources to overcome them. Fine. I did question the need for members to be operating on a peaked roof, covered in snow, to facilitate vertical ventilation. Vert. Venting is not always particularly beneficial in a PD and the risk of putting members on the roof seems unnecessary. In my dept., peaked roof ventilation is accomplished from the bucket of a tower ladder while the member is belted in. Clearly there is decades of operational experience that calls for such caution. Chainsaws, additionally, are THE. MOST. DANGEROUS. TOOL. we use.
I hope this discussion continues with focus on an, over-all, job well done. However,we can all improve and this is how.
**Discussions on staffing, consolidation and general resources is one that needs a great deal more attention than it's getting, but lets focus here on a single operation, it's merit's and detraction's, and not something fundamental that effects the whole fire service.

Spot on.

You know the consolidation of volunteer departments without the addition of any paid personnel could be a significant improvement over the completely arcane system we have now. Everyone immediately assumes that consolidation implies paid but it doesn't! How about merging 4-5 districts that serve the same town? Or the countless villages that rely heavily on each other and are smaller than a postage stamp.
Imagine a River Towns or Sound Shore or North County Fire District with several former departments under one hierarchy. Economies of scale in purchasing, reduction of apparatus numbers (and the ability to have "spares", something virtually non-existent outside the big cities), higher personnel counts, standard training, administration and operations, to name a few.
A member department with strengths in one area can help one weak in that area and so on. Officers can be vetted from a larger pool of candidates improving the quality, competition, and ultimately performance. Chiefs will oversee a bigger department giving them more experience. Budgets can be consolidated perhaps reducing the overall cost to the taxpayer.
There's a lot to be said for consolidating and it doesn't mean adding ONE paid guy.

This discussion, and this website, will often include conversations about operations and tactics. If we can't critique (constructively) operations of our own, or other departments, we'll learn nothing.
Emergency operations from New York City to Peoria deserve analysis and critique. No event is without mistake or action that could be evaluated after the fact. What are we supposed to say? The fire went out, great job guys?
For my own part of this discussion; I was not there, I did not take part. That limits my ability to comment, but photos and resources called raised some points for discussion. I for one will ALMOST never question the request for additional resources. Call more than ya need and send'em home if you find your self in better position to manage the incident with units on scene. At this particular fire, it looks as though the first due department was faced with several adverse conditions and they summoned more resources to overcome them. Fine. I did question the need for members to be operating on a peaked roof, covered in snow, to facilitate vertical ventilation. Vert. Venting is not always particularly beneficial in a PD and the risk of putting members on the roof seems unnecessary. In my dept., peaked roof ventilation is accomplished from the bucket of a tower ladder while the member is belted in. Clearly there is decades of operational experience that calls for such caution. Chainsaws, additionally, are THE. MOST. DANGEROUS. TOOL. we use.
I hope this discussion continues with focus on an, over-all, job well done. However,we can all improve and this is how.
**Discussions on staffing, consolidation and general resources is one that needs a great deal more attention than it's getting, but lets focus here on a single operation, it's merit's and detraction's, and not something fundamental that effects the whole fire service.

This discussion, and this website, will often include conversations about operations and tactics. If we can't critique (constructively) operations of our own, or other departments, we'll learn nothing.
Emergency operations from New York City to Peoria deserve analysis and critique. No event is without mistake or action that could be evaluated after the fact. What are we supposed to say? The fire went out, great job guys?
For my own part of this discussion; I was not there, I did not take part. That limits my ability to comment, but photos and resources called raised some points for discussion. I for one will ALMOST never question the request for additional resources. Call more than ya need and send'em home if you find your self in better position to manage the incident with units on scene. At this particular fire, it looks as though the first due department was faced with several adverse conditions and they summoned more resources to overcome them. Fine. I did question the need for members to be operating on a peaked roof, covered in snow, to facilitate vertical ventilation. Vert. Venting is not always particularly beneficial in a PD and the risk of putting members on the roof seems unnecessary. In my dept., peaked roof ventilation is accomplished from the bucket of a tower ladder while the member is belted in. Clearly there is decades of operational experience that calls for such caution. Chainsaws, additionally, are THE. MOST. DANGEROUS. TOOL. we use.
I hope this discussion continues with focus on an, over-all, job well done. However,we can all improve and this is how.
**Discussions on staffing, consolidation and general resources is one that needs a great deal more attention than it's getting, but lets focus here on a single operation, it's merit's and detraction's, and not something fundamental that effects the whole fire service.

This discussion, and this website, will often include conversations about operations and tactics. If we can't critique (constructively) operations of our own, or other departments, we'll learn nothing.
Emergency operations from New York City to Peoria deserve analysis and critique. No event is without mistake or action that could be evaluated after the fact. What are we supposed to say? The fire went out, great job guys?
For my own part of this discussion; I was not there, I did not take part. That limits my ability to comment, but photos and resources called raised some points for discussion. I for one will ALMOST never question the request for additional resources. Call more than ya need and send'em home if you find your self in better position to manage the incident with units on scene. At this particular fire, it looks as though the first due department was faced with several adverse conditions and they summoned more resources to overcome them. Fine. I did question the need for members to be operating on a peaked roof, covered in snow, to facilitate vertical ventilation. Vert. Venting is not always particularly beneficial in a PD and the risk of putting members on the roof seems unnecessary. In my dept., peaked roof ventilation is accomplished from the bucket of a tower ladder while the member is belted in. Clearly there is decades of operational experience that calls for such caution. Chainsaws, additionally, are THE. MOST. DANGEROUS. TOOL. we use.
I hope this discussion continues with focus on an, over-all, job well done. However,we can all improve and this is how.
**Discussions on staffing, consolidation and general resources is one that needs a great deal more attention than it's getting, but lets focus here on a single operation, it's merit's and detraction's, and not something fundamental that effects the whole fire service.

This discussion, and this website, will often include conversations about operations and tactics. If we can't critique (constructively) operations of our own, or other departments, we'll learn nothing.
Emergency operations from New York City to Peoria deserve analysis and critique. No event is without mistake or action that could be evaluated after the fact. What are we supposed to say? The fire went out, great job guys?
For my own part of this discussion; I was not there, I did not take part. That limits my ability to comment, but photos and resources called raised some points for discussion. I for one will ALMOST never question the request for additional resources. Call more than ya need and send'em home if you find your self in better position to manage the incident with units on scene. At this particular fire, it looks as though the first due department was faced with several adverse conditions and they summoned more resources to overcome them. Fine. I did question the need for members to be operating on a peaked roof, covered in snow, to facilitate vertical ventilation. Vert. Venting is not always particularly beneficial in a PD and the risk of putting members on the roof seems unnecessary. In my dept., peaked roof ventilation is accomplished from the bucket of a tower ladder while the member is belted in. Clearly there is decades of operational experience that calls for such caution. Chainsaws, additionally, are THE. MOST. DANGEROUS. TOOL. we use.
I hope this discussion continues with focus on an, over-all, job well done. However,we can all improve and this is how.
**Discussions on staffing, consolidation and general resources is one that needs a great deal more attention than it's getting, but lets focus here on a single operation, it's merit's and detraction's, and not something fundamental that effects the whole fire service.

Yeah, I'm not sure what all the distress is about. They called a lot of resources at a time when that seemed like the right choice and it worked out. Tough weather, tough geography and a tough time of day. I'm not sure why we latched on to the, "how many tankers" thing....
....call'em, you can always send'em back.
I will make one comment....I saw a couple of photos of guys walking around on a peaked roof, covered in a foot of snow....and I'm moved to ask: Why? Was there an urgent need for verticle ventilation?

So I have been watching this thread for a couple of days and really don't like to Monday morning QB but can someone explain to me why you would stretch not one but two 2 1/2 in hand lines into a 1800 Sq Ft residential fire? There are 2 things that are most needed to make that choice of a hand line successful. The 2 critical factors were most likely not met here. They did not have the manpower nor the water to operate these hand lines. I would think that those lines would produce about 500 GPM combined. That would certainly not be my choice as the first due Engine company officer who is counting on a tanker shuttle. A couple of 1 3/4 or 2 in lines would be the right choice to start out with as they are a lot more maneuverable in the confined qtrs. of residential fires. Leave the 2 1/2's to commercial fires and depts. that have the manpower to move them unless you are making a giant circle with one and sitting on the front lawn with it. I won't talk about the lack of exposures at the fire which would negate the need for 7 Engine companies and a tower ladder that most likely never made it up the driveway and would have better served its community by staying in qtrs. So I will end this session for all you Engine company officers out there to refresh upon. ( paid or volley )
There are several fire flow formulas in use today, but for the sake of space, we’ll only touch on two: the National Fire Academy (NFA) formula and the Iowa Rate of Flow. Each has pros and cons.
The NFA formula is based on offensive interior operations where less than 50 percent of the building is involved. The formula is:
Needed fire flow = [(length x width) ÷ 3] x percent of involvement
Example: For a 30' x 50' building that’s 25 percent involved, the flow would be 30 x 50 = 1,500 square feet, divided by 3 = 500 x 0.25 = 125 gpm.
Based on that required fire flow, one handline pumped at the correct pressure should be able to produce the required gpm.
The Iowa Rate of Flow is based on work performed by Keith Royer and Bill Nelson while they were working for Iowa State University’s fire training program. While studying the effects of fog streams on interior fires, the pair demonstrated that all you need to do is put the right amount of water in the right place for the fire to go out—something that’s often overlooked by the modern fire service.
The Iowa formula is:
Required volume = (length x width x height) ÷ 100
Example: The same 30' x 50' building used in the first example is 10 feet high. 30 x 50 x 10 = 15,000, divided by 100 = 150 gpm.
The Iowa formula is based on science, while the NFA formula is based more on information gained from experienced fire officers from around the country. The Iowa formula is also based on a 30-second application rate, which is more applicable to today’s fireground, where application rates should be based on gallons per second, not gallons per minute.

Well, I would suggest that geography is ever changing. This house was reported to be more remote than most. Tougher access to the operating pumper, perhaps longer distances to a tanker fill site, ect. There are tons of variables here and we have to trust the IC's decision to request X number of tankers.
As for the "system" and time of day....
I agree completely, but that's a different discusion....and a much bigger one.

Yeah, I'm not sure what all the distress is about. They called a lot of resources at a time when that seemed like the right choice and it worked out. Tough weather, tough geography and a tough time of day. I'm not sure why we latched on to the, "how many tankers" thing....
....call'em, you can always send'em back.
I will make one comment....I saw a couple of photos of guys walking around on a peaked roof, covered in a foot of snow....and I'm moved to ask: Why? Was there an urgent need for verticle ventilation?

Yeah, I'm not sure what all the distress is about. They called a lot of resources at a time when that seemed like the right choice and it worked out. Tough weather, tough geography and a tough time of day. I'm not sure why we latched on to the, "how many tankers" thing....
....call'em, you can always send'em back.
I will make one comment....I saw a couple of photos of guys walking around on a peaked roof, covered in a foot of snow....and I'm moved to ask: Why? Was there an urgent need for verticle ventilation?

Consolidation.............................

A first alarm assignment in Yonkers is 4 Engines, 2 Ladders, 1 Battalion Chief, and Rescue 1.If a 10-30(All Hands) is transmitted, an additional Ladder is assigned as F.A.S.T., an additional Battalion Chief is assigned as the Safety Officer, and Squad 11 is assigned. If the second Battalion Chief is unavailable, an Engine can be special-called to the scene and the officer of that company can serve as the Safety Officer.
A second alarm assignment in Yonkers brings 2 additional Engines, 1 additional Ladder, and usually a Deputy Chief. Often the Mask Service Unit and the Rehab. Unit are brought to the scene by the second alarm.

I don't believe that any fire departments have "extra" units. They may have "more" units but the politicians make sure nobody has extra anything!

F.D.N.Y. Thread is 3.030 x 8 TPI
NYC (New York Corp Thread) is 3.00 x 8 TPI
**Threads Per Inch**
These threads because they are so close in size are constantly getting mixed up.
Eastchester, Mt. Vernon and Pelham Manor are listed as New York Corp
New Rochelle and Pelham are FDNY
In addition: You can put a FDNY Female on a NYC male coupling but you can not put a NYC Female on a FDNY male.
BE CAREFUL, this could create a bad situation on the fire ground.
Stay safe...

That's one of the reasons why the FDNY/Westchester Mutual aid drills have been using the UTAC frequencies

Bronx Box 3000 is a Mutual Aid box to Westchester, staging at E081.