efdcapt115

Respectfully fireguy,
I don't know much about that neck of the woods you guys are talking about, so I won't comment on it. However, I take issue with ANY firefighter referring to fire apparatus as "toys." I recently rode with another firefighter who referred to his apparatus as I believe he said "a shiny red toy."
This isn't a lecture or anything. Fire apparatus are there for a deadly serious purpose. Those ladders, aerials, pumps and hoses might be the tools needed to pull a seriously burned victim from a raging fire, or get water on a fire to hopefully prevent that victim from burning to death, or dying of asphyxiation from toxic, choking, burning plastics, wood, or a thousand other things.
Firefighters definitely take pride in their apparatus. We love to wash them, test them and keep them ready for those times of need. We love to operate them.
Let's just keep our eyes on the objective of the mission. And it is serious, it is deadly, it is why we are/were there. To answer the call to action.
I don't think you'll hear too many cops refer to their weaponry or rigs as toys. Why should we be any different?
Have a safe day Bro.

The 2012 Summer Olympics are off and running. Many of us here probably watched the Opening Ceremony. Danny Boyle who directed "Slumdog Millionaire" put it all together.
For some reason the National Broadcasting Company decided there was a segment of the ceremony that would be edited out, and while it was happening we here in America got the treat of a Ryan Seacrest/Michael Phelps interview.
That segment it turns out was a tribute to the victims of the 7/7/2005 London bombings; Great Britain's 9/11.
Here's a link to view it. It's quite a beautiful and moving performance.
http://deadspin.com/...want-you-to-see
Never Forget.

Most Tactical Medic courses are generally 5 days long, some are up to 10 days, which is not an easy venture for most providers who are working 2 or 3 jobs and can't get the training on job time. I've had the opportunity to take a few Tac Medic programs, and in terms of the medical aspect, if you're a competent Paramedic, you're not going to really learn anything new. Needle decompression is needle decompression, surgical airways are surgical airways, IV's are IV's, and intubation is intubation. There are some distinct differences in the priorities of care (C-A-B instead of A-B-C, importance of tourniquets which we're now seeing in conventional EMS, use of hemostatic agents, zones of care, less importance on spinal immobilization, Medicine Across the Barricade, remote patient assessments, among other things) and the environment you're expected to operate in is obviously quite different. A lot of it is tailoring your conventional EMS skills to the tactical theatre of operations.
The other important aspect, and this depends on how you are integrated into the tactical operation, is the actual law enforcement tactics part of it. Weapons familiarization and safety, basic team movement, defensive tactics, understanding cover and concealment and how to properly utilize each, and so on are all aspects of training some medics may have to go through if they are going to be a fully integrated member of the "stack". If the role of the medic is a less aggressive one, as in they are staged in a warm zone and will only be called up to the target location once the scene is relatively secure, then they may be able to get away with a little less tactics training, but having a knowledge of the latter is still beneficial. The other important aspect is preserving the crime scene; what you should do and shouldn't do to help preserve evidence while still providing necessary patient care.
Having the training is great, but as you pointed out, unless your local PD allows you to train with them, integrate your medical skills, and develop SOP's regarding the medic's role and operational guidelines in a tactical situation, all the training in the world won't lead to a "seamless" joint operation because the left hand won't know what the right hand is doing. Your local PD doesn't necessarily need a tactical team, because in the event of an active shooter incident it's going to be the first responding patrol officers who are going to deal with the situation. If your local PD does have a tactical team, then you have to come up with SOP's to integrate a civilian TEMS component to the team, including monthly training and operational standards/guidelines. I already discussed the LODI/LODD benefits before.

The 2012 Summer Olympics are off and running. Many of us here probably watched the Opening Ceremony. Danny Boyle who directed "Slumdog Millionaire" put it all together.
For some reason the National Broadcasting Company decided there was a segment of the ceremony that would be edited out, and while it was happening we here in America got the treat of a Ryan Seacrest/Michael Phelps interview.
That segment it turns out was a tribute to the victims of the 7/7/2005 London bombings; Great Britain's 9/11.
Here's a link to view it. It's quite a beautiful and moving performance.
http://deadspin.com/...want-you-to-see
Never Forget.

Respectfully fireguy,
I don't know much about that neck of the woods you guys are talking about, so I won't comment on it. However, I take issue with ANY firefighter referring to fire apparatus as "toys." I recently rode with another firefighter who referred to his apparatus as I believe he said "a shiny red toy."
This isn't a lecture or anything. Fire apparatus are there for a deadly serious purpose. Those ladders, aerials, pumps and hoses might be the tools needed to pull a seriously burned victim from a raging fire, or get water on a fire to hopefully prevent that victim from burning to death, or dying of asphyxiation from toxic, choking, burning plastics, wood, or a thousand other things.
Firefighters definitely take pride in their apparatus. We love to wash them, test them and keep them ready for those times of need. We love to operate them.
Let's just keep our eyes on the objective of the mission. And it is serious, it is deadly, it is why we are/were there. To answer the call to action.
I don't think you'll hear too many cops refer to their weaponry or rigs as toys. Why should we be any different?
Have a safe day Bro.

The 2012 Summer Olympics are off and running. Many of us here probably watched the Opening Ceremony. Danny Boyle who directed "Slumdog Millionaire" put it all together.
For some reason the National Broadcasting Company decided there was a segment of the ceremony that would be edited out, and while it was happening we here in America got the treat of a Ryan Seacrest/Michael Phelps interview.
That segment it turns out was a tribute to the victims of the 7/7/2005 London bombings; Great Britain's 9/11.
Here's a link to view it. It's quite a beautiful and moving performance.
http://deadspin.com/...want-you-to-see
Never Forget.

The 2012 Summer Olympics are off and running. Many of us here probably watched the Opening Ceremony. Danny Boyle who directed "Slumdog Millionaire" put it all together.
For some reason the National Broadcasting Company decided there was a segment of the ceremony that would be edited out, and while it was happening we here in America got the treat of a Ryan Seacrest/Michael Phelps interview.
That segment it turns out was a tribute to the victims of the 7/7/2005 London bombings; Great Britain's 9/11.
Here's a link to view it. It's quite a beautiful and moving performance.
http://deadspin.com/...want-you-to-see
Never Forget.

Feel free to shoot me a private message here and I will try to get you some more details, or at least get you in touch with the program coordinator. They are in the final staging of receiving final DHS/FEMA approval for the program which will make it more readily available. It has been rolled out in the metro region (Minneapolis/St. Paul area) and we are starting to move it into the more suburban communities.
I realize that benefit laws vary from state to state and even department to department. I agree with Dinosaur that this is something that should be lobbied for. I am sure that we all recognize that much of what we do today is governed by the way it was 100 years ago - we need to be brought into 2012 and look toward the future. The risks we face today have changed and the services we provide have increased.
Agency Cooperation
One thing I have noticed is that 3E (and similar multi-agency training programs) brings people together. While it may be training and a policy that, hopefully, we never have to put to use, it gets people in the same room working together. I was raised on the east coast and grew up in emergency services there, so I understand the silos and even, unfortunately, the turf wars that exist. To be frank, its time to get over it. These "hostile events" require cooperation and coordination. There isn't such a thing as "that's not my job" anymore. The public doesn't care and won't tolerate that excuse. The person that is bleeding inside an empty classroom and going into shock doesn't care; they want help. We are all trained to recognize and manage risk. It is part of our job and what we do. I have a very close working relationship with our local law enforcement here. The only reason that exists is because we work to make it be that way. In closing, agencies that begin to plan for these hostile events may find themselves developing a better day-to-day working relationships between each other. We, as emergency first responders, know that we are there to help support one another, regardless of what our badge or patch says.

First off, having listened to the tapes, there was very little screaming. Agitation and frustration perhaps, but the officers of the Aurora PD were incredibly professional given what they were confronted with. Their dispatcher deserves an award, a raise, and a vacation, too. I don't know what they do in dispatch training out west as this is not the first time I've heard a remarkable dispatcher during a catastrophic incident. This is not a slight on our dispatchers here in the east, but there seems to be a consistency out west that is lacking here.
On to the subject of ICS.... were there even established branch directors as you describe or are you speculating on the possible organization? In your model who was the IC?
A formal structure seemed to evolve fairly quickly in each traditional discipline but how well integrated it was remains to be seen. FD/EMS talked about all kinds of division and group positions but how many frontline resources were pulled out of service to fill those roles further exacerbating the resource shortage?
Did the PD, FD, and EMS management form a single command post or were they all working in different locations playing the game of telephone to get messages out?
The first minutes of any critical incident are where ICS can be most valuable and is most often overlooked because you can claim the chaos defense when asked why things weren't done. If we don't properly implement ICS on the routine day to day stuff and drill/exercise on the bigger, less frequent stuff we're planning to fail. We don't need to assign "branch directors" but we do need to identify and communicate the location of the command post, who is in charge, where the staging area is and what resources are needed. We then need to establish objectives and start assigning resources to do that. All management 101 and all part of the ICS process. Big charts and fancy titles can be added as the brass gets there and needs to feel important or empowered.
Define "under control" or "safe" in a situation like that? One of the big problems that faced responders was the geographical size of the scene. This wasn't a single room or house with a person shot or otherwise assaulted inside. This was a movie theater complex at a suburban shopping mall.
I'm a cop at one entrance on one side of the building with multiple people shot, no direct threat to me or anyone else, and I'm calling for an ambulance. Is that under control? Should EMS respond? I'm going to bet that just the way active shooter protocols evolved from Columbine, so will improvements in the EMS integration into a tactical response at a large-scale incident.
If you're waiting for an "all-clear" you may be waiting for a while while some areas of the scene are safe and readily accessible. There is also going to be some risk to everyone because we probably won't know with any certainty if all the suspects are dealt with or hazards neutralized.
Lots of good points here. Training and exercise absolutely should be integrated (wouldn't that be nice?) and frequently test the credible worst case scenario. Unfortunately, we don't like to do that because we're not well prepared for the day to day stuff let alone the big one.
Just as Fire and EMS need to be included in the coordinated response, Fire and EMS need to recognize and embrace that there is risk inherent to the job and that risk must be accepted and managed. This doesn't mean take chances or become a dead hero but how can anyone possibly know when a scene like this one is really "safe"? Hours probably went by before anyone would say with any degree of accuracy and certainty that the scene in Aurora was safe because it probably took hours to search every theater and every room and all the vehicles, etc.etc.etc.
Scenarios like this one (not necessarily this big) need to be played out on white boards and tabletops and discussions had until we all improve our responses to them. This is not Monday morning quarterbacking but rather how we will improve in our fields.

People go under the assumption (not the original poster of this thread, he's just passing along information) that because agencies go through so much training and planning for catastrophic incidents, that when something horrific such as this MCI happens, things will/should go according to these static plans; drawn on white boards in our planning rooms, presented on Powerpoint and practiced time and again in our controlled environments on the drill field.
When something so horrendous happens, the first in officers are naturally going to be way ahead of the planning curve. Of course when they see multiple people injured, some obviously DOA, they're going to urgently ask for help.
The practiced and rehearsed response to these incidents is going to take time time to catch up to the real time action on the ground.
In this case if officers are possibly pleading for EMS and EMS is probably chomping at the bit to get in there and help; being removed from the scene gives the EMS personnel the ability to reasonably think that they should be waiting for the proper orders; a secure scene advisory to move in, etc.
As in every catastrophe, there are so many individual acts of heroism and valor that occur during and immediately after the event, they are hard to count. I think, with so much focus on sensationalism in media reporting, we should always recognize that none of these events are going to go exactly as they were presented to us on a white board in our training classrooms.
I also think that point has been made many times here on Bravo, but should be mentioned again.
My personal wish is for all emergency personnel who responded into this event to get the follow-up care that they are going to need, and certainly all of the victims and civilians who acted with courage and valor under fire, get the help and care they need as well.
Nobody, no matter how experienced, no matter how fearless and salty they may be, on any of our jobs can walk away from such an incident "untouched."
Once again, the emergency responders of this country, in this case Aurora, Co. did the best they could under extreme duress. I'm quite confident they ALL did an excellent job.

Nice story about Lenny and his bridge. http://www.lohud.com/article/20120728/NEWS02/307280070/Hiker-Lenny-Joyner-leaves-Eagle-Scout-legacy-park?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|Frontpage

From the Facebook Group wall post from one of the organizers of the event:
https://www.facebook.com/events/473678525978620/480121735334299/?notif_t=plan_mall_activity

This was sent to us by our brothers out west. Real class acts!

People go under the assumption (not the original poster of this thread, he's just passing along information) that because agencies go through so much training and planning for catastrophic incidents, that when something horrific such as this MCI happens, things will/should go according to these static plans; drawn on white boards in our planning rooms, presented on Powerpoint and practiced time and again in our controlled environments on the drill field.
When something so horrendous happens, the first in officers are naturally going to be way ahead of the planning curve. Of course when they see multiple people injured, some obviously DOA, they're going to urgently ask for help.
The practiced and rehearsed response to these incidents is going to take time time to catch up to the real time action on the ground.
In this case if officers are possibly pleading for EMS and EMS is probably chomping at the bit to get in there and help; being removed from the scene gives the EMS personnel the ability to reasonably think that they should be waiting for the proper orders; a secure scene advisory to move in, etc.
As in every catastrophe, there are so many individual acts of heroism and valor that occur during and immediately after the event, they are hard to count. I think, with so much focus on sensationalism in media reporting, we should always recognize that none of these events are going to go exactly as they were presented to us on a white board in our training classrooms.
I also think that point has been made many times here on Bravo, but should be mentioned again.
My personal wish is for all emergency personnel who responded into this event to get the follow-up care that they are going to need, and certainly all of the victims and civilians who acted with courage and valor under fire, get the help and care they need as well.
Nobody, no matter how experienced, no matter how fearless and salty they may be, on any of our jobs can walk away from such an incident "untouched."
Once again, the emergency responders of this country, in this case Aurora, Co. did the best they could under extreme duress. I'm quite confident they ALL did an excellent job.

People go under the assumption (not the original poster of this thread, he's just passing along information) that because agencies go through so much training and planning for catastrophic incidents, that when something horrific such as this MCI happens, things will/should go according to these static plans; drawn on white boards in our planning rooms, presented on Powerpoint and practiced time and again in our controlled environments on the drill field.
When something so horrendous happens, the first in officers are naturally going to be way ahead of the planning curve. Of course when they see multiple people injured, some obviously DOA, they're going to urgently ask for help.
The practiced and rehearsed response to these incidents is going to take time time to catch up to the real time action on the ground.
In this case if officers are possibly pleading for EMS and EMS is probably chomping at the bit to get in there and help; being removed from the scene gives the EMS personnel the ability to reasonably think that they should be waiting for the proper orders; a secure scene advisory to move in, etc.
As in every catastrophe, there are so many individual acts of heroism and valor that occur during and immediately after the event, they are hard to count. I think, with so much focus on sensationalism in media reporting, we should always recognize that none of these events are going to go exactly as they were presented to us on a white board in our training classrooms.
I also think that point has been made many times here on Bravo, but should be mentioned again.
My personal wish is for all emergency personnel who responded into this event to get the follow-up care that they are going to need, and certainly all of the victims and civilians who acted with courage and valor under fire, get the help and care they need as well.
Nobody, no matter how experienced, no matter how fearless and salty they may be, on any of our jobs can walk away from such an incident "untouched."
Once again, the emergency responders of this country, in this case Aurora, Co. did the best they could under extreme duress. I'm quite confident they ALL did an excellent job.

This event is a reminder of how our jobs as emergency responders is changing. Hats off to all of the responders - police, fire and ems - in Aurora for the courageous acts that day, including that of the dispatchers. I am sure there will be lessons learned from our brother and sister responders that we all can take home. Until such time, I won't comment on the events there but rather some of the lessons we have learned from other events.
Post analysis of the Columbine shooting and other high profile attacks revealed that first responders need to respond and react differently to hostile events. Hence new active shooter policies for police departments (i.e. rapid entry of patrol officers and not waiting for SWAT). One area that has been historically overlooked is how to treat/evacuate a mass number of victims from the "hot" zone. How do you reach and quickly extricate dozens, if not hundreds, of injured victims?
Fire and EMS need to be included as part of a coordinated response to a hostile event. Police quickly become overwhelmed. We (non law-enforcement) have been trained to wait for an "all clear" or to know the scene is completely "safe." Post incident analysis' has showed that this approach doesn't work. In Columbine, victims were bleeding out but were unable to be reached. Realistically, it can take upwards of a few hours for an area to be deemed safe (by our traditional definition).
There are efforts popping up across the county to address this issue. In Minnesota, for example, a program called 3E (3 Echo) is being rolled out that incorporates fire/ems into a coordinated response to a hostile event. The program is based on extensive research of past events both within the United States and across the world, taking best practices deploying in many countries (i.e. Israel) that see active terrorist activity, as well as research coming from the Iraq war. The program integrates police, fire and EMS into a coordinated, initial response with a goal to rapidly treat/evacuate massive numbers of patents within minutes (15-20 minutes or less) of a hostile event. From a fire/EMS perspective, it is a fairly significant shift in the paradigm of waiting blocks away for an "all clear" or for the scene to be 100% "safe." A collaborative approach will allow first responders to evaluate the risk/benefit, realizing that some risk will need to be taken. The key in this program is training, exercise and collaboration between first response agencies prior to an incident happening. Due to the sensitive and mission critical nature of the program, its training and policies, I can't go into much further detail online.
Our jobs are changing. The fire service isn't what it used to be 30-40 years ago. While we can only hope that events such as Columbine, Virginia Tech and now Aurora will not happen in our own community, we cannot ignore the reality that, in 2012, we need to take a better look at how we (police, fire and ems) will respond to a hostile event. Its our job.

One person claims over 1000 people turned out. I would be amazed if the entire hamlet of Wassaic could handle that much lol, but regardless, looks like an overwhelmingly amazing turnout!!

I never had the Honor of meeting Lenny. I never even had the chance to talk to him. But I would always read all of his post here on EMT Bravo. Through that I felt that I did know him. A young man with huge potential to offer. He dedicated his short life to treating the very sick and injuried. I wish I got to meet you Lenny. you were certainly a Credit to your generation.
We will ALL miss you my friend. My Condolunces to your family and friends, and to your co workers of the FDNY EMS.
Thank you for your services to the City of New York and all you have done to help others.
Rest in Peace Lenny.

Date: 07-26-12
Time: 10:05hrs.
Box: 1050
Area: Wingate
Location: 665 New York Ave.(Bing Maps)
Frequency: FDNY Brooklyn
Weather Conditions: Warm and Clear
Description Of Incident: Ladder 113 10-84(o/s) transmitting the 10-75(Working Fire) for Box 1050. Battalion 41 10-84(o/s) confirming a 10-75(Working Fire) for heavy fire showing from a 7-story brick OMD. Battalion 41 using All Hands on arrival for Box 1050. Battalion 41 reporting heavy fire on the top floor of a 7-story brick 200'x100' OMD. Battalion 41 requesting 1 & 1 S/C. 2-2(2nd Alarm) transmitted for Box 1050 by Battalion 41. Battalion 41 reporting heavy fire through the roof and cockloft. Battalion 41 requesting a Tower Ladder on the 2-2(2nd Alarm) Assignment. Battalion 41 reporting heavy fire on the top floor, cockloft, and through the roof of a large 7-story brick 200'x100' OMD. Battalion 41 requesting a Tower Ladder S/C on the 2-2(2nd Alarm) for Box 1050. 3-3(3rd Alarm) transmitted for Box 1050 by Battalion 41. Battalion 41 reporting heavy fire in the cockloft and advising Brooklyn Dispatch to be sure a Tower Ladder is assigned on the 3-3(3rd Alarm) Assignment. 4-4(4th Alarm) transmitted for Box 1050 by Field Comm. 1 by orders of Car 7(Brooklyn Borough Commander). Field Comm. 1 requesting 2 additional Ladder Companies and 2 additional Battalion Chiefs S/C on the 4-4(4th Alarm) for Box 1050. 5-5(5th Alarm) transmitted for Box 1050 by Field Comm. 1 by orders of Car 4(Chief of Operations). Car 4(Chief of Operations) requesting 2 additional Tower Ladders S/C above the 5-5(5th Alarm) for Box 1050. Field Comm. 1/Car 4(Chief of Operations) requesting Division 15 S/C on the 5-5(5th Alarm) for Box 1050. Field Comm. 1/Car 4(Chief of Operations) reporting heavy fire throughout the cockloft and throughout 18 apartments on the top floor w/fire through the roof. Brooklyn Dispatch advising Fall Back Step 3 implemented in Brooklyn. Field Comm. 1/Car 4(Chief of Operations) reporting evacuation tones sounded. Companies using aggressive exterior attack. 6-6(6th Alarm) transmitted for Box 1050 by Field Comm. 1 by orders of Car 3(Chief of Department). Car 3(Chief of Department) advising Brooklyn Dispatch that the 6-6(6th Alarm) Assignment will consist of 6 Engines and 2 Tower Ladders. Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting 1 additional R.A.C. Unit S/C on the 6-6(6th Alarm) for Box 1050. Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting Mobile Command Unit 1 S/C on the 6-6(6th Alarm) for Box 1050. Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting an additional R.A.C. Unit S/C on the 6-6(6th Alarm) for Box 1050. Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) reporting companies using exterior ops. w/5 Tower Ladder master streams in operation. Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting 2 additional Ladder Companies S/C on the 6-6(6th Alarm) for Box 1050. Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting 2 additional Ladder Companies S/C on the 6-6(6th Alarm) for Box 1050. 7-7(7th Alarm) transmitted by Field Comm. 1 by orders of Car 3(Chief of Department) for relief purposes. Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting 6 additional Engine Companies and 4 additional Ladder Companies S/C for relief on the 7-7(7th Alarm) for Box 1050. Numerous L/S/O's w/5 Tower Ladder master streams in operation. Ladder Companies opening up. All hands working. All searches negative. 11 victims injured and 1 victim seriously injured. 39 Firefighters, EMT's/Paramedics and 1 Red Cross Worker transported by EMS to hospitals for various minor injuries.
Reporter: sfrd18, exchief84(nycfire.net), mikeindabronx(nycfire.net)
Units Operating: FDNY Brooklyn; FDNY Brooklyn EMS; NYPD Brooklyn; NYC OEM; Red Cross
Telephone Alarm Box 1050 Assignment:
Engine 248, Engine 234, Engine 280
Ladder 113, Ladder 123
Battalion 41
10-75-1050(working Fire) Assignment:
Engine 240, Engine 310(S/C)
Ladder 132(F.A.S.T.), Ladder 147(S/C)
Battalion 38
Division 11
Squad 1
Rescue 2
R.A.C. 2
2-2-1050(2nd Alarm) Assignment:
Engine 249, Engine 281, Engine 235, Engine 284(Satellite Unit)
Ladder 174, Ladder 157(S/C)
Battalion 37(Safety), Battalion 48(Resource Unit Leader)
Rescue Battalion
Safety Battalion
Satellite 3
T.S.U. 2
Field Comm. 1
Car 7(Brooklyn Borough Commander)
3-3-1050(3rd Alarm) Assignment:
Engine 283, Engine 227, Engine 214, Engine 219
Ladder 124 Acting 111
Battalion 51, Battalion 44(Staging), Battalion 39(Air Recon.)
M.S.U. 1
Comm. Tac. Unit
4-4-1050(4th Alarm) Assignmnet:
Engine 231, Engine 220, Engine 239, Engine 217, Engine 262(Planning)
Ladder 122, Ladder 105, Ladder 148(S/C), Ladder 120(S/C)
Battalion 33(Planning), Battalion 40(S/C), Battalion 35(S/C)
Incident Management 1(Planning Unit)
Car 4(Chief of Operations)
5-5-1050(5th Alarm) Assignment:
Engine 202 Acting 234, Engine 257, Engine 226, Engine 282
Ladder 102, Ladder 101, Ladder 170(S/C), Ladder 119(S/C)
Division 15(S/C)
Car 3(Chief of Department)
6-6-1050(6th Alarm) Assignment:
Engine 210, Engine 250, Engine 279, Engine 228, Engine 233, Engine 230
Ladder 114, Ladder 172, Ladder 138 Acting 132(S/C), Ladder 111(S/C), Ladder 9 Acting 131(S/C), Ladder 176(S/C)
R.A.C. 5(S/C), R.A.C. 4(S/C)
Mobile Command Unit 1(S/C)
7-7-1050(7th Alarm) Assignment:
Engine 254, Engine 271, Engine 4 Acting 240, Engine 290, Engine 211(S/C), Engine 229(S/C), Engine 307(S/C), Engine 277(S/C), Engine 237(S/C), Engine 306 Acting 290(S/C)
Ladder 104, Ladder 162 Acting Ladder 104, Ladder 16 Acting 18(S/C), Ladder 163(S/C), Ladder 164 Acting 135(S/C), Ladder 130 Acting 111(S/C)
10:05hrs. - Brooklyn Dispatch transmitting the Telephone Alarm for Box 1050 for 665 New York Ave. between Hawthorne St. and Winthrop St.
10:09hrs. - Ladder 113 10-84(o/s) transmitting the 10-75(Working Fire) for Box 1050. Battalion 41 10-84(o/s) confirming a 10-75(Working Fire) for heavy fire showing from a 7-story brick OMD.
10:10hrs. - Battalion 41 using All Hands on arrival for Box 1050. Battalion 41 reporting heavy fire on the top floor of a 7-story brick 200'x100' OMD. Battalion 41 requesting 1 & 1 S/C.
10:12hrs. - 2-2(2nd Alarm) transmitted for Box 1050 by Battalion 41. Battalion 41 reporting heavy fire through the roof and cockloft. Battalion 41 requesting a Tower Ladder on the 2-2(2nd Alarm) Assignment.
10:15hrs. - Battalion 41 reporting heavy fire on the top floor, cockloft, and through the roof of a large 7-story brick 200'x100' OMD. Exposure # 1 is the street; Exposure # 2 is a street; Exposure # 3 is an alleyway; Exposure # 4 is a street. 2 L/S/O's w/Ladder Companies opening up. Fire is D/W/H.
10:17hrs. - Battalion 41 requesting a Tower Ladder S/C on the 2-2(2nd Alarm) for Box 1050.
10:23hrs. - 3-3(3rd Alarm) transmitted for Box 1050 by Battalion 41. Battalion 41 reporting heavy fire in the cockloft and advising Brooklyn Dispatch to be sure a Tower Ladder is assigned on the 3-3(3rd Alarm) Assignment. Staging will be at Parkside Ave. and Nostrand Ave.
10:27hrs. - Division 11 is 10-84(o/s).
10:33hrs. - 4-4(4th Alarm) transmitted for Box 1050 by Field Comm. 1 by orders of Car 7(Brooklyn Borough Commander).
10:38hrs. - Field Comm. 1 requesting 2 additional Ladder Companies and 2 additional Battalion Chiefs S/C on the 4-4(4th Alarm) for Box 1050.
10:44hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 7(Brooklyn Borough Commander) reporting 5 L/S/O's w/heavy fire in the cockloft and top floor. Fire is D/W/H.
10:48hrs. - Car 4(Chief of Operations) is 10-84(o/s).
10:52hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 7(Brooklyn Borough Commander) reporting primary searches on the top floor, "A" wing are negative.
10:55hrs. - 5-5(5th Alarm) transmitted for Box 1050 by Field Comm. 1 by orders of Car 4(Chief of Operations). Car 4(Chief of Operations) requesting 2 additional Tower Ladders S/C above the 5-5(5th Alarm) for Box 1050. Staging will be at New York Ave. and Clarkson Ave.
11:03hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 4(Chief of Operations) requesting Division 15 S/C on the 5-5(5th Alarm) for Box 1050.
11:07hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 4(Chief of Operations) reporting heavy fire throughout the cockloft and throughout 18 apartments on the top floor w/fire through the roof. 5 L/S/O's. Fire remains D/W/H.
11:09hrs. - Brooklyn Dispatch advising Fall Back Step 3 implemented in Brooklyn.
11:18hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 4(Chief of Operations) reporting evacuation tones sounded. Companies using aggressive exterior attack. Fire remains D/W/H.
11:20hrs. - Car 3(Chief of Department) is 10-84(o/s).
11:27hrs. - 6-6(6th Alarm) transmitted for Box 1050 by Field Comm. 1 by orders of Car 3(Chief of Department). Car 3(Chief of Department) advising Brooklyn Dispatch that the 6-6(6th Alarm) Assignment will consist of 6 Engines and 2 Tower Ladders.
11:40hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) reporting primary searches on the 4th, 5th, and 6th floors are negative. Fire remains D/W/H.
11:41hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting 1 additional R.A.C. Unit S/C on the 6-6(6th Alarm) for Box 1050.
11:51hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting Mobile Command Unit 1 S/C on the 6-6(6th Alarm) for Box 1050.
12:05hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting an additional R.A.C. Unit S/C on the 6-6(6th Alarm) for Box 1050.
12:24hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) reporting companies using exterior ops. w/5 Tower Ladder master streams in operation. All searches are negative. Fire is now P/W/H.
12:30hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting 2 additional Ladder Companies S/C on the 6-6(6th Alarm) for Box 1050.
13:20hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting 2 additional Ladder Companies S/C on the 6-6(6th Alarm) for Box 1050.
13:36hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) reporting fire is u/c. Brooklyn Dispatch advising duration of incident: 3 hours and 32 minutes.
13:42hrs. - 7-7(7th Alarm) transmitted by Field Comm. 1 by orders of Car 3(Chief of Department) for relief purposes.
14:23hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting 3 additional Engine Companies S/C for relief on the 7-7(7th Alarm) for Box 1050.
14:48hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting 3 additional Engine Companies S/C for relief on the 7-7(7th Alarm) for Box 1050.
15:03hrs. - Field Comm. 1/Car 3(Chief of Department) requesting 4 additional Ladder Companies S/C for relief on the 7-7(7th Alarm) for Box 1050.
NY Post Article
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http://www.cambio.co...nk2&pLid=184808

This is quite shocking, the whole situation. I'm asking myself "is this really happening?" It's surreal. ny10570 who we now know his name is Lenny Joyner, see his photo on the Denver news story, has been a regular productive member of this board for years. We know his political leanings, his compassion for others, his decency....yet most of us didn't know him personally.
I wish I had.
To those members here who had the honor of knowing him, condolences to you all. We all share in your grief.
For all of us here who care, who feel, please take care of yourselves now. Don't be tempted to grab the beers or anything else to drown the pain away.
Talk about it. Write about it. Share your feelings with those of us here who care for you and want you to be okay. That's what this site is about. A Fraternity of sorts. Times like these are the most testing for everybody. Talk about it at the firehouse, the precinct, the ambulance quarters.
Lenny got called home to God way too early, yet he obviously died doing what he wanted to be doing. Living his life the way he wanted it to be. Quite an adventurist it seems. I imagine he was quite ecstatic to reach that peak, to see that view, to be closer to his God.
Our board has another hero now. And his name is Lenny Joyner. God Rest In Peace.
Edit: Last name proper spelling.

If you wish to make a donation on behalf of Lenny the Joyner family has requested they be sent here :
Mountain Rescue Aspen
630 West Main Street
Aspen, CO 81611

Live every day to the fullest, for the past is gone and the future is not guaranteed....

Go Easy Officer Rubio-Pavon. Thoughts and condolences go out to his family and the Brighton PD. They did a great thing to make this young mans last days memorable.

Here's a shot of TL-75's 1990 rig brand new: