antiquefirelt

I had a similar thought when I read the story the other day.
I want to say that I read somewhere that Toledo had a large retirement a few years ago that depleted a lot of their senior members and resulted in a large influx of new members and promotion of some others without significant time on the job.
If I recall correctly, there was mention of something regarding crew make up in the NIOSH report from the double LODD he referred to. I don't think it was listed as a specific contributing factor in what occurred though. I think it was more of a making note of it and the obvious issues that can come with a less experienced crew.

If it ever comes to NY, Cuomo will limit it to 7 sections of the skids and you won't be able to buy the interchangeable attachments.
But until then it makes a great stocking stuffer

I've participated in two tactical simulations for promotions in departments other than my own. One was to hire a career Fire Chief and the other for a lieutenants promotion process in a career FD. The aspect I thought was missing, that is a real factor, is the urgency of the situation. Candidates are very calm, collected and methodical in the simulation, almost algorithmic, whereas we know some people who are challenged on the fireground when faced with some many factors all at once. That being said, I like this better than not having any evaluation of practical tactical applications.
One of the factors we use to evaluate leadership potential in firefighters is their ability to teach others. A hallmark of nearly every decent officer I've worked for or with, was their ability to pass on knowledge. Some don't have it, and that is generally reflected in how tight their crew is. Some crews have a few bright individuals that "get it", but others that don't, but where the officers are good, the baseline of the whole crew is raised.

Too much equipment could allow some inexperienced persons to lose sight of the big picture and become directly involved at the task level. Much like having booster reels, if it's there it can be misused where strict guidelines are not routinely followed. When the IC gets directly involved at the task level, other things get missed. And if you had it on board and did not deploy it, it could bite you. Anyone remember Dallas FD not maintaining the pumps on their quints yeas ago? Having equipment and failing to use it can become a legal nightmare when people are looking to pint the finger of blame, which is sadly becoming ever-more-present in public service.

Time they start outlawing assault skid-steers. Painted green and with tracks, must be militarized, making it a much more effective killing machine! It's the Bushmaster of the earthwork industry!

Time they start outlawing assault skid-steers. Painted green and with tracks, must be militarized, making it a much more effective killing machine! It's the Bushmaster of the earthwork industry!

Too much equipment could allow some inexperienced persons to lose sight of the big picture and become directly involved at the task level. Much like having booster reels, if it's there it can be misused where strict guidelines are not routinely followed. When the IC gets directly involved at the task level, other things get missed. And if you had it on board and did not deploy it, it could bite you. Anyone remember Dallas FD not maintaining the pumps on their quints yeas ago? Having equipment and failing to use it can become a legal nightmare when people are looking to pint the finger of blame, which is sadly becoming ever-more-present in public service.

I've participated in two tactical simulations for promotions in departments other than my own. One was to hire a career Fire Chief and the other for a lieutenants promotion process in a career FD. The aspect I thought was missing, that is a real factor, is the urgency of the situation. Candidates are very calm, collected and methodical in the simulation, almost algorithmic, whereas we know some people who are challenged on the fireground when faced with some many factors all at once. That being said, I like this better than not having any evaluation of practical tactical applications.
One of the factors we use to evaluate leadership potential in firefighters is their ability to teach others. A hallmark of nearly every decent officer I've worked for or with, was their ability to pass on knowledge. Some don't have it, and that is generally reflected in how tight their crew is. Some crews have a few bright individuals that "get it", but others that don't, but where the officers are good, the baseline of the whole crew is raised.

I like a testing system that allows experience to show through but doesn't hurt an eager firefighters motivation. In as small FD like ours, this can easily be done, I'm sure it's not as easy for large metro departments to conduct a promotions process that's on the up and up, but allows for verification of a firefighters skills and abilities. I know of decent sized career FD's that stripped away so much of the experience and officer's input that the smart kids promote every time. Then there's the Detroit method: all seniority. I cannot see a no testing promotion fairly gauging one's abilities. I've seen years on the job and training certs do not equal the best candidate.

Too much equipment could allow some inexperienced persons to lose sight of the big picture and become directly involved at the task level. Much like having booster reels, if it's there it can be misused where strict guidelines are not routinely followed. When the IC gets directly involved at the task level, other things get missed. And if you had it on board and did not deploy it, it could bite you. Anyone remember Dallas FD not maintaining the pumps on their quints yeas ago? Having equipment and failing to use it can become a legal nightmare when people are looking to pint the finger of blame, which is sadly becoming ever-more-present in public service.

I've participated in two tactical simulations for promotions in departments other than my own. One was to hire a career Fire Chief and the other for a lieutenants promotion process in a career FD. The aspect I thought was missing, that is a real factor, is the urgency of the situation. Candidates are very calm, collected and methodical in the simulation, almost algorithmic, whereas we know some people who are challenged on the fireground when faced with some many factors all at once. That being said, I like this better than not having any evaluation of practical tactical applications.
One of the factors we use to evaluate leadership potential in firefighters is their ability to teach others. A hallmark of nearly every decent officer I've worked for or with, was their ability to pass on knowledge. Some don't have it, and that is generally reflected in how tight their crew is. Some crews have a few bright individuals that "get it", but others that don't, but where the officers are good, the baseline of the whole crew is raised.

I've participated in two tactical simulations for promotions in departments other than my own. One was to hire a career Fire Chief and the other for a lieutenants promotion process in a career FD. The aspect I thought was missing, that is a real factor, is the urgency of the situation. Candidates are very calm, collected and methodical in the simulation, almost algorithmic, whereas we know some people who are challenged on the fireground when faced with some many factors all at once. That being said, I like this better than not having any evaluation of practical tactical applications.
One of the factors we use to evaluate leadership potential in firefighters is their ability to teach others. A hallmark of nearly every decent officer I've worked for or with, was their ability to pass on knowledge. Some don't have it, and that is generally reflected in how tight their crew is. Some crews have a few bright individuals that "get it", but others that don't, but where the officers are good, the baseline of the whole crew is raised.

While both written testing and seniority are good barometers to use for promotions, I think there is a third leg to the triangle that is often overlooked, and that is an actual ability to lead. The senior man may be the most experienced and know his way around the fireground and the good test taker the most knowledgeable with a wall full of certifications but that doesn't mean either can actually lead others. Remember too that much of what officers do takes place off the fireground, especially the higher up the chain one moves. Keeping a crew or shift or department working smoothly with the myriad of personalities, pressures and administrative demands in play is no easy task, and it's been my experience that some who are promoted just aren't up to it. Personally, although probably impractical, I would like to see some form of practical testing used to gauge a candidates all around leadership skill, on and off the fireground, coupled with the written and seniority criteria.

I would like to see a system that takes all of this into consideration. I have no problem with tests, but I think seniority should count. Certifications are not the be all and end all of a good firefighter or officer, but they are the best industry standard we have right now. So if you had a test, and then after passing points were added for certifications and seniority, that would seem fair to me. A senior man would have an edge, so would an educated man. a senior & educated man would be neqarly unbeatable, unless he had retained nothing and scored low on the initial test.

I like a testing system that allows experience to show through but doesn't hurt an eager firefighters motivation. In as small FD like ours, this can easily be done, I'm sure it's not as easy for large metro departments to conduct a promotions process that's on the up and up, but allows for verification of a firefighters skills and abilities. I know of decent sized career FD's that stripped away so much of the experience and officer's input that the smart kids promote every time. Then there's the Detroit method: all seniority. I cannot see a no testing promotion fairly gauging one's abilities. I've seen years on the job and training certs do not equal the best candidate.

For those bleeding hearts including Obama who wants to take away this type of equipment from law enforcement I wonder how many cop's lives this piece of machine saved.

This is the realistic fear of FD's just taking the headlines from these articles and implementing changes. Those who understand the research and ensure their personnel understand when to employ and when not to, how to employ and how not and that our priorities haven't changes, will likely successfully improve their operations. Like so many other tactics, failure to properly employ them or fully understand them can have disastrous results.
With regard to "pushing fire" with the hoseline, the analysis and conclusions are pretty verifiable. The problem is that only tells a small piece of the story, again, fully understanding the work UL/NIST put in along with FDNY, CFD and other fairly established FD's, is important. While the straight stream may not "push fire" or move air, the act of occluding a exhaust opening with just a little stream movement in the window can change the flowpath. When superheated smoke and gases suddenly cannot go out in one direction, they change direction and seek that low pressure. now we add in some added moisture, which makes the same temperature "feel" hotter, resulting in what so many of us have experienced: a sudden change in conditions. The NIST videos detailing the FDNY tests show the effects of improper exterior stream employment. That said, every set of tests, and there are many, all seem to show a rapid drop in interior temperatures in the immediate area where the exterior stream has been directed and those results extend out from there.
I would say there is as much danger if not more or continuing to do things the same as always as there is trying to employ this. If your FD is going to just start shooting water in from outside without understanding all of the processes, then the same FD was likely operating dangerously before any of this.As a FD that operates daily with too little first due staff, our focus is one getting the first line operating, if the exterior stream is indicated and can be done without measurably slowing the interior attack, then it will most likely be done. Utilizing a second line for an exterior stream is only likely where the second line is already been ordered due extension to an exposure. But as has been said above: situations dictate tactics, you must understand the tactics to be safe, regardless of which ones you utilize.

Sometimes, even in this scenario, putting water on the fire may be the best initial action. In our FD, we heavily refer to the 5 Basic Concepts laid out in Chapter 1 of the Fire Officer's Handbook of Tactics:
1. When proper manpower isn't available to do both rescue and extinguishment at the same time, rescue must be given priority.
2. When you don't have sufficient manpower to perform all the need tasks, perform those first that protect the greatest number of lives.
3. Remove those in greatest danger first.
4. When you have the staffing to do both rescue and fire attack at the same time, they must be coordinated.
5. Where there is no threat to occupants, firefighters lives should not be unduly endangered.
Again, understanding the conditions you face, the actual time to effect the rescue and a the likely challenges facing a "rescue only" approach may indicate that controlling the fire is the most appropriate first action. How imminent is the threat to the know rescue? Will you be able to make it? Will your actions make conditions worse such that an unsuccessful attempt will seal the victims fate? There is no one answer, except hoping the person making the decision at that moment is at the top of their game.

One of the hang-ups I have is calling the "resetting the fire" exterior stream hit: "Transitional Attack". Transitional attack has been a term that far predates any of this recent UL/NIST research. many fire service authors have written text in many well worn books describing Transitional Attack as employing one mode of attack while preparing for another. Such as cautiously sending in the first line to the interior while preparing for it to be ineffective by deploying defensive lines should the need to retreat be necessary. Or, conversely, using a master stream to knockdown an appreciable amount of visible fire before committing to the interior. In fact, a quick search shows that NFPA and IAFC defined "Transitional Attack" long ago and the current recommendation of the exterior fire stream fails to meet their definition on a few fronts.
In my view, the proper employment of the exterior stream should and will become just another step among those employed during a direct attack (offensive). Sometimes this step will be indicated, others times it will not, but it will not in and of itself, be a true mode of attack and thus should not be so named as to elevate its emphasis too greatly. Ultimately, I think this terminology leads to some of the skeptism as firefighters see us "abandoning the offensive attack for a transitional one", which really does not describe what is really indicated. We're merely indicating a "new" step along the way to the seat of the fire that will reduce temp's and speed our ability to get to the seat. At no time should this be taken to mean stop at the outside stream step and flow until the fire only needs mop up.

Sometimes, even in this scenario, putting water on the fire may be the best initial action. In our FD, we heavily refer to the 5 Basic Concepts laid out in Chapter 1 of the Fire Officer's Handbook of Tactics:
1. When proper manpower isn't available to do both rescue and extinguishment at the same time, rescue must be given priority.
2. When you don't have sufficient manpower to perform all the need tasks, perform those first that protect the greatest number of lives.
3. Remove those in greatest danger first.
4. When you have the staffing to do both rescue and fire attack at the same time, they must be coordinated.
5. Where there is no threat to occupants, firefighters lives should not be unduly endangered.
Again, understanding the conditions you face, the actual time to effect the rescue and a the likely challenges facing a "rescue only" approach may indicate that controlling the fire is the most appropriate first action. How imminent is the threat to the know rescue? Will you be able to make it? Will your actions make conditions worse such that an unsuccessful attempt will seal the victims fate? There is no one answer, except hoping the person making the decision at that moment is at the top of their game.

Sometimes, even in this scenario, putting water on the fire may be the best initial action. In our FD, we heavily refer to the 5 Basic Concepts laid out in Chapter 1 of the Fire Officer's Handbook of Tactics:
1. When proper manpower isn't available to do both rescue and extinguishment at the same time, rescue must be given priority.
2. When you don't have sufficient manpower to perform all the need tasks, perform those first that protect the greatest number of lives.
3. Remove those in greatest danger first.
4. When you have the staffing to do both rescue and fire attack at the same time, they must be coordinated.
5. Where there is no threat to occupants, firefighters lives should not be unduly endangered.
Again, understanding the conditions you face, the actual time to effect the rescue and a the likely challenges facing a "rescue only" approach may indicate that controlling the fire is the most appropriate first action. How imminent is the threat to the know rescue? Will you be able to make it? Will your actions make conditions worse such that an unsuccessful attempt will seal the victims fate? There is no one answer, except hoping the person making the decision at that moment is at the top of their game.

I stand corrected, I should refrain from the use of the words "always, never, and only" as they often are too restrictive when applied to opinions and commentary.
I guess I've not been exposed to very many firefighters who believe that "all defensive" is right or where we're heading. I have seen some arguments made that in some cases it is felt that new construction dictates a far less aggressive approach or almost a defensive unless rescue approach, but typically limited to new lightweight constructed unprotected residential structures. I think these also focus on too narrow a view of research. There is no way we can apply a one tactic fits all approach, not even to a particular structure. We need to instead be better at size-up, understanding how fire grows and spreads, appropriate tactics and the proper time and place for each tactic. Ultimately, I think we'll find that those who believe in the all one way or predominantly defensive approach will not prevail, as the American Fire Service still appears to attract mostly type "A" people who anticipate having to extend greater risk for others is part of the job. Not reckless risk, but more than the average person. Fires, buildings and human behavior is far too dynamic for a one size fits all approach.

Sometimes, even in this scenario, putting water on the fire may be the best initial action. In our FD, we heavily refer to the 5 Basic Concepts laid out in Chapter 1 of the Fire Officer's Handbook of Tactics:
1. When proper manpower isn't available to do both rescue and extinguishment at the same time, rescue must be given priority.
2. When you don't have sufficient manpower to perform all the need tasks, perform those first that protect the greatest number of lives.
3. Remove those in greatest danger first.
4. When you have the staffing to do both rescue and fire attack at the same time, they must be coordinated.
5. Where there is no threat to occupants, firefighters lives should not be unduly endangered.
Again, understanding the conditions you face, the actual time to effect the rescue and a the likely challenges facing a "rescue only" approach may indicate that controlling the fire is the most appropriate first action. How imminent is the threat to the know rescue? Will you be able to make it? Will your actions make conditions worse such that an unsuccessful attempt will seal the victims fate? There is no one answer, except hoping the person making the decision at that moment is at the top of their game.

The main issue here is that everyone is comparing FDNY's tactics, to their own and others. If your department can place 4 fully staffed engines, 3 full staffed ladders, a fully staffed rescue, 2 battalion chiefs on location, all trained to FDNY's minimum training standards, then by all means, compare away. FDNY's guys arrive on scene and each member basically has 1 function to perform... and that's it. 99.99% of other departments, when you arrive, are going to be expected to multitask and call audibles on the fly.
However, most of us are showing up with less then the NFPA's required 16 personnel for a single family residential home (2,000 sqft) within the first 8 minutes. That doesn't even account for larger McMansions or even high rise or OMDs. Each department must look at their manpower on any given moment, and make prudent tactical decisions based off of the situation that has been presented at that very moment.

Showing up with 2 guys and no officer on the first due engine, with no confirmed reports or identifying signs of people inside? Stretch your handline, IF NEEDED, give it a quick shot before you mask up, make entry and perform an aggressive interior attack, while your backup man and or second due companies search off the line.

Same staffing, but with confirmed reports of people trapped with a known location? Life above all else. Mask up, and either perform a normal search, or VES the area where the victim is expected to be.
Basement fire? Whats the harm of popping the bilco door, or venting a small basement window and giving it a quick shot, and allow the gasses to vent and cool, and maybe flash BEFORE you make entry and flash on you and your crew.
To sit here and say that every situation should require transitional (which, btw, is just a fancy name for a task that has been employed since the dawn of firefighting with a new fancy buzz name now) or strictly aggressive interior, or defensive attack, is ludicrous. Proper training, and knowledge of situational awareness and the ability to properly apply each individual tactic and strategy appropriately is what we should be discussing.
I highly recommend people read "Suburban Fire Tactics," by Jim Silvernail. He addresses issues that minimally staffed departments around the country face everyday, and goes over tactics and strategies to bring back and apply to your departments as necessary. Here is a fire engineering article he wrote that discusses some of the aforementioned points, and a link to purchase his book:
http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-164/issue-3/features/suburban-fire-tactics-prioritizing-functions-and-developing-preferred-operating-methods.html

https://books.google.com/books/about/Suburban_Fire_Tactics.html?id=QYDAxE_8e_QC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false

Very erudite and well presented response that for the most part I agree with. This tactic like all tactics has it's place and being educated on the dieferent tools at our disposal and when to use them should never be frowned upon. That said I do though take exception to this one sentence as I have personally experienced quite a different view:
As most know I spent a number of years doing contract firefighting overseas and in that capacity I worked with FF's from all over the U.S. and now Europe. Like FF's everywhere, we overseas engaged in tactical discussions frequently and at times even heatedly, especially when talking about aggressive interior operations. When I started back in 2004 there were probably 2 or 3 members out of 20 who advocated the "hitting it from the yard" tactic as THE primary means of attacking the average structure fire, specifically because they were taught and honestly believed that an "interior attack is too dangerous" in modern firefighting...their words not mine. Their departments made the conscious decision to change their fundamental strategy to an initial exterior attack every time at every fire as policy and justified that change by citing firefighter safety. Fast forward to 2015 and the number of my colleagues who come from departments that adhere to this principle has quadrupled to over a dozen or more, paid, volunteer and military out of 30. These are FFs from widely disparate departments ranging from North Carolina to Oregon, Indiana to Alabama and a host of places in between. They didn't know each other before being assigned to the base nor did their departments work together, the only thing they have in common is a taught belief that ""interior attack is too dangerous". The point being, the "push back " is not based on some kind of irrational fear of change, but rather resistance to a "one size fits all" "use this tactic always" philosophy that, in my personal experience anyway, seems to be spreading through the American fire service.